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2ABSTRACT
On 18 March 1938 Mexican labour problems in 
the oil industry culminated in Mexican President 
Ldzaro Cdrdenas' decision to expropriate the 
holdings of 17 American, Dutch and British oil 
companies.^ The purpose of this thesis is to fill 
the gaps in the literature on the Mexican oil 
nationalisation by analyzing the policies of the 
oil companies, and comparing and analyzing in 
detail how policy was determined in both Britain 
and the United States at a time when Britain was 
trying to win US cooperation in the face of 
increasing hostilities in Europe and the Far East. 
While Whitehall wanted US cooperation in taking a 
firm stance against Mexico, Washington refused. 
Washington’s failure to cooperate with London is 
consistent with its resentment of Britain's still 
extensive trade relations with several South 
American countries and its attempts to form 
preferential trade agreements at the Ottawa 
conference of 1932 and subsequently an exclusive 
sterling bloc. Also, Washington's pursuit of the 
Good Neighbor policy precluded any association with
1 The companies included Mexican Eagle, which was managed 
and partly owned by the British and Dutch Royal/Dutch Shell, 
as well as subsidiaries of the American companies Standard 
Oil of California, Standard Oil of New Jersey and Sinclair 
Oil.
3the tough policy adopted by Britain. Despite its 
refusal to be associated with Britain on this 
matter, Washington ended up taking a hard line 
towards Mexico, but American officials went to 
great lengths to make policy appear consistent with 
the Good Neighbor policy.
Totally reliant on overseas oil at a time when 
war seemed imminent, policy-makers in Britain 
immediately decided to prevent other countries from 
following Mexico's example by showing Mexico's 
policy to be a failure. Officials in Whitehall 
responsible for oil policy believed that secure 
access to foreign oil necessitated British 
ownership and control of oil supplies abroad 
whenever possible. Not only did Whitehall's 
concern about oil supplies in war focus policy­
makers, but the governmental machinery for 
formation of oil policy allowed for a consistent 
policy towards Mexico. Washington on the other 
hand lacked such machinery, and American officials 
displayed inconsistency in their policy toward 
Mexico. Also, the United States had plentiful 
indigenous supplies of oil, and Washington's main 
concern, to the disappointment of Whitehall, was 
increased trade with Mexico and other nations, 
rather than defending the more specific interests 
of the oil companies whose properties had been 
expropriated in Mexico.
4CONTENTS
Acknowledgements.................................. 5
Abbreviations......................................6
Int roduct ion...................................... 7
1. Setting the Stage.............................. 24
2. Anglo-American Tension before the Expropriation: 
November 1936-March 1938.......................... 50
3. Washington's Reaction to the Expropriation:
March 1938-November 1938.......................... 88
4. The Reaction of Whitehall and the Oil 
Companies: March 1938-November 1938............. 138
5. The Boycott:
March 1938-September 1939........................182
6. US and Oil Company Policy after the Agrarian 
Settlement: November 1938-May 1940.............. 227
7. Whitehall's Policy after the Agrarian 
Settlement: November 1938-May 1940.............. 270
8. The American Settlement:
May 1940-October 1943............................ 305
9. Britain and the American Settlement:
May 1940-June 1943 ............................... 346
Conclusion........................................387
Hull's Note to Mexico City,
26 March 1938 ................................... 393
O'Malley's Note from His Majesty's Government 
to the Mexican Government, 11 May 1938.......... 397
Dramatis Personae................................ 400
Bibliography..................................... 408
Archival Sources Consulted
but Not Referred to.............................. 420
5ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I owe a debt of gratitude to several people, 
without whom this project would not have been 
possible. First among these is my supervisor Dr. 
Robert Boyce who provided invaluable criticisms, 
suggestions, guidance and support. I am also 
grateful to Professor Donald Cameron Watt, under 
whose guidance this project began, for continuing 
to give tremendously constructive input even in the 
final stages of this project. Any errors, however, 
are entirely my own.
I would also like to thank the helpful staff 
at the Churchill Archive Centre, the Bank of 
England, the Public Record Office, the British 
Library of Political and Economic Science, the 
Science Museum Library, the Shell International 
Archives Centre, the National Archives in 
Washington, the Library of Congress, the Franklin 
Roosevelt Library , the British Petroleum Archives, 
the National Library in Dublin and the University 
Library in Birmingham.
The generosity of the Central Research Fund, 
the London Goodenough Trust and Fellowship House is 
also gratefully acknowledged. I would also like to 
thank Professor Roy MacLeod for the helpful 
criticism he provided.
Last but by no means least I would like to 
thank my family and friends for their unwavering 
support and encouragement.
ABBREVIATIONS
CID-Committee of Imperial Defence 
Cmd-Command
CTM-Mexican General Workers Union 
FO-Foreign Office
HMSO-His Majesty's Stationery Office (before 6 
February 1952); Her Majesty's Stationery Office 
(from 6 February 1952)
PP-Parliamentary Papers
RG-Record Group
STPRM-Mexican Syndicate of Oil Workers
Vol-volume
7INTRODUCTION
On 18 March 1938 Mexican President Ldzaro 
Cdrdenas issued a decree expropriating the 
properties of most of the foreign firms engaged in 
the oil industry, including subsidiaries of Anglo- 
Dutch Royal Dutch/Shell^ and the American 
companies, Sinclair Consolidated, Standard Oil of 
California and Standard Oil of New Jersey.2 His 
policy reflected a resurgence of the nationalism 
and zeal for social and economic reform which had 
characterised the Mexican revolution since 1910, at 
which time foreigners controlled nearly half of 
Mexico's wealth, and only 3 percent of the Mexican 
people owned land.3 in an effort to redress the 
imbalance, Mexican presidents from 1915 
expropriated American-held agricultural lands and 
distributed them among needy Mexicans, and in June 
1937, Cdrdenas expropriated National Railways, a 
company partly owned by US interests, which 
operated approximately 55 percent of the railroad
 ^In some of the published primary material, the subsidiary 
of Royal Dutch/Shell is referred to as 'Compania Mexicana de 
Petroleo "El Aguila'. Throughout this thesis, it will be 
referred to by its English name, 'Mexican Eagle*.
2 The expropriation decree excluded two small companies, 
Titania and Mercedes, which were subsidiaries of a company 
owned by Standard Oil of New Jersey and possessed extensive 
leases and concessions before the expropriation.
3 Cronon, E. David: Josephus Daniels in Mexico (Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1960), pp. 32-33.
8trackage in Mexico. Cardenas' policies, which 
catered to the revolutionary ideals, won him and 
his successor Manuel Avila Camacho widespread 
domestic approval except among oil workers 
themselves who had been influenced by anarcho- 
syndicalist thought and wanted more control of the 
oil industry than the management of Pemex, the 
government oil company, allowed.4
The Mexican expropriation was not a novelty to 
the oil companies, Washington or London. In 1917 
the Russian Bolsheviks seized the oil properties of 
Shell and Nobel Brothers Petroleum Producing 
Company, which later sold its interests to Standard 
Oil of New Jersey, and the companies never 
recovered their investment. In Persia in 1932, the 
shah cancelled the concession of Anglo-Persian, in 
which the British government was the majority 
shareholder, but the matter was settled within a 
few months by referring it to the League of Nations 
after which the concession was renegotiated. In 
March 1937, the Bolivian government seized the 
concession of a subsidiary of Standard Oil of New 
Jersey after the company had expressed interest in 
selling it, and by 1942 the Bolivian government 
agreed to compensate the company for the concession
4 Ashby, Joe C.: Organized Labour and the Mexican Revolution 
under Ldzaro Cardenas (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1967), chapter 11.
9and its properties.5 what makes the Mexican 
expropriation doubly interesting for the 
international historian is the fact that it 
occurred five days after Hitler's Anschluss of 
Austria. The response of the British and American 
governments thus had to take into account not only 
the companies' interests but also the implications 
for national security.
On 19 November 1941, days before the Japanese 
attack on Pearl Harbor, Washington, in an effort to 
strengthen defence cooperation with Mexico, 
formally agreed to allow Mexico to compensate the 
American oil companies. Washington made no mention 
of British oil interests or the fact that both 
British and American companies, which had formed a 
united front against the Mexican government, 
objected strenuously to compensation. Washington's 
disregard of British interests was typical of US- 
Mexican negotiations since 1937. From the start of 
the labour troubles in Mexico which led to the 
expropriation, Washington had far more ability to 
influence the Mexican government than London 
despite the fact that Mexican Eagle, which was 
managed and partly owned by Royal Dutch/Shell, had 
been responsible for 63 per cent of Mexican 
production while American interests had been 
responsible for merely 27 per cent. The state
5 Wood, Bryce: The Making of the Good Neighbor Policy (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1961), pp. 192-197.
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department, however, ignored requests from both 
London and the American oil companies to represent 
British oil interests. The resulting tension 
between London and Washington reflected the wider, 
long-standing conflict between Britain's pursuit of 
oil security and America's smouldering resentment 
of any commercial activity which smacked of 
imperialism - conflict that had manifested itself 
earlier in Anglo-American oil rivalry in Central 
America and the Middle East. While Britain had no 
significant known domestic oil and, therefore, had 
to rely on sources of oil from abroad, the United 
States in 1938 had plentiful local supplies. But 
this fact did not stop Americans from feeling 
vulnerable to British economic 'imperialism' and 
resentful at British control of so much of the 
world's raw materials overseas.6
The primary purpose of this thesis is to 
analyse Washington's and London's policies on 
Mexican oil in the context of Anglo-American 
relations from 1937, when Mexican labour challenged 
the oil companies' position, until Washington's 
agreement with Mexico in late 1941. Although the 
archives of Shell shed little light on Mexican 
Eagle's policy and the archives of the American 
companies remain inaccessible for the relevant time
6 Memorandum by Balfour on the Mexican Oil Question, 1 
December 1938, F0 371 22776 [A 8808/10/26]; Yergin, Daniel: 
The_Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil. Money and Power (New 
York: Simon and Schuster, 1991), p. 272.
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period, the thesis will also analyse the policies 
of the oil companies as they tried to persuade 
Washington to coerce Mexico into returning the 
properties. Their decision in 1943 to agree to the 
settlement Washington had negotiated in 1941 will 
also be explained. It is beyond the scope of this 
study, however, to consider Mexican policy in any 
detail.
THE LITERATURE
Despite the importance of Britain's stake in 
the Mexican oil industry and the acrimony between 
the United States and Britain over oil resources, 
the literature on British oil policy has so far 
neglected to provide a detailed analysis of 
Britain's reaction to the expropriation and analyze 
the problem in sufficient depth from the point of 
view of Anglo-American relations. D.J. Payton- 
Smith's official history, Oil: A Study of War-time 
Policy and Administration (London: Her Majesty's 
Stationery Office, 1971) mentions the Mexican 
expropriation only fleetingly despite the fact that 
it caused so much concern among British policy­
makers about oil supplies during wartime. Brian S. 
McBeth's British Oil Policy. 1919-1939 (London: 
Frank Cass, 1985) briefly analyses the British 
attitude to the Mexican problem and touches on the
12
expropriation's implications for British defence 
and London's failure to get Washington to take a 
strong stand in the matter. It, however, relies 
mainly on British sources and does not treat the 
matter in the context of Anglo-American relations. 
Lorenzo Meyer's Su Maiestad Britanica contra la 
Revolucion Mexicana. 1900-1950 (Colegio de Mexico: 
Centro de Estudios Internacionales, 1991) provides 
an excellent analysis of Anglo-Mexican relations, 
but also omits a detailed analysis of the Anglo- 
American context.
Maria Paz Salinas' thesis, 'The International 
Dimensions of the Cdrdenas Government, 1934-1940' 
(Ph.D. dissertation, University of London, 1985) 
draws on both British and Mexican government 
sources, but approaches the problem primarily from 
the Mexican angle and ends the study when Cdrdenas 
left office in 1940. John F. Thynne's thesis, 
'British Policy on Oil Resources, 1936-1951, with 
Particular Reference to the Defence of British 
Controlled Oil in Mexico, Venezuela and Persia' 
(Ph.D. dissertation, University of London, 1987) 
devotes one chapter to the British government's 
reaction to the Mexican expropriation and its 
efforts to elicit the support of the government of 
the United States, but makes little attempt to 
analyse the matter from the point of view of Anglo- 
American relations and to analyse Washington's
13
policy adequately. Ernest Gilman in 'Economic 
Aspects of Anglo-American Relations in the Era of 
Chamberlain and Roosevelt, 1937-1940' (Ph.D. 
dissertation, University of London, 1976) devotes 
only twenty pages to the Mexican oil expropriation 
and ends the study before the Mexican-American 
settlement.
Many excellent studies exist on Anglo-American 
economic, political and military relations in this 
period, among them C.A. MacDonald, The United 
States, Britain and Appeasement, 1936-1939 (London 
and Basingstoke: The Macmillan Press, 1981); David 
Reynolds, The Creation of The Anglo-American 
Alliance. 1937-1941: A Study in Competitive.Co­
operation (London: Europa, 1981); Donald Cameron 
Watt, Succeeding John Bull: America in Britain's 
Place (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1984); Alan Dobson, The Politics of the Anglo- 
American Economic Special Relationship. 1940-1987
(Sussex: Wheatsheaf Books, 1988); and Alan Dobson, 
US Wartime Aid to Britain. 1940-1946 (London: Croom 
Helm, 1986). None, however, mentions oil and 
Mexico. A detailed analysis of British and 
American reactions to the Mexican oil 
nationalisation should, therefore, complement the 
existing literature on Anglo-American relations.
While much literature exists on Washington's 
reaction, few studies analyse Washington's policy 
in detail. Clayton Koppes in 'The Good Neighbor
14
Policy and the Nationalisation of Mexican Oil' 
Journal of American history (June, 1982) rightly 
presents Washington's reaction as consistent with 
the Good Neighbor policy, coercion by economic and 
political means rather than military intervention, 
which Washington had used in the region earlier.
The state department's influencing the treasury to 
stop purchasing silver from Mexico after the 
expropriation helped eventually drive the ailing 
peso off the foreign exchange market. As Lorenzo 
Meyer in Mexico and the United States in the Oil 
Controversy. 1918-1942 (Austin: University of Texas 
Press, 1972) points out, Secretary of State Cordell 
Hull's note of 26 March 1938 requesting Mexico to 
pay compensation before Washington could recognise 
the expropriation as legal was far more malign in 
its intent than its words alone conveyed, since it 
was well known that Mexico was in no position to 
pay. It was in effect an unneighbourly attempt by 
the colossus of the north to give Mexico no other 
choice but to return the oil properties.
The scholarly literature on Washington's 
reaction, however, does not adequately explain what 
motivated the state department. Bryce Wood's The 
Making of the Good Neighbor Policy (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1961), E. David Cronon's 
Joseohus Daniels in Mexico (Madison: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1960), Meyer's Mexico and the 
United States in the Oil Controversy and Daniel
15
Yergin's brief account of Washington's reaction in 
The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money and Power 
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992) show that the 
state department balanced the conflicting concerns 
of the oil companies on the one hand and American 
defence interests in Mexico on the other. They all 
rightly attribute Washington's agreement with 
Mexico in November 1941 to concerns about defence. 
They, however, do not do justice to the complexity 
of Hull's and Undersecretary of State Sumner 
Welles' attitudes toward the oil companies.
Dick Steward's Trade and Hemisphere: The Good 
Neighbor Policy and Reciprocal Trade (Columbia: 
University of Missouri Press, 1975), which briefly 
narrates Washington's efforts to get a reciprocal 
trade agreement with Mexico and shows how the oil 
expropriation obstructed this goal for several 
years, shows that Hull's primary focus was his 
reciprocal trade agreements programme rather than 
protection of the oil companies. Archival evidence 
indeed confirms that Hull never considered full 
support of the oil companies. Rather, he tried to 
further the broader cause of American commercial 
interests abroad, and his actions must be 
interpreted in light of his desire to establish a 
trade agreement with Mexico rather than any strong 
loyalty to the oil companies.
Studies such as Lorenzo Meyer's recognise 
Washington's pursuit of conflicting commercial and
16
defence concerns. However, they do not explain the 
main actors' responses to the dilemma or analyse 
them in the wider context of the administration's 
concerns about German and Japanese aggression. The 
literature on the Mexican oil nationalisation also 
largely ignores the struggle for influence among 
officials in Washington. E. David Cronon's 
analysis of the relationship between Hull, US 
Ambassador to Mexico Josephus Daniels and President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt is laudable, but both he and 
Lorenzo Meyer pass over the struggle between Sumner 
Welles and Hull, who broadly agreed with one
another on policy toward Mexico but struggled for
control over foreign policy-making. Although 
Welles' private papers were closed while this 
thesis was being researched, the state department 
documents provide sufficient material to explain 
his behaviour with regard to policy toward Mexico.7 
After explaining the early history of oil in 
Mexico, the formation of policy in Washington and
London, and the attitude of the oil companies in
the first chapter, chapter two examines the 
reactions of the oil companies to the events 
culminating in the oil expropriation and the 
tension between Washington and London as Cdrdenas 
challenged the oil industry. The third chapter
^ Irwin Gellman treats the relationship between Hull, 
Roosevelt and Welles in a broader context in Secret Affairs: 
Franklin Roosevelt. Cordell Hull, and Sumner Welles 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995) .
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explains Washington's reaction to the expropriation 
before the US agreement with Mexico in November 
1938 settling the outstanding debts Mexico owed US 
interests after the expropriation of farmlands from 
1915. It also shows how policy-makers were faced 
with a dilemma over whether to placate Mexico for 
defence purposes or stand up for US commercial 
interests abroad, and in November 1938, the concern 
for security led Cordell Hull to agree to a 
compromise settlement which set a precedent that 
was deeply unpopular among the oil interests. The 
fourth chapter examines Whitehall's and the oil 
companies' bitter reactions to Washington's refusal 
of cooperation during the same time period. The 
oil companies were so determined to secure the 
return of their oil properties that they suspended 
discussions with Cdrdenas. Also during that time, 
Mexico severed relations with Britain, although a 
detailed analysis of the diplomatic correspondence 
shows that this event was largely due to the 
provocative behaviour of British Minister to Mexico 
Owen St. Clair O'Malley.
The fifth chapter analyses the boycott of 
Mexican oil by the expropriated oil companies 
between March 1938 and the start of the war. As is 
shown, both American and British oil companies not 
affected by the expropriation helped Mexico find 
markets for its oil, thus posing a substantial 
challenge to the boycott. The reactions of
18
Washington and London to these companies and the 
countries wishing to purchase the oil in turn 
illustrate the main differences in American and 
British priorities in the Mexican oil matter.
The sixth chapter describes Sinclair Oil's 
desire to make a settlement with Mexico, which 
prompted efforts by the other American and British 
oil companies to get Washington to stand up for 
their interests. The oil companies' plan involved 
staging abortive negotiations with Mexico to 
convince Washington that Mexico City was 
unreasonable. Washington, however, continued its 
policy of compromise, and Sinclair Oil agreed to 
accept minimal compensation from Mexico in April 
1940. Chapter seven describes London's continued 
resentment of Washington's policy during this time. 
It also resumes the analysis of the boycott after 
the start of war when the Allied blockade made the 
selling of Mexican oil to Germany nearly 
impossible. Chapter eight analyses Washington's 
response to the growing need for Mexico's 
solidarity in the event of war and continued desire 
to protect US commercial interests. It also 
explains why Washington, after Hull and Welles 
substantially breached diplomatic protocol with the 
Mexican ambassador in 1941, finally reached a 
settlement with Mexico without the consent of the 
oil companies. Chapter nine explains Britain's 
reactions to US negotiations with Mexico during
19
this time. It also explains Whitehall's decision 
to renew relations with Mexico, Britain's 
bitterness at Washington's settlement and the 
renewed determination of the board of trade to 
increase trade with Mexico despite the apparent 
efforts of the United States to close British 
interests out of the oil industry there.
Finally, conclusions are drawn which address 
the themes omitted by the existing secondary 
literature. The issue of Mexican oil provided a 
mild irritant in Anglo-American relations. 
Whitehall's reliance upon Washington and its 
resentment toward Washington are evident in the 
comments and actions of policy-makers as they tried 
to secure Washington's support for British oil 
interests. Officials in Washington, however, 
expressed their antipathy toward British interests 
tacitly, by not cooperating with any of Britain's 
requests for help. Washington regarded British 
efforts to obtain its cooperation in the Mexican 
issue as yet another instance of Britain trying to 
get the United States to pull its chestnuts out of 
the fire as had occurred in the First World War. 
Washington's non-cooperation with Britain was a 
symptom of American resentment of British 
imperialistic activity in general and in the 
western hemisphere in particular. Whitehall 
officials in turn resented what they regarded as 
Washington's unwillingness to allow British oil
20
interests to work overseas supplies of oil, which 
they desperately needed. Despite Whitehall's 
anger, the fact that Britain needed US help in the 
war made retaliation unthinkable.
Second, British policy was far more focused 
than Washington's. Although Britain did not suffer 
from any major oil shortages before the American 
settlement of November 1941, its reliance on oil 
supplies abroad was central to the decisions 
officials in Whitehall made about the matter, and 
on the whole they tended single-mindedly to protect 
the interests of Mexican Eagle. Also, in Britain 
there was no tradition of Progressivism and 
muckrakers, the name President Theodore Roosevelt 
gave to journalists who vilified big business in 
widely circulated magazines such as McClures and 
Collier's .8 It can also be said that British 
policy-makers lacked options and influence 
effectively to deal with the matter, especially 
after the break in relations with Mexico. After 
Mexico severed relations, however, policy-makers 
did the best they possibly could to make a negative 
example of Mexico to discourage other oil suppliers 
from taking foreign oil properties.
® From the turn of the century Progressivism was a political 
reaction against the results of industrialisation including 
poverty among urban working classes, the corrupting 
influences of cities and the power of big business which 
exploited labour. One such muckraker who directed a hostile 
campaign against Nelson Rockefeller's Standard Oil was Ida 
Tarbell.
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Because Washington unlike Britain had 
plentiful oil supplies in the US, Hull did not feel 
compelled to make maintaining access to overseas 
supplies his main priority. Instead, he focused on 
achieving a Mexican-American trade agreement, part 
of his reciprocal trade agreements program, based 
on the theory that close ties of finance and trade 
would maintain peace between nations. He, 
therefore, set out to establish a standard of 
respect for US interests investing in Mexico before 
a trade agreement could be established.
Instead of demanding the return of the 
expropriated properties, Hull adhered to the Good 
Neighbor policy ostensibly by formally recognising 
the expropriation. At the same time, however he 
used economic sanctions to intimidate Mexico City 
into returning the properties. Hull influenced the 
Treasury to halt direct silver purchases, 
drastically reduce the Mexican quota for oil 
imports, and stopped federal agencies from 
purchasing Mexican oil. The oil companies and the 
British government also stopped purchasing Mexican 
oil and influenced other companies to do the same. 
The boycott, however, was not that effective 
between the expropriation and the start of the war. 
It was only until after the Allied blockade started 
that they were able to cut Mexico off from foreign 
markets
22
Although Mexico continued to refuse to return 
the properties, Hull, inspired by Daniels, decided 
in November 1941 to come to an oil agreement with 
Mexico involving compensation and also to lay the 
foundations for a reciprocal trade agreement. As 
the thesis will demonstrate, however, Daniels did 
not rescue Mexican-American relations from the 
brink of disaster after the insulting diplomatic 
gaffes of Hull and Welles, as E. David Cronon 
argues in Josephus Daniels in Mexico. While 
Daniels played an important role in the signing of 
the November agreement, the shared awareness in 
Washington and Mexico City of common security needs 
rather than the role of a single diplomat made the 
agreement possible.
The fact that whoever had the approval of 
President Roosevelt had the most influence over 
policy and the struggle for influence that ensued 
also caused inconsistencies in US policy. Daniels 
and Roosevelt had great sympathy for Cdrdenas' 
decree and took liberties with the state 
department's policy by sending messages to Mexico 
that contradicted those of Hull and Welles. If the 
president and ambassador had been solely in charge 
of Mexican policy Washington would not have 
suffered any of its inconsistencies, but Roosevelt 
could not maintain a constant watch over Mexican 
matters; he also relished differences of opinion
23
among members of his cabinet and the administration
as a whole. As Hull later said of him:
Mr. Roosevelt seldom intervened when 
his Cabinet officers or principal 
assistants got into quarrels among 
themselves. He gave the impression 
almost of being a spectator looking 
on and enjoying the drama.9
As the thesis will later show, both Welles and 
Hull straddled conflicting defence and commercial 
objectives in forming policy toward Mexico.
Welles' behaviour emerges particularly lacking in 
coherence. He acted consistently with Hull's 
policy some of the time, but would also support 
Roosevelt's and Daniels' reactions to the problem 
which directly contradicted Hull's preferred course 
of action and assumptions about the matter. This 
inconsistency in behaviour can perhaps be 
attributed to his desire to gain influence in the 
administration at Hull's expense because whenever 
Roosevelt or Daniels were paying attention to the 
issue, he seemed to agree with them. As the thesis 
will also show, such inconsistent behaviour and 
competition for influence among officials in 
Washington greatly contributed to the disjointed 
nature of US policy and contrasts with the 
formation of policy in Britain.
9 Hull, Cordell: The Memoirs of Cordell Hull. Vol. 1 
(London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1948), p. 205.
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CHAPTER ONE 
SETTING THE STAGE
EARLY HISTORY OF OIL IN MEXICO
Foreign oil prospecting in Mexico started in 
1884 when Porfirio Diaz, Mexico's dictator from 
1876 to 1880 and from 1884 to 1911, ended years of 
Spanish legal tradition which Mexico had inherited. 
Spanish laws had stated that substances in the 
subsoil belonged to the state and that individuals 
needed licenses to exploit them.l To attract 
foreign capital for modernizing Mexico, Diaz gave 
away vast tracts of land and offered generous terms 
to foreigners willing to invest in projects to 
build harbours, railways, mines, public utilities 
and facilities to exploit natural resources.2 
Mexican investors believed the country's oil 
resources were not worth exploring, and in any case 
Mexico lacked the entrepreneurs and the necessary 
capital.3 Diaz, therefore, changed the mining code 
to enable owners of land also to own the rights to 
the subsoil resources, including petroleum and gas,
1 Cooper, Bryan, (ed.): Latin American and Caribbean Oil 
Report (London: Petroleum Economist, 1979), p. 115.
2 Powell, J.R.: The Mexican Petroleum Industry (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1956), p. 7.
3 Meyer, Lorenzo: Mexico and the United States in the Oil 
Controversy. 1918-1942 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 
1972), p. 22.
25
without the necessity of securing specific rights 
from the government.^ Soon after the change in 
Mexican law, the Americans, Henry Clay Pierce, head 
of the Waters-Pierce Oil Company, an affiliate of 
Standard Oil of New Jersey, and Edward L. Doheny, 
who started to prospect for oil in Mexico in 1900, 
both discovered rich oil fields.5 Americans 
continued to invest in Mexican oil, and by the time 
of the expropriation in 1938, many other companies 
had been established,6 and oil interests in Mexico 
had evolved and expanded so that many of them 
controlled the pumping, refining, transport and 
marketing of the oil.
In 1901 the Englishman Weetman Pearson, later 
Lord Cowdray, a member of parliament and 
entrepreneur, decided to prospect for oil in Mexico 
to run the Tehuantepec Railway he had recently 
reconstructed.7 The so-called cientificos, 
advisers to Diaz on matters involving Mexico's 
modernization were uneasy about the success and the 
potential domination of Mexican oil by Standard Oil 
of New Jersey. They, therefore, encouraged Pearson 
to prospect for oil in order to break Waters- 
Pierce ' s monopoly of the distilled petroleum
4 Gordon, Wendell C.: The Expropriation of Foreign Owned 
Property in Mexico (Washington, D.C.: American Council on 
Public Affairs, 1941), p. 5.
5 Mancke, Richard B.: Mexican Oil and Natural Gas (New York: 
Praeger Publishers, 1979), pp. 23-25.
6 Rippy, Merrill: Oil and the Mexican Revolution (Leiden: 
E.J. Brill, 1972), p. 310.
7 Waugh, Evelyn: Robbery Under Law (London: Chapman and Hall 
Ltd., 1939), p. 93.
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product, kerosene, in Mexico.® In 1910 Pearson 
discovered a huge oil field and formed what later 
became the Mexican Eagle Oil Company, an 85 percent 
British owned company which at the time of the 
expropriation represented virtually all the British 
interests in oil. The Mexican government 
encouraged bitter competition between American and 
British interests,9 and to give Pearson an 
advantage, Diaz introduced a tax on imported 
refined oil products, knowing that Waters Pierce 
was the only company which used refineries in the 
US and brought oil back into Mexico. A price war 
ensued between Pearson and Henry Pierce, and in 
1913 Standard Oil abandoned Waters Pierce, losing 
the monopoly of selling petroleum in Mexico and 
leaving Pearson in control of over 50 percent of 
the Mexican oil industry. In 1918 Shell started 
managing Mexican Eagle and got a 20% shareholding 
in the company, while Pearson remained the majority 
shareholder.
The government of President Venustiano 
Carranza, a vehement nationalist who bitterly 
resented the fact that foreigners dominated every 
aspect of his country's economy except agriculture, 
drafted and ratified the constitution of 1917,
8 Mancke, p. 25.
9 Thynne, John Francis: 'British Policy on Oil Resources, 
1936-1951' (Ph.D. diss., University of London, 1987), p. 60; 
Rippy, Fred J.: British Investments in Latin America. 1822- 
1949 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1959), p. 
102.
10 Meyer, p. 26.
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designed to provide social justice, distribution of 
land and Mexican control over natural resources.H 
Article 27 of the constitution stated unequivocally 
that the state owned all minerals, oils and hydro­
carbons in the subsoil.12 to counter Washington's 
insistence on the principle of international law 
which upheld the legality of intervention whenever 
necessary to protect the contracts of Americans, 
Carranza, inspired by an Argentine lawyer of the 
19th century, Carlos Calvo, included a clause which 
stated that foreigners could only acquire property 
if they agreed formally to relinquish their right 
to request support from their governments in the 
event of a dispute regarding their affairs in 
Mexico.13 The constitution also set a legal 
precedent for expropriation by stating that the 
government could expropriate private property 
provided that it was for public welfare and that 
the government indemnified the previous owner based 
on the value of the property. Despite the 
existence of this provision, the immediate cause of 
the oil expropriation arose from the efforts of 
labour to exercise their rights under article 123,
H  Brown, Jonathan C.: 'Why Foreign Oil Companies Shifted 
Production from Mexico to Venezuela during the 1920's' 
American Historical Review. V (April,1985), p. 369; Sigmund, 
P. E.: Multinationals in Latin America; The Politics of 
Nationalization (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 
1980), p. 51.
12 Randall, Stephen J.: United States Foreign Oil Policy. 
1919-1948 (Kingston: McGill University Press, 1985), p. 51.
13 Philip, George: Oil and Politics in Latin America 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), p. 203.
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a basic code which established minimum standards 
for labour such as an eight-hour day and one day of 
rest after six days of w o r k .
The oil companies regarded the constitution as 
a formidable threat to their property in Mexico and 
tried to get the support of the state department 
against efforts of subsequent governments to apply 
it to their holdings. In reaction to these 
efforts, Washington and to a lesser degree London 
had several ways to get the Mexican government to 
co-operate:1^ witholding recognition of a 
president who tried to apply article 27 
retroactively to the disadvantage of foreign 
holders of property,16 threatening arms embargoes 
and refusing to grant loans. Mexico City was 
particularly concerned about the possibility of 
armed intervention since President Woodrow Wilson 
had ordered the navy to occupy the port of Vera 
Cruz in April 1914 and General John J. Pershing to 
hunt the rebel forces of Pancho Villa in Spring 
1916.17
Roosevelt's administration continued the shift 
by President Herbert Hoover away from military 
intervention after the inter-American conference at
14 Stocking, George Ward: The Mexican Oil Problem (Dallas: 
Southern Methodist University Press, 1938), pp. 11-12.
15 Randall, p. 51; Sigmund, pp. 52-53.
16 Sigmund, p. 52.
17 Turner, Louis,: The Oil Companies in the International 
System (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1973), p. 80;
Schulzinger, Robert D.: American Diplomacy in the Twentieth 
Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), pp. 57-59.
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Havana of 1928 when Latin American delegates 
harshly criticised Washington's use of physical 
force in the r e g i o n . 18 The depression led the 
Roosevelt administration to reject further the idea 
of force which was highly costly to the US and 
deemed counter-productive. In Latin America, the 
depression led to stronger authoritarian control 
and nationalism in reaction to the widely held 
belief that dependence upon foreign investment lay 
at the root of current economic troubles. When 
Roosevelt took office, he immediately faced social 
unrest in the US protectorate of Cuba whose economy 
was dominated by the sugar industry where Americans 
had invested heavily. Both Roosevelt and Hull in 
particular wanted Latin America to provide a large 
market for US manufactured goods and desperately 
wanted to maintain stability in the region.19
In his inaugural address Roosevelt reaffirmed 
Washington's move away from physical force when he 
proclaimed that in its relations with countries of 
the western hemisphere, the US would adhere to the 
policy of the Good Neighbor, which he described as 
a reciprocal policy between countries who respect 
obligations and agreements between each o t h e r . 20
18 Green, David: The Containment of Latin America:.A History 
of the Mvths and Realities of the Good Neighbor Policy 
(Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1971), p. 7.
19 see chapter one of Green, David: The Containment of Latin 
America.
20 Franklin Roosevelt, Inaugural Address, 4 March 1933 in 
Rosenman, Samuel I.: The Public Papers and Addresses of
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At the pan-American conference in Montevideo in 
1933/ Hull agreed to a resolution which barred 
intervention in the internal affairs of the 
signatory countries, and at the Buenos Aires 
conference in 1936, the US unequivocally renounced 
the use of force.21 The US, however, had not 
renounced the use of political and economic 
pressure, and as this thesis will show, the Good 
Neighbor policy did not preclude either form of 
pressure in the place of military intervention to 
get President Cdrdenas to return the oil 
properties.
The Good Neighbor policy had overtones of the 
anti-European feelings that had inspired the Monroe 
Doctrine of 1823 which was against new colonial 
European intervention or enterprise in the western 
hemisphere. The renunciation of intervention in 
the internal affairs of Latin American states was 
as much a guarantee to Latin American states 
against US interference as it was a subtle warning 
to European nations to keep out of the r e g i o n . 2 2
Franklin D. Roosevelt: The Year of Crisis. 1933. Vol 2 (New 
York, Random House, 1938), p. 11-16.
21 Schulzinger, p. 153.
22 Harper, John Lamberton: American Visions of Europe 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 56.
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THE FORMATION OF POLICY IN WASHINGTON
Washington’s policy toward Mexico during the 
Roosevelt administration was the result of input 
from several officials involved in a struggle for 
influence over foreign policy and winning the 
president's favour. Unlike the British system, 
where officials in government generally accept the 
value of party unity because their political 
fortunes rise and fall with the party, the 
president's cabinet members are far more likely to 
cross one another. Also, the fact that the 
president is elected makes him far more powerful 
among cabinet members than a British prime 
minister, who takes office as a result of a 
particular party winning an election, and winning 
the president's favour often enhances an official's 
political influence. Since Roosevelt did not 
sustain a keen interest in the Mexican oil problem 
on account of more pressing domestic problems and 
more direct defence issues, cabinet members and 
other officials took charge of the matter and 
whoever was closest to him at a given time had the 
most influence over matters regarding Mexico.
Nowhere was the struggle to win Roosevelt's 
favour as strong as between Secretary of State 
Cordell Hull and Undersecretary Sumner Welles, and 
despite his seniority, Hull felt threatened by
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Welles. The undersecretary and the president, 
although 10 years apart in age, had known each 
other from childhood and had both attended Groton 
and Harvard, and Welles came from an east coast 
patrician background while Hull was born into a 
poor family in Tennessee. In addition, Hull's ill 
health forced him away from office for periods of 
convalescence, leaving Welles to conduct policy 
single-handedly during his absences, and because 
Welles oversaw Latin American affairs in the state 
department, he had considerable influence over 
Mexican matters and often acted inconsistently with 
Hull's policy. Hull’s resentment of Welles became 
particularly strong in 1940 after Welles went on 
the peace mission to Europe and the president 
decided at the last minute not to back Hull for the 
p r e s i d e n c y .23 Despite the undersecretary's close 
relationship with the president, Roosevelt seemed 
careful not to make Welles feel too secure in his 
position because the bitter rivalry between the 
secretary and undersecretary enhanced his own 
influence.
Although the differences between the two men's 
attitudes toward the Mexican oil expropriation were 
minimal, Welles was unable to put his enmity for 
Hull aside and work effectively with him,
23 Gellman, Irwin F.: Secret Affairs: Franklin Roosevelt. 
Cordell Hull and Sumner Welles (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1995), p. 215.
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particularly in 1941. They both saw the need for 
collaboration with Mexico in matters of defence on 
the one hand and the need to protect US commercial 
interests abroad on the other. Close military 
coordination with Mexico, however, would almost 
certainly have required the state department to be 
lenient about the oil matter, since demanding 
respect for the rights of Americans investing 
abroad would have run the risk of alienating Mexico 
City.
The fact that Hull blended defence and 
commercial concerns together complicated the matter 
further. Hull's reciprocal trade agreements 
programme, which Welles agreed with in p r i n c i p l e , 24 
made peace and close economic relations synonymous 
because, he believed, countries with strong ties of 
finance and trade would refrain from waging war 
against one another. Mexico's decision to increase 
its tariff rates at the beginning of 1938 and the 
subsequent expropriation of the oil properties had 
infuriated Hull, who had been trying to lay the 
ground work for a reciprocal trade agreement with 
Mexico, and left him determined to resolve the oil 
matter in a way that would establish a standard of 
respect for US interests operating abroad before 
reciprocal trade agreements with Mexico and other 
nations could be established. He specifically
24 Ibid., p. 109.
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hoped to increase American investment in Latin 
America and also regarded the area as an important 
market for American e x p o r t s . 25
While Hull sought to restore good relations 
with Mexico and to protect US interests at the same 
time, Welles' behaviour fluctuated between 
supporting US commercial interests and being 
lenient toward Mexico. Although Hull was concerned 
about the struggle for influence with Welles, he 
did not let it overtly affect his policy toward 
Mexico the way Welles seemed to do. Welles formed 
opinions and changed his mind often. He endeared 
himself to Josephus Daniels, whom he knew the 
president held in high esteem, and often 
contradicted earlier actions in order to reflect 
Daniels' opinion or that of Roosevelt when the 
president was taking an active interest in Mexican 
matters. He also appeared to have confidence in 
his own ability to control matters and smooth 
situations over after he suddenly changed his mind. 
While the secretary and undersecretary had perhaps 
equal influence over policy toward Mexico, the fact 
that Roosevelt had put Welles formally in charge of 
Latin American affairs in 1937 meant that the 
British ambassador dealt with him more than Hull,
25 Wood, Bryce: The Making of the Good Neighbor Policy (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1961), p. 210-211; 
Memorandum of a Conversation by the Secretary of State, 22 
January 1938, US Department of State: Foreign Relations of 
the United States: The American Republics. Vol. 5 
(Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office,
1954), pp. 776-79.
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and Welles often distorted US policies in 
conversation with the British.
Another of Hull's adversaries was Secretary of 
the Interior Harold Ickes who became petroleum 
administrator for war at the end of May 1941.
Ickes and Hull had fallen out in 1938 when the 
interior department reversed its decision in summer 
1938 to sell helium to the Nazis, and Hull 
challenged Ickes to honour his commitment. The 
relationship between the two became even more 
acrimonious when both were vying for Roosevelt's 
backing in the 1940 presidential election in which 
the president decided to seek a third term.26 Like 
Roosevelt, Ickes questioned Hull's competence 
frequently and once wrote of him, 'the fellow just 
can't think straight.'27 ickes also believed 
Hull's idea that breaking down trade barriers would 
deter war was dangerously naive. Although Ickes 
was rarely involved in the formation of policy 
toward Mexico, as an old Progressive, he was highly 
suspicious of big business, opposed Hull's solution 
of the Mexican oil problem and tried unsuccessfully 
to persuade Roosevelt between 1941 and 1943 that 
the US government should buy the producing and 
refining facilities in Mexico.
26 Geliman, pp. 152, 214.
27 Ickes, Harold L.: The Secret Diarv of Harold Ickes. Vol 
3, The Lowering Clouds (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson,
1955), p. 339.
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By far the closest person politically to the 
president in this story was Daniels who had been 
Roosevelt's superior during his term as assistant 
secretary of the navy during the First World War. 
Despite the fact that Roosevelt had not always 
agreed with Daniels, he had great respect for him, 
chose to continue addressing the ambassador as 
'chief' and allowed him to obstruct Hull's harsher 
policies toward Mexico with impunity. Both 
Daniels' and Roosevelt's involvement in the oil 
issue gave Mexican officials the impression that 
Washington's policy was far more tolerant than the 
state department intended it to be. Daniels and 
Roosevelt shared an antipathy to big business, a 
Progressive's sympathy for the common man whom 
Cdrdenas was trying to benefit, and resentment of 
British interests operating in the western 
hemisphere. Daniels in particular resented British 
activities in Mexico because he had been in 
President Woodrow Wilson's cabinet when Anglo- 
American oil rivalry in Mexico was at its fiercest. 
At the time, Weetman Pearson supported Victoriano 
Huerta, the Mexican president, against Wilson's 
wishes, and his efforts to secure a loan for Huerta 
in the City of London raised Wilson's suspicions 
that he was trying to establish a monopoly over 
Mexican oil. The issue was not resolved until the 
coming of war made Whitehall realise that close
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relations with Washington were more important than 
supporting Huerta.28
While Hull, Welles, Daniels and Roosevelt had 
the most input on policy toward the Mexican oil 
problem, Secretary of the Treasury Henry 
Morgenthau, Roosevelt's neighbour in Hyde Park, 
also played a role in policy formation. Although 
Morgenthau*s foreign silver purchases often pitted 
him against the secretary of state who believed 
that the silver purchases allowed him too much 
control over foreign policy, Morgenthau cooperated 
to some degree with Hull over silver purchases from 
Mexico. Like Hull, Morgenthau also experienced a 
dilemma with regard to policy toward Mexico. On 
the one hand, he was very concerned about Mexico 
turning to Germany, Japan or Italy, but on the 
other, he wanted to teach Mexico fiscal 
responsibility, and, therefore, objected to making 
aid to Mexico too readily available. Above all he 
believed silver purchases to be a waste of federal 
money and complied with Hull's request to stop 
special purchases of silver from Mexico. He 
refused, however, to lower the price on the world 
market, where he continued to purchase Mexican
silver.29
28 Meyer, pp. 37-8.
29 Conversation with Taylor and Lochhead, and Morgenthau, 28 
March 1938, 9:07 a.m., Morgenthau Diary, #117; Memorandum of 
a Conversation, 5 April 1938, RG 59, Records of the 
Department of State [812.6363/3450].
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THE REACTION OF THE OIL COMPANIES
Despite the Anglo-American competition for oil 
resources, the oil companies responded to the 
Mexican expropriation in a united front. This 
consisted of independent companies such as Sinclair 
and British and American major oil companies such 
as Shell, Standard Oil of New Jersey and Standard 
Oil of California. However, not only were the 
major American and British companies traditional 
competitors, but the interests of smaller 
independent companies, which lacked global systems 
of production, transport refining and marketing, 
often clashed with those of larger oil companies. 
For example, when Washington and American oil 
interests were trying to solve the problems of 
surplus oil and falling prices early in the 
Roosevelt administration, independent oil producers 
opposed limits being placed on production, while 
Standard Oil of New Jersey urged the government to 
allocate quotas for oil production.30
Anglo-American oil interests learned early the 
value of working in unison. Francisco I. Madero, a 
young member of Diaz' establishment who took power 
in 1911, issued a decree obliging oil companies and 
landowners to cooperate with a government registry
30 Nash, G.D.: US Oil Policy 1890-1964 (Pittsburgh: 
University of Pittsburgh Press, 1968), p. 131.
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by providing information about the value of their 
holdings to facilitate payment of indemnities in 
case the government took over any properties. The 
companies' joint refusal to comply with this new 
law as well as Mexico's strained relations with 
Washington contributed to Madero's decision to do 
away with the registry. Similarly, when a tax was 
introduced in the state of Veracruz British and 
American oil companies resisted it together, and, 
with the support of the American consul there, 
successfully countered the new measure.31
In reaction to the expropriation in 1938, the 
Anglo-American oil interests and Sinclair 
Consolidated staged a boycott of Mexican oil, tried 
to secure Washington's support for both British and 
American oil interests through their main 
spokesperson William Farish, president of Standard 
Oil of New Jersey, and insisted that they owned the 
rights to oil in the subsoil. Despite the 
absurdity of making calculations of future profits 
on estimated sizes of oil reserves, the American 
and British companies confidently asserted that 
their properties were worth $450 million.32 The 
Mexican government denied their claim to oil in the 
ground and offered compensation for their original 
investments and other expenses excluding future 
profits from the subsoil. The companies, however,
31 Meyer, pp. 31-2.
32 Cronon, p. 186.
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refused offers of compensation from debt-ridden 
Mexico. Above all they wanted to discourage other 
countries such as Venezuela, where their 
investments in the oil industry were considerable, 
from following Mexico's example. They, therefore, 
refused anything short of the return of their 
properties, even if temporarily, to make Cdrdenas' 
policy appear to fail in the eyes of the world.
The united front between American and British oil 
companies even outlived the agreement Washington 
negotiated on behalf of the American oil companies 
in November 1941.
Although the united front was fairly solid 
among subsidiaries operating in Mexico, it was a 
mere marriage of convenience among the parent 
companies, and it eventually broke down. The 
rivalry and distrust among the parent companies 
were far too strong to sustain cooperation among 
the subsidiaries operating in Mexico. Throughout 
the 1930's Standard Oil of New Jersey, while it was 
discussing cooperation with Shell, was thinking of 
merging with Standard Oil Company of New York so it 
could handle competition from Shell more 
effectively. In addition, in 1936 Shell was 
outraged to learn that the company was also 
contemplating selling its Mexican operation to 
William Davis, a maverick independent oil man, who
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almost certainly would have broken the united 
front.33
It will be seen that the first break in the 
united front was not due to lack of cooperation 
between American and British major oil interests 
but due to the decision of Sinclair Consolidated, 
which had large domestic holdings in the US and 
fewer international holdings than the larger 
international oil companies, to make an early 
settlement with Mexico in the spring of 1940. The 
break which came in 1943 involved American 
interests agreeing to the settlement Washington had 
negotiated with Mexico in November 1941 with the 
understanding, as Whitehall suspected, that the 
American oil companies might have a chance of 
returning to Mexico.
THE FORMATION OF POLICY IN LONDON
Input on policy came from several departments 
in Whitehall. The oil board, comprised of the 
secretary of mines, the civil lord of the 
admiralty, senior officials of the service 
ministries, the treasury and the board of trade, 
was concerned mostly with the needs of the armed 
services in the event of war and recommended oil
33 Yergin, Daniel: The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil. Money 
and Power (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992), p. 267.
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strategy to the committee of imperial defence of 
which it was a sub-committee. Because Britain 
relied on petroleum wholly from overseas sources, 
the foreign office also played an important role in 
determining oil policy. The fact that the 
Anschluss of Austria occurred a few days before the 
expropriation distracted the attention of senior 
officials in the foreign office. As a result, 
responsibility for the execution of policy usually 
went no higher in the foreign office hierarchy than 
John Balfour, head of the American department, who 
relied heavily on input from Owen St. Clair 
O'Malley, the minister in Mexico City. More senior 
officials intervened only intermittently during the 
crisis, and the matter rarely went as high as the 
cabinet.
In addition to the oil board and the foreign 
office, the petroleum department, a subdivision of 
the mines department, headed by Secretary for Mines 
Captain Crookshank, M.P., was responsible for a 
wide variety of oil matters. These included 
promoting British oil companies in world trade, 
coordinating action and information on petroleum at 
home and abroad and advising the government 
departments about technical, commercial and 
political matters involving oil. Director of the 
Petroleum Department Frederick Starling not only 
met directly with Mexican Eagle, but also played an 
important role as a liaison between the oil board
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and the foreign office. While neither Starling nor 
anyone in the foreign office was a member of the 
oil board, he attended all of their meetings and 
acted as a channel of information to both bodies 
which usually heeded whatever advice he gave.
Britain, unlike the United States whose oil 
supplies were plentiful at the time, had no known 
domestic supplies,34 and the British empire only 
produced 5 percent of the world's oil.35 
Remembering the unprecedented and vital role oil 
. played in World War I, Whitehall was highly
concerned that failure to return to the status quo 
ante in Mexico would encourage other countries to 
expropriate British oil holdings and stop supplying 
British oil needs at a time when hostilities seemed 
imminent. While officials in the department of 
overseas trade, M.P.s and others objected to 
Whitehall's support of the boycott of Mexican oil 
which required great sacrifices for British 
concerns which normally traded with Mexico, Balfour 
and Starling kept tight control over policy and 
single-mindedly pursued the interests of the oil 
companies - never experiencing dilemmas over policy 
to the degree officials in Washington did. The 
interests of the oil companies were regarded as
34 Payton-Smith, D. J.: Oil: A Study of War-time Policy and 
Administration (London: H.M.S.O., 1971), p. 24.
35 'Note on the Advantages accruing to His Majesty's 
Government from having Foreign Oil fields developed under 
British control', Confidential Print, South and Central 
America, 1 December 1938, FO 371 20636 [A8808/10/26].
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synonymous with defence. Whitehall wanted not only
British access to foreign sources, but also British
control of the production of needed petroleum
products abroad:
The position which British oil 
companies have built up affords the 
only basis on which the Empire can 
hope to have any assurance of 
securing the large supplies needed.
As long as foreign governments are 
not directly concerned in the oil 
business they are much less likely 
to interfere with the companies in 
the export of oil.36
ANGLO-AMERICAN RIVALRY OVER MEXICAN OIL
Officials in Whitehall felt particularly 
frustrated because Britain’s ability to influence 
events in Mexico was commensurate neither with its 
strategic stake in Mexican oil nor Shell's control 
of 63% of oil production in M e x i c o . 37 officials in 
Whitehall realised that they would have to depend 
on the United States to raise objections because of 
Washington's strong historical role in Mexico, but 
their approaches to Washington for help both 
directly and through the united front led to 
nothing. Washington bitterly resented Britain's 
economic presence in the western hemisphere, 
especially Latin America. These feelings were
3 6 Ibid.
37 New York Times. 20 March 1938, p. 3, column 4; 8 April 
1938, p. 29, column 4.
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borne not only of an oil rivalry between the two 
countries, but also of a fierce rivalry for raw 
materials and markets which went back to the turn 
of the century.
From the start of the Great War, the US 
successfully challenged British predominance in 
Latin America as Britain was preoccupied with the 
war and reconstruction. The Great War had reversed 
the financial situations of Britain and America 
making America a net creditor nation which replaced 
Britain as the main source for investment capital. 
The rivalry worsened further in the 1930‘s as both 
countries tried to cope with the depression: 
Britain's National government adopted a system of 
protective tariffs from 1931-32, and at the Ottawa 
conference in 1932 Britain implemented higher 
tariffs and import quotas to discriminate against 
foreign goods. Britain left the gold standard in 
September 1931, and most of the Dominions as well 
as other countries dependent upon trade with 
Britain tied their currencies to the pound and 
joined the emerging sterling trading bloc.
Britain's defaulting on war debts in 1934 increased 
American resentment of Britain.38
From 1936 President Franklin D. Roosevelt 
tried to increase military and economic co-
38 Reynolds, David: The Creation of the Analo-American 
Alliance. 1937-41: A Study in Competitive Co-operation 
(London: Europa, 1984), pp. 13-14.
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operation with republics in South America and was 
perturbed about the British interests entrenched 
there. The British controlled the production and 
distribution of tin, dominated the oil industry and 
had envied trading arrangements with Argentina.
They also tried to block American commercial 
enterprise in Brazil. The president especially 
resented the control of primary materials like 
rubber and oil by colonial powers and cartels.39 
While Roosevelt and his administration were bitter 
about British trade policies and colonial 
possessions, Whitehall resented what it believed 
were American efforts to block its access both to 
air routes in Latin America and raw materials such 
as tin, tobacco, rubber, cotton and o i l . 40 Ever 
since US entry into the war in 1917, Whitehall 
suspected the US of wanting to stop the Allies' 
imperialism as much as eliminate German 
militarism.41
The rivalry became particularly strong after 
the Second World War began when Britain's dollar 
shortages became acute. In winter 1939-1940, the 
purchases of supplies from the US made the problem 
of paying for them increasingly serious, and
39 Gilman, Ernest: ‘Economic Aspects of Anglo-American 
Relations in the Era of Chamberlain and Roosevelt, 1937- 
1940' (Ph.D. dissertation, University of London, 1976), pp 
ii-xxvii and pp. 308-10.
40 Watt, Donald Cameron: Succeeding John Bull: America in 
Britain1s Place (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1984), p. 87.
41 Reynolds, p. 15.
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Britain tried buying some supplies from elsewhere 
and increasing exports to ease dollar shortages.
As a result, Anglo-American competition for markets 
for agricultural products and manufactured goods 
increased particularly in Latin America. Hull was 
irate at Britain's discrimination against American 
products and was highly suspicious about Britain's 
tactics to gain dollars. He could not understand 
how the British empire was unable to afford 
American goods.42 Washington, therefore, refused 
every request from the foreign office, which 
maintained that the expropriation was illegal, to 
voice strong diplomatic disapproval of the Mexican 
act and to co-ordinate their policies regarding 
Mexico.
Whitehall was furious that Washington appeared 
to condone the expropriation. Most if not all of 
the companies' subsidiaries by virtue of being 
incorporated in Mexico were subject to Mexican law, 
and Washington recognised that Mexico had the right 
to expropriate property within Mexico provided it 
was for the public good and provided Cdrdenas 
promptly arranged adequate and effective 
compensation. The fact that a strike before the 
expropriation led to grave fuel shortages which 
crippled transport and industry fulfilled the 1917 
constitution's requirement that expropriations be
42 Dobson, Alan P.: US Wartime Aid to Britain. 1940-1946 
(London: Croom Helm, 1986), pp. 15-28.
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justifiable in the name of public welfare. While 
Washington conceded Mexico's right to expropriate 
provided the country paid prompt, adequate and 
effective compensation, disagreements arose over 
what constituted such compensation. Mexico City 
insisted that it had 10 years to pay compensation 
for the companies' investment. The oil companies, 
however, insisted on immediate compensation for 
future profits on oil still in the ground.43 
As the thesis will show, the differences 
between the reactions of London and Washington were 
more apparent than real. The state department had 
made compensation the requirement for recognition 
of the legality of expropriation, knowing that 
Mexico was incapable of paying such compensation. 
Its demand was intended to secure a settlement 
allowing the American oil companies to return to 
Mexico in a managerial position. The state 
department tried to mask this ambition with the 
Good Neighbor policy which provided a convenient 
excuse for the American government to turn down 
British suggestions of stronger action toward 
Mexico. Whitehall also wanted to secure the return 
of Mexican Eagle, Shell's Mexican subsidiary, to 
managing and working its former Mexican concessions 
and hoped that its refusal to recognize the
43 Gaither, Roscoe, B.: Expropriation in Mexico: the Facts 
and the Law (New York: William Morrow, 1940), p. 9.
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legality of the expropriation would achieve this 
goal.
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CHAPTER TWO 
ANGLO-AMERICAN TENSION BEFORE THE 
EXPROPRIATION: NOVEMBER 1936-MARCH 1938
In time of war, Britain would be largely dependent 
on foreign supplies of oil whereas the United 
States owing to their big home production would 
not. They could, therefore, afford to look with 
comparative equanimity on this sort of thing 
whereas it is vital to Britain that our foreign 
sources of supply should remain under British-owned 
control. The lack of satisfactory cooperation from 
the US in this is indeed heartbreaking.1
Gerald Gray Fitzmaurice
The nature of the Anglo-American oil rivalry 
in Mexico was apparent throughout the labour 
troubles which culminated in the expropriation. 
Mutual hostility existed mainly between the two 
governments and among independent oil companies of 
the two countries rather than among the major 
firms. It is the purpose of this chapter to 
analyse Anglo-American competitiveness in the 
Mexican oil industry in the period just before the 
oil nationalisation of March 1938. After first 
explaining the important changes President Ldzaro 
Cdrdenas made to the labour movement and the 
Expropriation Law of November 1936/ all of which
1 Fitzmaurice, Minute, 16 March 1938, FO 371 21364 
[A2004/10/26J.
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threatened foreign oil companies, the different 
reactions of Washington, Whitehall and the oil 
companies are given in turn. While Washington 
showed great reluctance to get involved in what was 
regarded as largely an internal Mexican matter, 
Whitehall believed the situation potentially 
threatened Britain's oil supplies in an emergency 
and resented Washington's mild policy. The oil 
companies also resented what they regarded as 
Washington's inaction, and, in the absence of the 
administration's support, they resorted to trying 
to coerce the Mexican government by harming the 
Mexican economy.
Second, the effects of Mexico's attempts to do 
business with British companies at the same time as 
it expropriated the American company Standard Oil 
of California's lands show the degree of Anglo- 
American resentment of each others' interests in 
Mexico. Third, it is seen that Whitehall's efforts 
to get support from Washington failed: US officials 
gave Whitehall misleading information rather than 
divulge details of their policy. Welles' efforts 
to use Washington's silver purchase programme to 
put pressure on the Mexican government provide an 
illustration of Washington's secrecy. Last, the 
chapter describes how Washington, London and the 
oil companies reacted to the final events leading 
to the expropriation.
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LAZARO CARDENAS' POLICIES BEFORE THE EXPROPRIATION
In an effort to modernize Mexico, redistribute 
wealth and improve the plight of labourers,
Cdrdenas sought to fulfil the aspirations of the 
peasant class and catered to the strong, widespread 
nationalist sentiment.2 Many Mexicans bitterly 
resented foreigners who they believed operated in 
Mexico at the expense of their own economic well­
being. 3 cdrdenas, therefore, introduced socialist 
democracy and developed agriculture and light 
industry run by workers' co-operatives. The co­
operative system, he hoped, would allow Mexico to 
evolve from a feudalistic system to a socialist one 
thus by-passing the intermediate stage of 
capitalism which Karl Marx had predicted.4
Although Cdrdenas did not actually create the 
socialist society he had planned, he transformed 
labour into a powerful bargaining force by bringing 
it closer to the government and unifying oil 
workers under a labour code. Before Cdrdenas 
became president, the freedom to strike had existed 
only in theory. Despite rhetoric in favour of
2 Cline, Howard F.: The United States and Mexico (New York: 
Harcourt Brace, 1963), pp. 216-18.
3 Carrillo, Alejandro: The Mexican People and the Oil
Companies (Mexico: Workers University of Mexico, 1938), p.
8.
4 Meyer, Lorenzo: Mexico and the United States in the Oil 
Controversy. 1918-1942 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 
1972), p. 151.
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labour, corrupt leaders and labour courts had 
usually ensured that private interests prevailed 
against workers in disputes. Due to resistance 
from the Mexican government and the oil companies 
to the establishment of a single union of all 
workers for the oil industry, nineteen independent 
oil unions for ten thousand workers had existed in 
1934 when Cdrdenas became president.5 Because oil 
workers had formed unions based on company 
affiliations, no consistency existed in working 
standards and labour contracts from one company to 
another.6 In 1935 Cdrdenas unified these unions 
under the Syndicate of Oil Workers of the Mexican 
Republic, the STPRM, which affiliated with the 
powerful General Workers' Union, the CTM.7
On 3 November 193 6 the general assembly of the 
STPRM submitted to the oil companies a list of 
demands in accordance with article 123 of the 
constitution of 1917 which established minimum 
standards for labour. The constitution also set 
out a procedure to settle disputes between labour 
and management whereby, at the request of either 
party, a tribunal known as the federal board of 
conciliation and arbitration would bring about a
5 Philip, George: Oil and Politics in Latin America 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), p. 215;
Ashby, Joe C.: Organized Labor and the Mexican Revolution 
Under Lazaro Cardenas (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1963), p. 119.
6 Powell, J.R.: The Mexican Petroleum Industry, 1938-1950 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1956), p. 19.
7 Meyer, Lorenzo, p. 154.
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settlement by compulsory arbitration. The union's 
demands included filling most managerial and other 
positions with members of the union, training 
Mexicans to replace foreign technicians and 
establishing union control over hiring and firing. 
In addition, the union wanted the companies to 
provide workers with higher wages, medical care, 
indemnity in cases of lay-offs and voluntary leave, 
pensions, scholarships for workers' children, and 
housing of specified standards. The union 
threatened the companies with a general strike if 
they did not quickly agree to start negotiations 
based on its demands.® These demands came at the 
same time as the new Mexican Expropriation Law of 
23 November 193 6 which furthered the federal 
executive's authority vested in it by the 
constitution to expropriate all privately owned 
land by substantially widening the definition of 
public utility. It also gave the president the 
authority to declare partial or full expropriations 
so long as compensation was paid within 10 years.®
® Workers University of Mexico: The Oil Conflict in Mexico 
(Mexico: The Workers University of Mexico, 1937-1938), pp. 
11-13.
9 Rippy, Merrill: Oil and the Mexican Revolution (Leiden: E. 
J. Brill, 1972), p. 77.
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WASHINGTON'S POLICY IN THE AFTERMATH OF MEXICAN 
LABOUR'S CHALLENGES
Although concerned about the well-being of US 
commercial interests operating abroad, Washington 
gave little response to the new law and Mexican 
labour's challenges to the oil companies. Hull 
believed strongly in the importance of pan-American 
goodwill in the defence of the western hemisphere. 
The union's demands in Mexico and the expropriation 
law happened at roughly the same time as Hull's 
departure for the inter-American conference at 
Buenos Aires, where he hoped to increase pan- 
American solidarity against threats to world peace. 
After Franklin Roosevelt's landslide victory in the 
presidential election in November 1936, the 
president's concerns about what he believed was the 
inevitability of war in Europe and the danger of it 
spreading to the western hemisphere led him to join 
Hull at the conference where he roundly condemned 
war. In the end the conference achieved both a 
multilateral pledge of non-intervention and a 
declaration which obliged each nation present to 
consult one another when a non-American nation 
threatened the peace of the western hemisphere.1^
10 Gellman, Irwin: Secret Affairs: Franklin Roosevelt. 
Cordell Hull and Sumner Welles (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
Press, 1995), pp. 112-17; Hull, Cordell: The Memoirs of 
Cordell Hull. Vol. 1 (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1948), 
pp.497-500.
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Consistent with the belief in the importance 
of pan-American solidarity and the pledge of non­
intervention, the state department refused to 
support the oil companies in fighting the 
challenges Mexican labour posed. When the oil 
companies tried to persuade the state department to 
give formal disapproval of labour's demands, the 
department informed them that they had to exhaust 
legal avenues in Mexico and suffer a denial of 
justice before Washington would consider taking 
decisive action to protect their interests.H 
Cordell Hull, trying to lay the groundwork for a 
reciprocal trade agreement with Mexico, did, 
however, see the need to get a guarantee that 
Cdrdenas would not take American property under the 
expropriation act, and Cdrdenas told Josephus 
Daniels that, because Mexico needed American 
investment in the country, he would not take over 
oil fields or mines in which US investment had been 
substantial.12
H  Meyer, p. 147.
12 Cronon, E. David: Josephus Daniels in Mexico (Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1960), pp. 122-5.
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WHITEHALL’S POLICY AND CRITICISM OF WASHINGTON
Washington's maintenance of this cautious 
attitude toward the problem deeply disappointed 
Whitehall. The world situation looked increasingly 
precarious, and Whitehall did not want Washington’s 
reaction to encourage other countries to make 
trouble for British oil interests abroad. The 
possibility existed of war with Italy, Germany and 
Japan simultaneously. In summer 1937 war broke out 
between Japan and China, which posed a potential 
threat to Britain's empire in South East Asia and 
India. Italy, whose imperialistic ambitions were 
confirmed during the Abyssinian crisis, threatened 
Britain's position in the eastern Mediterranean 
which linked Britain to the Suez Canal, the gateway 
to Britain's eastern empire, and to its oil 
interests in the Middle East. After Hitler's 
occupation of the demilitarized zone of the 
Rhineland, Britain, hbwever, regarded Nazi Germany 
as the main threat.13
Britain's lack of effective allies made the 
prospect of a war even more bleak. The US seemed 
to have embraced isolationism in order to
Reynolds, David: The Creation of the Analo-American
Alliance. 1937-41: A Study in Competitive Co-operation 
(London: Europa, 1981), pp. 7-8; Watt, Donald Cameron: How 
War Came: The Immediate Origins of the Second World War. 
1938-1939 (New York: Pantheon Books, 1989), pp. 26-7.
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concentrate on domestic policy and recovery from 
the depression. The fact that France had so many 
different ministries in such a relatively short 
period of time made Britain lose confidence in its 
former ally. Stalin's purges of the bureaucracy 
and officer corps shook British confidence in 
possible support from the Soviet Union. The 
isolationism of Canada and South Africa reduced the 
hopes of Commonwealth support. ^
The Mexican oil problem made Britain's 
situation seem all the worse. John Balfour and 
Frederick Starling, both highly influential in 
forming policy toward Mexico, immediately perceived 
the situation in Mexico as a potential threat to 
British oil supplies during wartime. The prospect 
of Italian hostilities in the Mediterranean cutting 
Britain off from Iraqi and Iranian oil as well as 
the possibility of American neutrality precluding 
Britain from using US oil in wartime made Whitehall 
all the more reliant on British oil production in 
Latin America. Starling wanted to avoid setting an 
unhelpful precedent which would make the example of 
Mexican labour inspire other South American 
countries such as Venezuela, which supplied 
approximately 40 percent of British oil needs, to
14 Reynolds, pp. 7-8; Parker, R.A.C.: Chamberlain and 
Appeasement; British Policy and the Coming of the Second 
World War (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire and London: 
The Macmillan Press, Ltd., 1993), p. 19.
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challenge British petroleum interests. ^  At the 
time, only oil production in Iraq and Iran, which 
could supply the admiralty with an adequate amount 
of oil for wartime, was sufficient to make a 
substantial contribution to Britain's oil supplies 
in an emergency.
US neutrality legislation made Britain all the 
more nervous about oil supplies. In August 1935 
Italy's attack on Abyssinia, at a time when it was 
still widely believed that sales of US arms to the 
Allies had led to US involvement in the First World 
War, inspired congress to prohibit Americans from 
exporting implements of war and munitions to any 
country involved in hostilities. Subsequently 
congress tried to include oil on the list of banned 
exports. The British oil board, which planned for 
the needs of the armed services in the event of 
war, was highly concerned and, therefore, tried to 
prepare for the dreaded scenario of American oil 
being denied to the British empire if Britain were 
to become involved in a war with Germany. The 
second Neutrality Act of May 1937, making oil 
available to belligerents on a cash and carry 
basis, somewhat alleviated British concerns. The 
oil board, however, still prudently made plans in
Starling to Balfour, 8 March 1938, F0 371 21463 
[A1721/10/26].
16 Payton-Smith, D.J.: Oil; A Study of War-time Policy and 
Administration (London: H.M.S.O., 1971), p. 52.
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case American oil became unavailable to Britain in 
the future.I7
Although Britain had much at stake, Whitehall 
felt powerless to demand the cessation of 
challenges to its oil interests. Although Royal 
Dutch/Shell was part Dutch, its ties with Whitehall 
were as close as any fully British company. The 
strong historical role of the United States and its 
economic leverage over Mexico, however, eclipsed 
Whitehall's ability to influence events in Mexico. 
The British, therefore, had to rely on Washington 
to take the lead in the matter and insist that the 
Mexican government check labour's d e m a n d s . 18 
Washington, however, quietly refused Whitehall's 
requests to coordinate policies. In August 1937 
the foreign office sought Washington's cooperation 
in making representations to Mexico, and Sumner 
Welles replied, complaining about a denial of 
justice might only provoke severe problems for the 
oil companies. Welles was also vague about the 
prospects of cooperation with the British 
g o v e r n m e n t . The foreign office privately fumed 
at this stance. As Adrian Holman, a clerk in the 
American department said, 'There is little hope of 
US cooperation until it is too l a t e ! ' 2 0
17 Ibid., pp. 56-57.
Balfour, Memorandum, 27 May 1938, F0 371 21471 
[A4305/10/26].
19 Lindsay to Foreign Office, 24 August 1937, FO 371 20635 
[A6192/132/26].
20 A. Holman, Minute, 26 August 1937, FO 371 20635
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Whitehall's resentment of Washington's lack of 
cooperation in the Mexican matter coincided with 
British resentment at what Whitehall officials 
believed was Washington's lack of effort to bring 
peace in the Far East. After the violence between 
Japanese and Chinese soldiers at Marco Polo Bridge 
in July 1937 that unleashed the Sino-Japanese war, 
Britain wanted to make joint approaches with the US 
to Japan and China, but Washington refused to 
cooperate, preferring parallel representations 
instead. Washington was particularly concerned not 
to appear to be ganging up on the Japanese which 
would justify and give support to the extremists in 
the Japanese army, and in addition congress had 
just defeated Roosevelt's efforts at reforming the 
supreme court, which had cost him dearly in terms 
of support in congress, and he could not take a 
chance of further alienating isolationists.21
THE OIL COMPANIES' REACTION IN THE ABSENCE OF 
WASHINGTON'S SUPPORT
On 11 November 1936 Anglo-American oil 
interests formally refused to start negotiations 
based on the union's demands, alleging their
[A6192/132/26].
21 MacDonald, C.A.: The United States. Britain and 
Appeasement. 1936-1939 (London and Basingstoke: Macmillan, 
1981), p. 37; Parker, pp. 104-7.
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inability to pay for the changes. What they 
objected to the most, however, was not so much the 
increase in wages but the loss of control which 
would result from the demanded increase in the 
number of Mexicans in managerial j o b s . 22 while 
they refused to make any concessions on putting 
Mexicans in positions of management, they did make 
an offer to increase annual wages by 14 million 
pesos which was only 3 million pesos lower than 
what labour representatives had requested. The oil 
issue was a highly nationalist one, and the 
companies' refusal to give Mexicans control over 
their oil fields made the union reject this offer 
and call a strike on 28 May 1937.23
The companies reacted by trying to damage 
further Mexico's already ailing economy. 
Strengthening labour had clearly not had the benign 
effect Cdrdenas had intended because the strike 
exacerbated the depression in the Mexican economy 
and contributed to social u n r e s t . 24 The strike led 
to a sharp increase in commodity prices and the 
closing of industries due to lack of fuel. The 
price of gasoline soared and prevented the use of 
modern equipment on many farms, and many crops 
failed leading to food shortages. The depression
22 Ashby, p. 196.
23 Gobierno de Mexico: Recovilacion de Documentos Oficiales 
del conflicto de Ordern Economico de la Industria Petrolera 
(Mexico, Gobierno de Mexico, D.F., 1940), pp. 20-21.
24 Powell, p. 20.
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had already badly affected Mexico as had Cdrdenas' 
programmes to reform agriculture and organize 
public works, which had severely drained the 
treasury. The Mexican government was heavily in 
debt and desperately needed oil revenues as well as 
foreign exchange. In 1937 foreign sales of 
petroleum and petroleum products had amounted to 
18.2 per cent of Mexican exports, and agriculture 
had provided a significant source of revenue of 
which the Mexican government had deprived itself 
when it expropriated agricultural lands. The 
Mexican government had a particularly difficult 
time getting foreign exchange needed to pay for the 
necessary foodstuffs. Mexico was caught in a 
severe depression as the peso fell and domestic 
prices rose dramatically.25
The companies, hoping the economic troubles 
would lead to the toppling of Cdrdenas, contributed 
to the problems in every way open to them. In 
August 1937 they started to withdraw their deposits 
from Mexican banks, and the metallic reserves of 
the Bank of Mexico decreased from 194 million pesos 
to 110 million between then and March 1938.
Deposits and reserves of capital in private banks 
dropped more than 113 million pesos from June 1937 
to April 1938. The resulting decreased public 
confidence caused other depositors to withdraw
25 Scroggs, William 0.: 'Mexican Oil in World Politics', 
Foreign Affairs Quarterly. XVII (1938), p. 173.
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their money from Mexico in fear of a fall in the 
rate of e x c h a n g e . 26 Meanwhile, the Mexican 
government confronted heightened social unrest 
which resulted not only from the disruption in the 
fuel supply but also from the companies' refusal to 
sell oil within Mexico on credit as they had 
previously done.27
Because of the threat the severe economic 
troubles posed to Cdrdenas' political position, the 
federal board of conciliation and arbitration 
announced the existence of a national emergency. 
This allowed it to apply the provision of the 
Federal Labour Law of 1931 designed to alleviate 
the disastrous economic effects of protracted 
disputes between capital and l a b o u r . 28 j n  
accordance with this provision, the federal board 
of conciliation and arbitration ordered a return to 
normal conditions before the dispute arose pending 
the decision of three experts appointed by the 
b o a r d . 29 on 3 August 1937 the experts submitted to 
the board their report which, as the companies had 
expected, recommended most of the benefits 
requested by the workers including their request to 
increase their control of management. The report
26 Rippy, p. 244.
27 Cronon, p. 162.
28 Ashby, p. 197.
29 Powell, pp. 18-20.
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also pronounced the companies financially capable 
of meeting the cost of the demands.30
The companies were desperate to establish a 
denial of justice to encourage the support of the 
state departmental in accordance with the legal 
procedure outlined by the Federal Labour Law of 
1931, the companies, therefore, filed a response to 
the experts' decision. They then waited for 
special group seven of the federal board of 
conciliation and arbitration to review the experts' 
report and their response to it to make a final 
decision on whether to make the experts' 
recommendations legally binding.32 The American 
oil companies reported their compliance with the 
Federal Labour Law of 1931 to the state department 
and expressed their concern that if special group 
seven upheld the experts’ recommendations, they 
would have to stop their Mexican operations.
Thomas Armstrong, a manager of Standard Oil of New 
Jersey, suggested that the state department should 
tell the Mexican government that it was imposing
30 Summary Conclusions and Recommendations in Report 
Rendered by the Commission of Experts, 5 August 1937, 
enclosed in Gallop to Foreign Office, 6 August 1937, FO 371 
20635 [A5926/132/26].
31 The Charge in Mexico (Boal) to the Secretary of State, 16 
August 1937, US Department of State: Foreign Relations of 
the United States: The American Republics. Vol. 5, 1937 
(Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 
1954), p. 665.
32 Mr. F. C. Panill of the Standard Oil Company of New 
Jersey to the Chief of the Division of American Republics 
(Duggan), 11 August 1937, US Department of State: Foreign 
Relations of the United States: The American Republics. Vol. 
5, 1937 (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing 
Office, 1954), pp. 662-64.
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unreasonable conditions on the oil companies and 
ask it to suspend the decision of the board until 
the department had the opportunity to review the 
case. Sumner Welles reiterated that 'the only 
ground for action by the department would be a 
denial of justice' after the companies had 
exhausted all legal avenues in Mexico.33
ANGLO-AMERICAN MUTUAL SUSPICIONS
While special group seven was considering the 
case, Mexico City offered an arrangement for D.A. 
Thomas' independent British oil company Centralamer 
Ltd., a subsidiary of Harrison, Ltd., to drill in 
the Poza Rica field and construct the necessary 
pipelines and refineries to help the national 
Mexican oil company, Pemex, which lacked 
refineries, adequate wells, and marketing 
capabilities abroad.34 News of the probable 
agreement led to heightened Anglo-American tension 
both between American and British oil interests as 
well as London and Washington. It also created a 
rift in the foreign office between the department
33 Memorandum of a Conversation by the Chief of the Division 
of American Republics (Duggan), 18 August 1937, US 
Department of State: Foreign Relations of the United States: 
The American Republics. Vol. 5, 1937 (Washington, D.C.: 
United States Government Printing Office, 1954), pp. 666-7.
34 Department of Overseas Trade to Foreign Office, 13 
October 1937, FO 371 20636 [A7415/132/26]; Starling to 
Holman, 26 November 1937, FO 371 20636 [A8573/132/26].
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of overseas trade and the American department over 
whether to support the interests of an independent 
company over those of Mexican Eagle.
Mexican Eagle was furious at the prospect of 
such an agreement because it had brought in the 
first well in this field in 1930, which the New 
York Times had called 'the second most important 
oil field in the world'.35 The company believed 
that the lands in the Poza Rica area involved in 
the arrangement with Thomas were ones to which it 
had been claiming rights for several years under 
the Petroleum L a w . 36 The Petroleum Law of 31 
December 1925 required companies to apply for the 
Mexican government's confirmation of all of their 
concessions which were acquired before 1 May 1917 
when the constitution went into effect. In order 
to get the concessions confirmed the companies had 
to prove that they had done positive acts or 
development work before 1 May 1917 on the property 
in question. Any such concession, if granted, 
would run for only 50 years, according to the new 
law, rather than in perpetuity as b e f o r e . 37
Starling was concerned that the Mexican 
government had not yet reaffirmed Mexican Eagle's 
concession on lands in Poza Rica and afraid that 
the success of Thomas' company could help the
35 Cronon, p. 42
35 starling to Holman, 26 November 1937, FO 371 20636 
[A8573/132/26].
37 Cronon, p. 42.
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Mexican government in their efforts to bring down 
the existing oil companies in M e x i c o . 3 8 He 
believed that in view of the substantial role Shell 
played in the defence of Britain in comparison with 
the minimal role of companies the size of 
Centralamer, Whitehall ought to consider the 
interests of Mexican Eagle before those of an 
independent company. He also felt compelled to 
support Mexican Eagle because of the enormous 
investments it had already made in M e x i c o . 39
The department of overseas trade disagreed 
with Starling because it believed that if Whitehall 
did not support Thomas' agreement, its business 
might end up in America or Germany.40 in the words 
of Joseph Pyke, the British consul general in 
Mexico City, Thomas' arrangement would help 
'further British sales to Mexico at the expense of 
the United States and Germany'. The department of 
overseas trade also argued that if Thomas had a 
contract with the Mexican government to distribute 
oil, British shipping interests would benefit. 43- 
News that Thomas decided to get tankers and oil 
well machinery from the United States rather than
3® Allen, Minute, 11 October 1937, FO 371 20636 
[A7064/132/26].
39 starling to Holman, 26 November 1937, FO 371 20636 
[A8573/132/26].
Gallop to Foreign Office, 9 September 1937, FO 371 20636 
[A6603/132/26].
^  Consul General Pyke to Foreign Office, 30 August 1937, FO 
371 20636 [A6644/132/26]; Department of Overseas Trade to
American Department, 13 October 1937, FO 371 20636 
[A7415/132/26].
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Britain and the fact that the petroleum department 
was so influential in formulating policy on oil 
matters caused Starling's views to prevail.4^
Mexico's efforts to break the united front 
threatened to cause major friction between the 
large Anglo-American oil interests but ultimately 
failed. In November the Mexican government offered 
Mexican Eagle an agreement for the joint 
exploitation of oil in Poza Rica, and at roughly 
the same time, Mexico City nationalized 350,000 
acres of land leased to the Richmond Petroleum 
Company, a subsidiary of Standard Oil of 
California. Mexican Eagle was tempted by the terms 
Mexico offered and agreed to recognise Mexico's 
right to the subsoil and to participate in a loan 
that the Mexican government had tried to float.^3 
The company promised the Mexican government 13,000 
barrels minimum per day or payment of a royalty of 
up to 35 percent on gross production, which the 
government hoped would help the country through its 
economic crisis.44 In addition the company offered 
to build three refineries in Mexico, buy ten 
tankers and drill a number of wells.4  ^ The major 
oil companies, however, continued to work together 
against Mexico's threats to their oil interests.
4^ Department of Overseas Trade to Allen, 27 November 1937, 
FO 371 20636 [A8583/132/26].
4  ^ Meyer, p. 161; Kluckhohn, pp. 109-110.
44 Rippy, p. 203.
4^ Kluckhohn, p. 110.
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Despite this seemingly good arrangement, the 
American oil interests persuaded Mexican Eagle to 
reject the deal at the last minute in order to 
cooperate with the American companies in trying to 
solve the labour dispute and secure their chances 
of future successful operations in M e x i c o .
Josephus Daniels and Thomas Lockett, the 
American commercial attachd in Mexico reacted 
adversely to Mexican Eagle's initial acceptance. 
Neither Lockett nor Daniels realised that 
Centralamer and Mexican Eagle were competing in the 
Poza Rica field and believed that the two were 
working together. Part of Mexican Eagle's contract 
was to recognise the Mexican government's right to 
approximately 30 drilling locations within the Poza 
Rica area. Part of the independent group's 
contract, which happened so suspiciously near the 
time of the Poza Rica agreement with Mexican Eagle, 
was to drill from 20 to 30 wells in Poza Rica. 
Lockett believed that Centralamer planned to drill 
wells where Mexican Eagle agreed not to and that 
Centralamer also planned to store the oil from 
these wells in storage tanks owned by Mexican 
Eagle.^7 The fact that gasoline, which came from
^  Ambassador in Mexico (Daniels) to the Secretary of State, 
17 November 1937, US Department of State: Foreign Relations 
of the United States: The American Republics. Vol. 5, 1937 
(Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 
1954), p. 674-5; Cronon, p. 184.
^  Daniels to Secretary of State, 13 November 1937, RG 151, 
Records of the Bureau for Foreign and Domestic Commerce 
[File 312: Oils and Minerals-Mexico].
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the particular section of Poza Rica where the 
independent company planned to drill, did not meet 
export specifications made Lockett all the more 
suspicious that the two were working together; the 
only way to make such oil marketable abroad was to 
mix it with high octane gasoline from a major 
company, Shell being the most likely of all.^8
Lockett was also bitter that Mexican Eagle's 
agreement with the Mexican government seemed to 
spare it from labour problems in Mexico which the 
American companies still had to face. He wrote, 
'...concessions granted to Mexican Eagle in Poza 
Rica, in conjunction with the deal of the 
independent British groups, have pulled the 
former's chestnuts out of the fire.' He continued, 
'The already predominant position of Mexican Eagle 
in the petroleum industry has been greatly 
enhanced.'^9 Thomas Lockett lamented that the 
British along with the Mexican government had 
'almost complete control of one of the richest 
petroleum fields yet discovered in Mexico'.50
The US embassy in Mexico even believed that 
British interests were, with the help of the 
Mexican government, driving out US interests. 
Daniels believed that Cdrdenas had deliberately
4® Lockett to Daniels, 17 November 1937, RG 151, Records of 
the Bureau for Foreign and Domestic Commerce [File 312: Oils 
and Minerals-Mexico].
49 Ibid.
50 Daniels to Hull, 17 November 1937, RG 59, Records of the 
Department of State [812.5045/583],
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tried to drive a wedge between the united front of 
American and British oil interests and that the 
British legation had actively supported the 
negotiations of the independent group and Mexican 
Eagle. Pierre Boal, the counsellor of the US 
Embassy in Mexico, suspected that Shell might have 
had hopes of removing American oil interests from 
Mexico with Mexican help.51 Daniels also reported 
to the state department that the granting of the 
Poza Rica concession to Mexican Eagle might make 
the situation for the American companies all the 
more difficult because the Mexican government might 
feel in a stronger position to have special group 
seven uphold the recommendations of the experts.52 
British suspicions of American machinations 
were closely similar. In September Rodney A. 
Gallop, British chargd d'affaires in Mexico, had 
complained to Ramdn Beteta, Mexican undersecretary 
of state for foreign affairs, about US oil 
interests in Mexico which he believed strove to 
eliminate all foreign oil interests. Gallop and 
Beteta agreed that although officials in Washington 
did not strive to eliminate other foreign interests 
in Mexico altogether, certain US business circles 
most probably did, and if the Mexican government
51 Gilman, Ernest: 'Economic Aspects of Anglo-American 
Relations in the Era of Chamberlain and Roosevelt, 1937- 
1940' (Ph.D. diss., University of London, 1976), p. 151; 
Daniels to Secretary of State, 17 November 1937, RG 59, 
Records of the Department of State [812.6363/3042].
52 Daniels to Hull, 17 November 1937, RG 59, Records of the 
Department of State [812.5045/583].
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were intent on eliminating big foreign companies 
from the country, the oil interests of the United 
States would most likely find a way to remain.53 
When he realised how annoyed Washington was over 
the agreement of Mexican Eagle in Poza Rica and the 
arrangement with Thomas, Starling began to fear US 
oil interests in Mexico might come to a compromise 
solution with the Mexican government. British oil 
interests had a much greater stake in the Mexican 
oil industry than those of the United States, and 
therefore, they had a great deal to lose if the 
Mexican government broke the united front by coming 
to a separate agreement with US interests.54
WHITEHALL'S EFFORTS TO GET WASHINGTON'S SUPPORT
On 18 December 1937 special group seven of the 
federal board of conciliation and arbitration 
announced its decision to accept almost all of the 
experts' recommendations and said that the award's 
total cost would be approximately 26,329,393 pesos. 
The companies were horrified and announced their 
plans to appeal the decision in the Mexican supreme 
court. They reiterated that they could not afford 
such an increase particularly since they predicted
53 Gallop to Anthony Eden, 2 September 1937, FO 371 20636 
[A6648/132/26].
54 Starling to Holman, 3 January 1938, FO 371 21461 
[A19/10/26].
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the cost of the award would be much greater than 
the figure stated given all the benefits the 
workers were demanding.55 on 29 December Jersey 
S t a n d a r d ^  issued a defiant press release rejecting 
the board's d e c i s i o n . 5 7
The foreign office was unable to secure any 
cooperation from Washington in reacting to special 
group seven's reaction. When Minister to Mexico 
Owen O'Malley stressed to the American embassy in 
Mexico the need for close cooperation between the 
two countries regarding labour difficulties in 
Mexico,58 he gQt nowhere with Daniels whom he 
described condescendingly as a politician rather 
than a professional diplomat and complained about 
his lack of f r a n k n e s s . 59 O'Malley contrasted the 
secretiveness of Daniels with the helpfulness of 
Pierre Boal, with whom O'Malley tried to cultivate 
a good relationship. O'Malley and members of the 
foreign office began to wish that rumours of Boal 
taking over Daniels' position would soon 
materialise.60
When Ronald Lindsay, British ambassador to the 
US, asked if Welles could arrange close contact
55 Feis to Welles, 20 December 1937, RG 59, Records of the 
Department of State [812.5045/621].
56 standard Oil of New Jersey
57 cronon, p. 176.
58 Holman to Lindsay, 26 December 1937, FO 371 20636 
[A 9329/132/26].
58 O'Malley to Troutbeck, 27 December 1937, FO 371 21462 
[A524/10/26].
60 O'Malley to Holman, 13 January 1938, FO 371 21462 
[A887/10/26].
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between the American embassy and the British 
legation in Mexico, Welles said his government had 
adopted no attitude on the matter. He said that he 
saw no advantage in such a suggestion and that the 
American embassy had not been authorised to make 
any representations to the Mexican government. He 
continued that the matter was within the 
jurisdiction of the Mexican courts and that the oil 
companies needed to go through Mexican legal 
channels to sort out the situation. He even said 
that the American oil companies had made no request 
of the department of state for any help.61 
O'Malley angrily recounted the meeting to the 
foreign office and wrote that it was not true that 
the companies had not requested help. While they 
had not asked for official representations, the 
local American managers had been asking the US 
embassy to show 'a lively interest in the matter to 
the Mexican government and to use unofficial 
influence on the Mexican government'. Welles was 
obviously reluctant to share the details of these 
matters with the British.62
The US policy of intervening only after the 
companies had exhausted legal recourses and a 
denial of justice occurred also angered O'Malley.
Memorandum of a Conversation between Lindsay and Welles, 
29 December 1937, RG 59, Records of the Department of State 
[812.5045/620].
62 O'Malley to Foreign Office, 31 December 1937, FO 371 
21461 [A19/10/26].
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He believed that the most opportune time for the
governments of the United States and Britain to
cooperate in trying to influence the action of the
Mexican government was before the companies
exhausted legal remedies in Mexico. In this way
the Mexican government would be able to back down
from their position while still saving face. If
the companies were to exhaust all legal recourse in
Mexico and still get nowhere, intervention on the
part of the state department or foreign office or
both would leave the Mexican government in a
position from which retreat would be difficult. He
suspected that Welles might be intentionally
misleading Britain:
It must surely be known to 
Welles that a useful moment for 
exercise of influence is before 
legal remedies have been 
exhausted ... before the 
president has got into a 
position from which retreat 
(would be) very difficult.63
63 Ibid.
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THE UNITED STATES AND SILVER
During the Welles-Lindsay conversation of 29 
December Welles never revealed his plans subtly to 
use the prospect of Washington discontinuing 
special direct monthly purchases of Mexican silver, 
as leverage over Mexico City. Such purchases were 
part of a larger policy which started in 1934 with 
the Silver Purchase Act whereby the US treasury 
purchased silver on the world market until the 
value of the metal in the monetary stocks of the 
United States reached one fourth of that of gold or 
until its price exceeded $1.29 per ounce.
Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau had 
started purchasing the metal directly from the 
Mexican government in January 1936 to help it 
obtain badly needed revenue and foreign exchange.
Eduardo Suarez, the Mexican minister of 
finance, on 13 December 1937, had asked Morgenthau 
to purchase 35,805,000 ounces of silver at 45C per 
ounce, advance $10,000,000 and agree to continue 
monthly purchases of silver produced in Mexico.64 
Suarez explained to Morgenthau that Mexican exports 
were suffering from the vast difference in price 
levels between the US and Mexico and that Mexican 
goods simply could not compete with cheaper US 
ones. As a result of the consequent increase in
64 Mexico's Budgetary Situation, 28 December 1937,
Morgenthau Diary, p. 104.
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imports, Mexico had been losing foreign exchange
heavily. People's loss of confidence in the peso
also contributed to the crippling flight of capital
from Mexico. Because of these economic problems,
Suarez announced, the Mexican government was
contemplating raising tariffs on imports.65
Morgenthau was alarmed at Mexico's position.
He shared Roosevelt's view of the world as a
bipolar one with totalitarian forces threatening
democracy. He also shared Roosevelt's belief that
if the United States failed to keep Mexico strong
economically it might fall under German, Italian or
Japanese domination. He wanted to continue the
silver purchases and told Roosevelt:
Mexico was busted and that if we 
did not do something to help 
[it] within a year... Italy,
Germany and Japan would walk in 
there and treat Mexico the way 
they did Spain.[SIC]66
He believed Mexico to be, 'the...greatest store of
natural resources close to the shores of any
country in the world' with 'everything that those
three countries n e e d '.67
While Morgenthau saw the desperate need to
help Mexico immediately, the fact that Mexico City
had failed to pay their long-standing debt to the
65 Conversation with Nijera, Suarez, White, Morgenthau,
Feis, 13 December 1937, 11 a.m., Morgenthau Diary, p. 101.
66 Morgenthau, Diary entry, 15 December 1937, Morgenthau 
Diary, p. 101.
67 Meeting with Taylor, Oliphant, Gaston, Haas, Lochhead, 
Upham, McReynolds and Magill, 16 December 1937, Morgenthau 
Diary, p. 101.
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United States made him hesitate to make aid to 
Mexico appear automatic. He was also appalled at 
Mexico's confiscation of American agrarian lands 
from 1915 and National Railways on 23 June 1937, 
and the prospect of Mexico City increasing tariffs 
further angered him. His plan, therefore, was to 
help Mexico as much as possible while not appearing
too obliging.68
Although Welles shared Morgenthau's concerns 
about Mexico's economy, he devised a plan to use 
Mexico's position of weakness to help the oil 
c o m p a n i e s . 69 on 30 December, the day after talking 
to Lindsay, Welles arranged for Morgenthau to 
withhold announcement of his plans to purchase 
Mexican silver until Welles, at the request of an 
oil company representative, persuaded the Mexican 
government to agree to postpone all other 
proceedings until the companies could appeal the 
matter in the Mexican supreme court.70 Morgenthau 
willingly gave his cooperation to the plan because 
it coincided with his desire to teach Mexico fiscal 
responsibility and not to take US aid for granted.
6® Conversation with Oliphant, Taylor Magill, Gaston, Haas, 
Lochhead, McReynolds, 17 December 1937, Morgenthau Diary, p. 
102.
69 Conversation with Morgenthau, Welles, Feis, Lochhead and 
White, 30 December 1937, 10:45 a.m., Morgenthau Diary, p. 
104.
7® The Ambassador in Mexico (Daniels) to the Secretary of 
State, 30 December 1937, US Department of State: Foreign 
Relations of the United States: The American Republics. Vol. 
5, 1937 (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing 
Office, 1954), pp. 675-6; Adviser on International Economic 
Affairs to Welles, 30 December 1937, RG 59, Records of the 
Department of State [812.5045/622].
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Welles never revealed to the British the 
desire of the state department to put economic 
pressure on Mexico in this way, and the fact that 
he arranged for this delay in announcing silver 
plans shows that he was much more willing to 
support the oil companies than he wanted to let on 
to the British. While the state department did not 
want official intervention, it was willing to help 
the oil companies subtly behind the scenes.
Welles' statement that the US government had 
adopted no attitude and would only intervene if 
there were a denial of justice was clearly designed 
to keep US actions and attitudes secret from the 
British.
WHITEHALL'S INCREASED RESENTMENT AT THE LACK OF US
SUPPORT
Although Welles had arranged for the US oil 
companies to await the supreme court's decision, 
the federal board of conciliation and arbitration 
felt the need to assert itself in the face of what 
it perceived as the growing power of the supreme 
court and on 20 January it ordered the companies to 
comply with the decision of 18 December 1937.71 
Alarmed at this news, the foreign office wanted to
' ft
71 Daniels to Secretary of State, 20 January 1938, RG 59, 
Records of the Department of State [812/5045/629:telegram] .
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determine informally whether the state department 
planned to intervene.7  ^ when on 25 February 
Lindsay approached Welles, the undersecretary said 
he doubted his government would intervene. This 
response omitted the state department's plans to 
get involved if there were a denial of justice, 
which he reiterated to Thomas Armstrong on the same 
day.7  ^ After hearing Welles' statement, Adrian 
Holman described the United States government as 
'to put it mildly, supine'.7  ^ Welles was clearly 
trying to give the British a different impression 
from that which he was giving American oil 
interests.
A few days after Lindsay spoke to Welles, 
O'Malley asked Daniels if the two countries should 
act together in their representations to the 
Mexican government and got an equally unhelpful 
response. Daniels replied that it was better for 
each government to act alone so the Mexicans would 
not think two English-speaking nations were 
conspiring against them. Daniels believed that the 
Mexican government would be more inclined to take
7^ O ’Malley to Foreign Office, 21 February 1938, FO 371 
21462 [A1393/10/26].
7  ^ O'Malley to Foreign Office, 25 February 1938, FO 371 
21462 [A1486/10/26]; Starling to Balfour, 1 March 1938, 371 
21462 [A1625/10/26].
7  ^ O'Malley to Foreign Office, 25 February 1938, FO 371 
21462 [A1486/10/26]; Memorandum of a Conversation between 
Lindsay and Welles, 25 February 1938, RG 59, Records of the 
Department of State [812.5045/707].
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two separate suggestions well rather than one with 
the two countries working together.7 5
After the federal board's decision, the 
Mexican supreme court also upheld the demands of 
the oil workers including the figure of 26,000,000 
pesos on wage increases. The Mexican government 
informed the oil companies of this decision on 1 
March and gave them seven days to comply with 
it.76 The companies, while offering higher wages, 
refused to agree to the other demands. The oil men 
still maintained that they could not afford the 
extra expense the demands would require and 
believed that the Mexican government was 
intentionally making excessive demands so they 
could later confiscate the oil companies' 
property.77
John Balfour and Frederick Starling agreed 
that the supreme court's verdict created a very 
urgent situation. Balfour, therefore, authorised 
O'Malley to go directly to the Mexican government 
and express strong dissatisfaction at 'the probable 
consequences to established British interests 
should the findings of the Arbitration Board be
7  ^ Daniels, Notes, 29 February 1938, Papers of Josephus
Daniels; Daniels to the Secretary of State, 28 February
1938, RG 59, Records of the Department of State
[812.5045/664].
7® The Ambassador in Mexico (Daniels) to the Secretary of 
State, 4 March 1938, US Department of State: Foreign 
Relations of the United States, 1938, Vol 5 (Washington, 
D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1956), p 
723 .
77 Josephus Daniels, Diary entry, 5 March 1938, Papers of 
Josephus Daniels.
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made effective.' Balfour also told him to convey 
the hope that a solution would be reached which 
would be satisfactory to Mexico City and fair to 
the oil interests, 'which have invested very large 
capital in Mexico and have rendered great service 
to the oil industry'.78 on 8 March O'Malley 
delivered a note to Mexican Foreign Minister 
Eduardo Hay both expressing Whitehall's hope of a 
mutually satisfactory solution and expressing 
concern for the interests of British shareholders 
in Mexican Eagle.79
Whitehall also had O ’Malley and Lindsay try to 
secure Washington's cooperation and to 'dislodge 
the United States government from its seemingly 
passive attitude'. Starling wanted O'Malley and 
Lindsay specifically to mention the danger of the 
oil nationalisation in Mexico spreading to other 
South American countries and the fact that the 
timing of the crisis was particularly serious 
because problems in Europe threatened Britain with 
a war that would limit or even block access to 
British oil supplies in the Near East and Far East 
and leave the country dependent on oil from the 
western hemisphere. The British government hoped 
that because US interests in Venezuela, Colombia 
and Peru were much greater than in Mexico, the
Balfour, Minute, 1 March 1938, FO 371 21462 
[A1682/10/260].
79 O'Malley to Eduardo Hay, 8 March 1938, RG 59, Records of 
the Department of State [A812.6363/3135].
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state department would take action upon hearing 
that the Mexican government was encouraging other 
Latin American countries to adopt a common policy 
with regard to foreign domination of their oil 
industries.80
When O'Malley suggested to Daniels that the 
state department should issue a note to the Mexican 
government similar to the British one of 8 March, 
Daniels replied that the American companies had not 
yet asked the state department for assistance and 
implied that his instructions did not allow him to 
do more than show a personal interest in solving 
the matter. Balfour knew what he said was untrue 
and wrote that Daniels was 'talking nonsense' 
because representatives of the oil companies had 
spoken to the state department on 3 March.81
Similarly, Lindsay failed to get a helpful 
response from Welles, who replied that for the time 
being Washington did not plan to make any
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s .82 He then criticised the oil
companies in Mexico most of which had obtained 
valuable concessions and had 'always extracted 
maximum profit with minimum consideration for
O'Malley to the Foreign Office, 10 March 1938, FO 371 
21463 [A1899/10/26]; O'Malley to Foreign Office, 9 March 
1938, FO 371 21463 [A1865/10/26].
O'Malley to Foreign Office, 10 March 1938, FO 371 21463 
[A1899/10/26].
Memorandum of a Conversation between Lindsay and Welles, 
14 March 1938, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, 
[812.5045/695].
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labour or any other i n t e r e s t s ' . ®3 The British
government was particularly upset at Welles'
reaction this time. Balfour called it 'a douche of
cold w a t e r ',84 and Gerald Gray Fitzmaurice, acting
first secretary in the diplomatic service, called
Washington's response 'heartbreaking' because of
the superior position of the United States with
regard to oil:
I fear that what Welles had in 
mind was in fact that in time of 
war, Britain would be largely 
dependent on foreign supplies 
of oil whereas the United States 
owing to their big home 
production would not. They 
could therefore afford to look 
with comparative equanimity on 
this sort of thing whereas it is 
vital to Britain that our 
foreign sources of supply should 
remain under British-owned 
control.®5
In a final attempt to resolve the Mexican oil 
matter, the companies at the initiative of Royal 
Dutch/Shell, offered the Mexican government to pay 
the wage increase of up to 26,000,000 pesos 
provided that the Mexican government agreed to 
revise some of the more objectionable of the 
administrative clauses.86 Both O'Malley and 
Daniels talked to the Mexican government to try to 
get a last minute agreement. Specifically Daniels
Lindsay to Foreign Office, 14 March 1938, FO 371 21364 
[A2004/10/26] .
84 Balfour, Minute, 16 March 38, FO 371 21463 [A2004/10/26] .
85 Fitzmaurice, Minute, 16 March 1938, FO 371 21463 
[A2004/10/26].
85 O'Malley to Foreign Office, 16 March 1938, FO 371 21463 
[A2086/10/26].
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wanted the Mexican government to induce the workers 
to withdraw the objectionable provisions.®^
Despite last minute negotiations, President 
Cdrdenas on 18 March 1938 issued a decree 
expropriating the oil properties of certain named 
companies: subsidiaries of Shell,®® and the 
American companies Standard Oil of New Jersey, 
Standard Oil of California, and the Sinclair Group. 
In the decree Cdrdenas promised to have the 
minister of finance compensate the oil companies in 
cash within 10 years. The decree was effective 
immediately, and the army started seizing 
everything possible such as derricks and refineries 
as well as personal property.®®
In conclusion, several themes of this chapter 
will become important to the story and analysis 
later in this thesis. First, Welles' inability to 
act consistently on this matter is evident as he 
refused to intervene to defend them from the 
challenges put forward by Mexico one minute and 
then tried to manipulate events in their favour the 
next. A second important theme is Britain's 
reliance on Washington which continued to frustrate
Daniels to Roosevelt, 22 March 1938, President's 
Secretary's File, Papers of Franklin D. Roosevelt.
®® The subsidiary of Shell, Mexican Eagle, is often referred 
to in documents by its Spanish name, 'Aguila
The Ambassador in Mexico (Daniels) to the Secretary of 
State, 19 March 1938, Foreign Relations of the United 
States. 1938, Vol 5 (Washington, D.C.: United States 
Government Printing Office, 1956), pp.725-7.
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officials in Whitehall and became worse after the 
severance of Anglo-Mexican relations in May 1938. 
Third, in this chapter a pattern emerges which 
becomes more pronounced after the expropriation 
whereby London and the Anglo-American oil interests 
agreed that Washington should take active and 
strong measures to ensure the rights of the oil 
companies in Mexico. Each tried in turn without 
success to persuade Washington to do so. Last, 
while London and Washington harboured resentment 
toward one another, the major Anglo-American oil 
interests, despite the brief threat to their united 
front in November 1937, worked together throughout 
the crisis until November 1941.
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CHAPTER THREE 
WASHINGTON'S REACTION: MARCH 1938-NOVEMBER 1938
If bad feelings should result in Central and South 
America as a result of the oil situation that exists 
just now with Mexico, it would be more expensive for 
us than the cost of all the oil in Mexico A
Harold Ickes
My dear friend, Cordell Hull, let his Tennessee temper 
lead him into undue sharpness in a message to Mexico.2
Josephus Daniels
Washington's reaction to the expropriation 
reflected the dilemma which divided policy-makers. On 
the one hand, Hull recognised the need to send an 
unequivocal message to Mexico that Washington refused 
to condone the expropriation. If President Cdrdenas 
were to carry out his oil policy with impunity it 
would possibly encourage other countries which might 
be contemplating similar programmes and also impede 
reciprocal trade agreements. The day before the 
expropriation, Hull had delivered a speech before the 
National Press Club in Washington, D.C., which 
received Roosevelt's enthusiastic support. In the 
speech he had asserted that Washington needed to
1 Ickes, Harold L.: The Secret Diarv of Harold Ickes. Vol. 2 
(London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1955), p. 352.
2 Wood, Bryce: The Making of the Good Neighbor Policy (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1961) p. 211.
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insist on the 'universal observance of the principles
of international law' and mutual respect between
nations of one anothers' rights.3 on the other hand
Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes and even Hull
himself could not whole-heartedly defend the oil
companies' interests for fear of alienating Mexico
City and driving Cdrdenas into close relations with
potentially hostile countries. The perceived need to
adhere to the Good Neighbor policy to keep fascist and
communist influences out of Mexico, therefore, made
good relations with America's southern neighbour a
priority. As Ickes wrote shortly after the
expropriation:
If bad feelings should result in 
Central and South America as a 
result of the oil situation that 
exists just now with Mexico, it 
would be more expensive for us than 
the cost of all the oil in Mexico.4
The purpose of this chapter is to analyse how 
different individuals in Washington responded to the 
expropriation in the context of this dilemma. It is 
shown that the state department did not whole­
heartedly support the oil companies, as E. David 
Cronon suggests in Josephus Daniels in M e x i c o .5
3 Hull, Cordell: The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, vol 1 (London: 
Hodder & Stoughton, 1948), pp. 576-7.
4 Ickes, Harold L.: The Secret Diarv of Harold Ickes. Vol. 2 
(London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1955), p. 352.
5 Cronon, E. David: Josephus Daniels in Mexico (Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1960).
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Despite Hull's attempts to punish Mexico economically 
in the aftermath of the oil expropriation, he did not 
favour oil companies over other American businesses 
that had lost properties in the expropriation of 
agrarian and railroad lands. Hull's priority was 
getting a reciprocal trade agreement, and the timing 
of the oil expropriation just after Mexico increased 
tariff rates in early 1938 influenced Hull's reaction 
more than anything. Higher tariff rates were an 
obvious impediment to a trade agreement, a component 
of the reciprocal trade agreement programme on which 
Hull had spent most of his political life in 
Washington.6 He, therefore, felt the need to punish 
Mexico economically to gain its respect for American 
business interests operating in Mexico before closer 
economic ties with the country could be achieved.
It is also the purpose of this chapter to show 
how Daniels and Roosevelt were able to temper Hull's 
angry reaction to Mexico and how Roosevelt's 
involvement in the matter had a significant impact on 
Welles' attitude toward Mexico. In addition, Hull 
linked peace and close trade relations, and he himself 
often had to temper his own desires to stand up for US 
business in Mexico which he believed would foster
6 Wood, pp. 210-211.
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closer economic relations with Mexico in order to 
placate Mexico for more immediate defence needs.
This chapter will in turn show that the state 
department's initial reaction was a compromise between 
upholding the Good Neighbor policy and supporting the 
interests of US investors in Mexico. Second it is 
seen that the picture of Secretary of the Treasury 
Henry Morgenthau in the secondary sources is 
inaccurate. While the literature claims that 
Morgenthau with his execution of the Silver Purchase 
Act did his best to temper Hull's harsh reaction, 
Morgenthau's unpublished Diaries indicate that Harry 
Dexter White, his adviser, rather than Morgenthau, 
deserves the credit for trying to help Mexico.^
Third it will be seen how both Roosevelt and 
Daniels, contemptuous of big business and sympathetic 
to Cdrdenas’ efforts to champion the cause of 
repressed peoples, softened the impact of Hull's 
policy. Like Hull, Daniels was concerned about 
maintaining peace and wanted increased trade and 
improved relations with Mexico; however, he had little 
sympathy for the oil companies whom he accused of 
exploiting Mexican workers. He strongly opposed
^ Alan Seymor Everest's Morgenthau. the New Deal and Silver 
(New York: King's Crown Press of Columbia University, 1950) is 
based on interviews with Morgenthau and gives him credit for 
policies that Morgenthau's Diaries indicate that White was 
responsible for.
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economic sanctions or a hard line toward Mexico. 
Instead, he believed, Washington should do everything 
possible to help make Mexico strong economically and 
foster good will to make Mexicans 'our best neighbors 
and best customers'.® Daniels felt so strongly that 
he secretly initiated his own policy from the embassy 
in Mexico to temper Hull's angry response to the 
expropriation. The fact that the president held his 
former boss in the navy in such high esteem allowed 
him to change policy without Hull recalling him. 
Daniels' diplomacy in Mexico and Roosevelt's casual 
encounter with a reporter in Warm Springs, Georgia, in 
which he revealed his lack of sympathy for the oil 
companies, both made a contribution to Cdrdenas' and 
the Mexican people's impression that Washington 
approved of the expropriation. Fourth, the effect of 
Roosevelt's and Daniels' intervention on Welles' 
policy is seen.
Fifth, it is shown that Hull soon gave up hope 
that the oil companies would get their properties 
returned, and increasing defence concerns led him to 
diverge more and more from their interests. Concerned 
about the implications of the internal situation in 
Mexico, Hull tried to get the oil companies to 
compromise with Mexico much to their anger. Sixth, it
® Daniels to Roosevelt, 31 August 1938, Papers of Josephus 
Daniels.
93
is seen that Hull turned to settling the matter of 
Mexico's expropriation of agrarian lands belonging to 
US citizens and initially tried to set a helpful 
precedent for the oil companies; however, concerns to 
get Mexico City's support in the upcoming Lima 
conference in December caused Hull to make concessions 
to Mexico on agrarian matters.
THE OIL COMPANIES AND WASHINGTON
The most pressing concern for the oil companies 
was the possibility of other countries following in 
Mexico's footsteps. The Mexican Petroleum Law of 
1925, which exchanged private property rights for 
government concessions, the Morrow-Calles agreement of 
1928, which recognised the Mexican government's 
authority over oil resources, as well as the 
exhaustion of older fields in Mexico had caused 
British and American oil interests to shift much of 
their production from Mexico to Venezuela and Colombia 
during the 1920's. The oil companies, therefore, were 
especially concerned to set an example that would 
protect their investments in Venezuela, at that time
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the third largest oil producer in the world, as well 
as in other countries.9
The companies hoped to secure the return of 
their properties by demanding compensation they knew 
Mexico could not pay, proving the expropriation's 
illegality and getting the state department to demand 
the return of the properties.10 It had been the 
policy of the state department before the 
expropriation to insist that the companies go through 
legal channels in Mexico before Washington intervened 
on their behalf. Assuming this policy still applied, 
the companies on 4 April started proceedings in Mexico 
City to get an injunction against the expropriation.H 
The Mexican constitution stated that in cases of 
expropriation, Mexico must compensate at the time of 
the t a k i n g .  ^2 *phe Expropriation Law of 23 November 
193 6, however, provided for payment within a period of 
ten years.12 The companies sought to hold the Mexican 
government to the constitution's requirement for 
immediate compensation, and both Whitehall and the oil 
companies stated that because of Mexico's inability to
^ Jonathan Brown explains this shift in his article,'Why 
Foreign Oil Companies Shifted their Production from Mexico to 
Venezuela during the 1920's' American Historical Review. April 
1985, v.90 (2).
1® Armstrong to Hull, 21 July 1938, RG 59, Records of the 
Department of State [812.6363/4450].
11 Cronon, p. 201.
12 Gaither, Roscoe B.: Expropriation in Mexico. The Facts and 
the Law (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1940) p. 9.
13 Ibid., pp. 9-10.
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pay adequate compensation early enough the 
expropriation was illegal. ^
In its pamphlet 'Empty Promises', written to 
give publicity to the oil companies' case against 
Mexico, Standard Oil of New Jersey called attention to 
Mexico's unpaid foreign debts which had been in 
default since 1927 and earlier in some cases. ^  In 
April the Anglo-American oil interests confidently 
asserted that their former properties were worth $450 
million, a figure which included lost profits on oil 
still in the ground despite the absurdity of making 
calculations on future profits on estimated sizes of 
oil reserves.16 The Mexican government disagreed 
strongly with the claim citing the Mexican 
constitution which only required that Mexico pay for 
the cadastral value of the property which excluded 
future profits on oil still in the ground but included 
any money spent on implements less d e p r e c i a t i o n . ^  
Although the mining code of November 1884 in Mexico 
had stated that whoever owned the surface land owned 
the rights to petroleum in the subsoil, the 
constitution of 1917 vested the subsoil in the nation,
14 Armstrong to Hull, 21 July 1938,RG 59, Records of the 
Department of State [812.6363/4450]
standard Oil of New Jersey: Empty Promises (New York: 
Standard Oil Company, 1940)
16 state Department, Chronology, n.d., RG 59, Records of the 
Department of State [812.6363/7104 1/2].
17 Gaither, p. 114.
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making the oil companies' claim of ownership difficult 
to uphold.18
After starting the legal proceedings in Mexico 
the oil companies urged the state department to make 
representations to Mexico City. Although Hull and 
Welles initially responded in a promising manner, they 
later failed to give strong support to the oil 
companies. ^  Welles was at first furious and told 
Mexican Ambassador Francisco Castillo Ndjera on March 
21 that the oil expropriation put Mexican-American 
relations in a critical state. He complained that 
shortly after the United States treasury had bought a 
large amount of Mexican silver in January to help 
Mexico out of a financial crisis, Cdrdenas launched a 
policy which Welles bluntly described as 'suicidal'. 
Welles clearly was supporting the oil companies when 
he also told Castillo Ndjera that the oil properties 
were worth 'many hundreds of millions of dollars', a 
figure which was consistent with the oil companies' 
view that they deserved to be compensated for lost 
profits on oil still in the ground. He reacted to the 
Mexican promise to pay compensation by bluntly telling 
the Mexican ambassador that because the government was
18 Ibid., pp. 2-3.
19 State Department, Chronology, n.d., RG 59, Records of the 
Department of State [812.5045/702-3169]
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not financially capable of paying cash for the 
properties:
the mere assertion by the Mexican 
authorities that ... cash would be 
given for these equities within a 
period of ten years carried no 
conviction whatever.20
He continued that the Mexican government was
alienating American public opinion to the point that
if it persisted with confiscatory policies, Washington
would not be able to negotiate a solution to the
outstanding issues between the two countries.21
His blunt treatment of Castillo Ndjera contrasts
with the sentiments he expressed in a letter to
Daniels the previous November in which he stated that
the time for threats and 'high-handed and domineering
attitudes on our part with regard to the other
American republics is p a s t . ' 22 it also contrasts with
the statements he made to Laurence Duggan, chief of
the division of American republics, a week after he
spoke to Castillo Ndjera that the question of the
decree of expropriation 'cannot be passed upon until
the American companies have resorted to all legal
recourse in Mexico.' In addition, 'we have not yet
2® Memorandum of a Conversation by the Under Secretary of State 
(Welles), 21 March 1938, US Department of State: Foreign 
Relations of the United States. 1938, Vol. 5 (Washington, D.C.: 
United States Government Printing Office, 1956), pp.729-33.
21 Ibid.
22 Welles to Daniels, 8 November 1937, Papers of Josephus 
Daniels.
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had time to determine whether in our judgement the 
proceedings against the American companies involved a 
denial of justice.'23*
Hull was also furious with President Cdrdenas 
and regarded Mexico's expropriation as 'hari kari in 
its commercial relations with us.' Before protecting 
the interests of the oil companies, Hull wanted to 
punish Mexico both to show United States citizens who 
had contemplated making investments in Mexico that the 
state department was not passive when presented with 
challenges to US business interests. He also wanted 
to discourage other countries who might try to follow 
Mexico's e x a m p l e . 24 Despite Hull's anger, however, he 
could not overtly intervene in Mexico or demand that 
Cdrdenas return the properties. The US's pledges of
23 Welles to Duggan, 28 March 1938, RG 59, Records of the 
Department of State [812.6363/3311].
*Realising the emphasis the state department put on using 
Mexican legal channels the oil companies tried to get the 
courts to declare the expropriation decree illegal or to 
establish a denial of justice so the state department would 
become more involved in supporting their interests. First, in 
April, they filed for an injunction against both the 
expropriation law of November 1936 and the decree of March 1938 
on the grounds that both were unconstitutional. In addition 
they claimed that seizing the oil properties without 
compensation was illegal. Unsurprisingly the Mexican courts 
withheld the legality of what Cardenas had done including his 
promise to pay compensation within 10 years. In December 1939 
the supreme court upheld the rulings by the lower courts and 
ruled that compensation needed to be paid on the surface 
properties only rather than on oil still in the ground. [Meyer, 
Lorenzo: Mexico and the United States in the Oil Controversy 
1918-1942 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1972), pp. 179- 
80] .
24 Telephone Conversation between Hull and Daniels, 21 March 
1938, Papers of Cordell Hull.
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non-intervention at the pan-American conferences at 
Montevideo in 1933 and Buenos Aires in 1936 prevented 
Washington from intervening in the matter which Mexico 
regarded as strictly an internal matter.25
Hull came up with a plan which was consistent 
with international law and non-intervention but at the 
same time greatly damaged Mexico's economy to coerce 
Cdrdenas into conducting policy according to his 
w i s h e s . The first part of the plan was to ask 
Daniels to deliver a note to Mexico dated 26 March 
1938, which emphasized the dedication of the United 
States to the Good Neighbor policy while at the same 
time stressing its reciprocal nature. The note 
denounced expropriations without compensation such as 
the ones that had occurred under the agrarian policy. 
It, however, stayed within the bounds of international 
law by admitting that the government of the United 
States did not question Mexico City's right to take 
over property as long as it paid prompt, just and 
adequate compensation to the former owners. The note 
expressed a desire to settle American claims against 
Mexico which had been accumulating throughout the 
years and demanded of the Mexican government a 
specific plan for payment for the properties in 
question and assurances that they would be made. The
25 Cronon, pp. 217-18.
26 Meyer, p. 188.
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note closed with a sharp request for a 'prompt 
reply’ . 27
Hull believed that insisting upon compensation 
would lead to the return of the properties and at 
least give the appearance of Mexico's renewed respect 
for US investments. He knew that Mexico was incapable 
of paying what the oil companies considered adequate 
compensation due to its worsening economic problems 
and showed his contempt for Mexico City's promise of 
compensation by dismissing it as 'utterly 
unimportant'.28 Assistant Secretary of State Adolf 
Berle, who tended to agree with Hull on Mexican 
matters, said that compensation would 'not solve the 
situation.'29
The second part of the plan was to harm Mexico's 
economy both to make Cdrdenas realise the importance 
of American good will and to diminish further Mexico's 
ability to pay compensation. Like the companies, Hull 
wanted to increase the chances of Cdrdenas returning 
the oil companies' former properties due to Mexico's 
inability to pay adequate compensation. At the same 
time Hull wanted Daniels to deliver the note to 
Mexico City on 27 March, Hull secured Morgenthau's
27 Hull to Daniels, 26 March 1938, RG 59, Records of the 
Department of State [812.6363/3190A].
28 Telephone Conversation between Secretary Hull and Daniels,
21 March 1938, Papers of Cordell Hull.
28 Berle, Diary entry, 23 March 1938, Diary, Papers of Adolf 
Berle.
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cooperation in announcing the suspension of special 
monthly purchases of Mexican silver.30 in 1937 Mexico 
had earned $30 million from silver exports, which 
provided the country with both needed revenue and 
dollar exchange. Hull also persuaded Morgenthau to 
decrease the price of silver on the world market so 
that Mexico would earn less when it tried to sell 
stocks of silver,31 and by 29 March Morgenthau had 
lowered the price of silver per ounce from 45 cents to 
43 cents.32
Although Morgenthau purchased the metal on the 
world market without prejudice to Mexican silver, the 
lower price caused Mexico to suffer economically for 
two reasons.33 First, the Bank of Mexico controlled 
the silver purchases to the US, and the change in 
Washington's policy largely stopped the Mexican 
government's revenue from silver purchases, which in 
1936 amounted to a value of $30.5 million. Second 
although the peso was not backed by silver, 
Washington's announcement that it would suspend
30 Everest, pp. 88-89.
33 Gardner, Lloyd: Economic Aspects of the New Deal Diplomacy 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1959), pp. 116-19; Chester, 
Edward W . : United States Oil Policy and Diplomacy (Westport, 
Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1983), p. 125.
3^ McMahon, William E.: Two Strikes and Out (Garden City: 
Country Life, 1939), pp. 124-5.; Conversation with Taylor, 
Lochhead and Morgenthau, 28 March, 11:54 a.m., Morgenthau Diary 
#117.
33 Daniels to Hull, 9 April 1938, RG 59, Records of the 
Department of State [812.6363/3388].
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special purchases of Mexican silver caused holders of 
pesos in Mexico to lose confidence in the currency and 
sell them for dollars, thus contributing to the peso's 
depreciation. The Bank of Mexico, which for some time 
had been struggling to keep the exchange rate stable, 
had to take the peso off the foreign exchange market 
out of fear that the public might withdraw all of its 
reserves.34 Following the expropriation of the 
petroleum industry in March 1938, the peso declined 
from 3.60 to 5 to the dollar.35
In early April, Eduardo Hay, the Mexican foreign 
minister, expressed his hope that the United States 
treasury would resume special purchases of Mexican 
silver and said that the discontinuation of purchases 
of the metal had hurt Mexico 'psychologically, 
economically and financially'. Concerned about 
Mexico, Daniels informed the secretary of state, 'It 
is generally recognised that the discontinuation of 
silver purchases lessens Mexico's ability to pay,'36 
an argument which, unbeknownst to Daniels, probably 
encouraged Hull to persist with such a policy.
E. David Cronon has noted that the state 
department resorted to economic retaliation against
3^ Meyer, pp. 204-5.
3 5 Robert G. McGregor, American Consulate General in Mexico, 
Analysis of the Mexican Silver Industry, 30 January 1939, RG 
59, Records of the Department of State [812.6342/36].
3 6 Daniels to Hull, 7 April 1938, RG 59, Records of the 
Department of State [811.515 Silver/162].
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Mexico only after the oil expropriation. By contrast, 
it had opted for mere diplomatic protests to solve the 
matter of agrarian lands which had been expropriated 
following several decrees and laws since 1915, the 
debt from which remained unpaid, as well as the 
expropriation of the partly US-owned Mexican National 
Railways Company on 23 June 1937. Cronon believes 
that the fact that the state department reacted far
more strongly to the oil expropriation, despite the
fact that comparable amounts of foreign capital were
invested in the rail and oil industries, points to
Washington's favouritism towards the oil companies.37 
Hull's humble background, however, gave him no reason 
to show the oil companies such loyalty. The timing of 
the oil expropriation just after the increase in 
Mexican tariffs no doubt influenced his reaction more 
than anything. He called the expropriation of the oil 
properties, 'but one incident in a long series of 
incidents of this character' .38 The ambivalence 
exhibited by Sumner Welles towards the oil problem 
shows that, like Hull, he had no special loyalty to 
oil interests.
37 Cronon, pp. 127-8.
38 Rippy, Merrill: Oil and the Mexican Revolution (Leiden: E.J. 
Brill, 1972), p. 97.
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MORGENTHAU AND SILVER
Much of the secondary literature indicates that 
Morgenthau, because of his belief in the need to keep 
Mexico economically strong enough to avoid fascist or 
communist influences, only reluctantly agreed to 
Hull's p l a n ; 39 however, Morgenthau's Diary shows his 
willingness. His motives, however, were entirely 
different from those of Hull. Morgenthau was still 
highly concerned about the state of the Mexican 
economy and the need to keep communist and fascist 
elements from gaining influence in Mexico, but, at the 
time, he had become tired of executing the terms of 
the Silver Purchase Act and had lost his temper for 
reasons that had nothing to do with Mexico.
First, Morgenthau wanted to put an end to the 
act because he was tired of taking the blame for 
Washington's policies involving silver. With the 
exception of Welles and Dr. Herbert Feis, economic 
adviser to the state department, Morgenthau disliked 
working with officials in the state department 
especially Cordell Hull, when Morgenthau discovered
39 For example see: Chester, Edward W. : United States Oil 
Policy and Diplomacy ; Cronon, E. David: Josephus Daniels in 
Mexico ; Everest, Allan Seymor: Morgenthau. the New Deal and 
Silver ; Gardner, Lloyd C.: Economic Aspects of New Deal 
Diplomacy .
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that the state department had informed Mexico City of 
the treasury's plan to stop buying Mexican silver 
directly he fumed. Not only had the state department 
informed Cdrdenas well before the treasury's own 
announcement,4  ^but it had also blamed the new policy 
entirely on Morgenthau.41
Second, Morgenthau also considered the Silver 
Purchase Act to be a costly waste which many countries 
used for profit and which Washington could not afford 
to continue. He predicted that after the announcement 
about stopping the special purchases from Mexico, 
countries would try to sell their silver immediately 
in case the US treasury lowered the world price to 
punish Mexico.42 The Spanish ambassador confirmed his 
fears when he made an offer, which Morgenthau called 
'the last straw*, to sell the treasury 56 million 
ounces of the metal. This silver, the ambassador 
explained, could not be delivered for one to three 
months and would probably have to remain unrefined for 
a year because of the heavy demand on refineries. 
Morgenthau realised that the United States could not 
make such an absurd commitment to Spain and 
contemplated allowing the price of silver on the world
40 Cronon, p. 192.
4  ^ Conversation with Taylor and Lochhead and Morgenthau, 28 
March 1938, 11:54 a.m., Morgenthau Diary, #117.
42 Conversation with Taylor and Lochhead, and Morgenthau, 28 
March 1938, 9:07 a.m., Morgenthau Diary, #117.
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market to reach its own level. Morgenthau also 
realised that the architect of the act, Chairman of 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Key Pittman 
from the silver mining state of Nevada, only cared 
about the domestic price of silver which affected his 
constituents, rather than the price of the metal on 
the world market.^3
His communication to Roosevelt on 25 March about 
Hull's plan contrasts with the communications he had 
sent Roosevelt the previous December and January and 
reflected his feelings of exasperation with the silver 
policy. Instead of telling Roosevelt that Mexico was 
suffering economically and saying that he wanted to 
continue purchases of silver as he had in December
1937, Morgenthau sent a letter with a very different 
message to the president who was on one of his many 
visits to the reputedly therapeutic natural springs in 
Warm Springs, Georgia. Morgenthau informed Roosevelt 
that he had decided to cooperate with Hull's plan and 
told him that he would interpret a lack of reply from 
him as consent.44 if Morgenthau had been in the least 
hesitant about stopping the silver purchases he would 
have sought Roosevelt's opinion. Instead he made it 
more convenient for the president to agree than to
43 Conversation with Taylor, Morgenthau and Lochhead, 28 March
1938, 11:54 a.m., Morgenthau Diary, #117.
4^ Morgenthau to Roosevelt, 25 March 1938, Office Files, Papers 
of Franklin Roosevelt.
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intervene. He called this technique of securing the 
president's passive support the 'Warm Springs 
technique'.45
While Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Harry 
Dexter White sympathised with Morgenthau's frustration 
at the state department and the excessive purchases of 
silver,46 he emphasised that 'the elements for serious 
political and economic disintegration in Mexico 
definitely exist'. Whether the situation would get 
bad enough to create serious problems, he believed, 
depended on foreign governments and whether they 
wanted to retaliate economically against Mexico.
White also believed that Washington and the American 
oil companies would have much to gain if they helped 
Mexico financially and warned that forceful tactics 
with Mexico City might drive the country to fascist or 
communist countries for h e l p . 47 After careful 
consideration of White’s arguments, Morgenthau decided 
to form policy on a day to day basis rather than let 
silver find its natural p r i c e . 48
45 Meeting with Magill, Oliphant, Taylor, Klotz, Gaston, Bell, 
McReynolds, Gibbons, Upham, Lochhead, White, Haas, 25 March 
1938, Morgenthau Diary, #117.
45 Conversation with Taylor and Lochhead and Morgenthau, 28 
March 1938, 11:54 a.m., Morgenthau Diary, #117.
4*7 White to Morgenthau, 1 April 1938, Morgenthau Diary, #118. 
4® Memorandum of a Conversation, 5 April 1938, RG 59, Records 
of the Department of State [812.6363/3450].
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DANIELS' AND ROOSEVELT'S EFFECT ON HULL'S POLICY
The third part of Hull's plan was to instruct 
Daniels to return to Washington directly after he 
delivered the note dated 26 March in order to confer 
with the state department. Daniels disobeyed the 
instructions because he considered the note a threat 
to Mexican-American relations and believed that Hull 
had let his 'Tennessee temper lead him into undue 
sharpness to Mexico'.^9 Daniels wanted the United 
States to help the Mexican government in its reforms 
in every way possible because he believed that 
Mexico's programs including the oil expropriation 
would provide the masses with more wealth and more 
purchasing power which would make Mexico a better 
market for goods from the United States and combat the 
spread of communism and fascism.50 Disappointed that 
he was only able to persuade Hull to make an 
insignificant change in the note and to agree 
temporarily to refrain from printing it,51 Daniels 
decided to soften the impact of the note without 
informing Hull by telling Foreign Minister Eduardo Hay 
to consider it 'not received'. Suspicious of Hull's
 ^^ Wood, p . 211.
50 Meyer, p. 185.
51 Daniels to Roosevelt, 22 March 1938, President's Secretary's 
File, Papers of Franklin Roosevelt.
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orders for him to return to Washington, he remained in 
Mexico to ensure Hull would not threaten to break 
relations during his absence.52
For many weeks, Hull had no idea that Daniels 
had done anything other than deliver the note in the 
normal w a y . 53 when Hull found out about the fate of 
the note almost four months later by Cdrdenas' 
comments in a press conference, he was furious, but 
could not recall Daniels because of his relationship 
with R o o s e v e l t . 54 instead, Hull insisted that Daniels 
inform Cdrdenas that Washington had always considered 
the note as valid and received in the normal way.
Hull did, however, agree to keep the note from being 
published in order to avoid further e m b a r r a s s m e n t . 55 
However, when Hull wanted to send a note to Mexico 
City on the agrarian expropriations a few days later, 
he sent it via Castillo Ndjera rather than D a n i e l s . 56
52 Koppes, Clayton: 'The Good Neighbor Policy and the 
Nationalization of Mexican Oil' Journal of American History 
(June, 1982), p. 70.
52 23 July 1938, Diary of Josephus Daniels.
54 Wood, pp. 217-19.
55 Memorandum of a Conversation, 21 July 1938, RG 59, Records 
of the Department of State [812.6363/4490]; The Ambassador in 
Mexico (Daniels) to the Secretary of State, 21 July 1938, US 
Department of State: Foreign Relations of the United States. 
1938, Vol. 5 (Washington, D.C.: United States Government
Printing Office, 1956), p.756.; The Secretary of State to the
Ambassador in Mexico (Daniels), 21 July 1938, US Department of
State: Foreign Relations of the United States. 1938, Vol. 5
(Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 
1956), pp. 756-7.
56 Wood, p. 218.
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Before the state department was aware of the 
note's fate, the Mexican government expressed its 
appreciation for Washington's understanding attitude. 
Cardenas even informed Washington it had 'won the 
esteem of the people of Mexico', and reiterated his 
promise to compensate the companies without 
specifying, as the note of 26 March had requested, how 
and giving any guarantees.57 Washington’s reactions 
to Mexico's responses were highly inconsistent. On 31 
March Welles appeared to support the oil companies by 
telling Castillo Ncijera bluntly that the Mexican reply 
had not specified, as the note of 26 March had 
requested, how the Mexican government planned to pay 
compensation to the oil p r o p e r t i e s .58
However, Roosevelt's comments the following day 
in an informal interview with a reporter in warm 
Springs, Georgia, which received much publicity in 
American and Mexican newspapers, contradicted what 
Hull and Welles had told Mexican officials. Roosevelt 
revealed that he was content with Cdrdenas' general 
promise to compensate the oil companies for the value 
of their original investment. He agreed with Cdrdenas
57 The Ambassador in Mexico (Daniels) to the Secretary of 
State, 31 March 1938, US Department of State: Foreign Relations 
of the United States. 1938, Vol. 5 (Washington, D.C.: United 
States Government Printing Office, 1956), pp. 739-41.
5® Memorandum of a Conversation by the Under Secretary of State 
(Welles), 31 March 1938, US Department of State: Foreign 
Relations of the United States. 1938, Vol. 5 (Washington, D.C.: 
United States Government Printing Office, 1956), pp. 736-9.
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that Mexico only needed to compensate the oil 
companies for money invested in the land, drilling, 
pumping and refining and other necessary processes 
less depreciation rather than for profits on oil not 
yet extracted from the subsoil.59 in the interview, 
the president negated both Welles' comment that the 
properties were worth a lot of money and Welles' 
insistence that the Mexican government assure 
Washington it would pay prompt compensation. Having 
disregarded Hull's note of 26 March, Mexico City paid 
much more attention to Roosevelt's comments than to 
those of Welles and gave much publicity to the belief 
that Washington approved of the expropriation.60
DANIELS AND ROOSEVELT'S EFFECT ON WELLES
Most likely due to the president's attitude and 
perhaps in an effort to undermine Hull who had written 
the note of 26 March, Welles appeared to change his 
attitude toward the matter and praised Daniels' 
failure to return home after delivering the note as 
Hull had requested:
59 New York Times. 2 April 1938, page 4, columns 3,4.
60 Daniels to Secretary of State, 9 April 1938, RG 59, Records 
of the Department of State [812.6363/3388]; Holman to Duggan, 4 
April 1938, RG 59 Records of the Department of State 
[812.6363/3391].
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So far the policy which we have 
adopted and the friendly and 
understanding attitude which you 
yourself have displayed have 
fortunately averted any change in 
our friendly and understanding 
relationship with the Mexican 
government.61
He also responded to Daniels' requests that he
persuade the oil companies to participate in Mexico's
efforts to evaluate their former properties. Although
Welles had appeared supportive of the companies only
days earlier, he told the oil companies that 'an
attitude of intransigence on their part, should the
Mexican government indicate a practical and
satisfactory means of offering compensation, would
only redound to their own disadvantage as well as to
the disadvantage of this government62
Welles clearly vacillated between supporting the
oil companies and agreeing with Daniels' conciliatory
point of view. Welles most likely took the
opportunity of the president's involvement in the oil
issue to endear himself to Daniels, whom Roosevelt
held in high esteem, even if it meant going back on
his efforts to support the oil companies. Although he
did not yet know how far Daniels had taken matters
into his own hands with the note of 26 March, he was
thoroughly familiar with Daniels' sympathy for the
^  Welles to Daniels, 11 April 1938, Papers of Josephus 
Daniels.
^  Daniels to Welles, 10 April 1938, Papers of Josephus 
Daniels.
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expropriation, and his praise of Daniels' actions 
contrasts with his own blunt statements to Castillo 
Ndjera earlier which showed his support of the oil 
companies.
THE FADING HOPES OF THE OIL COMPANIES
The reaction of the state department to Mexico's 
plans to compensate the oil companies attests to the 
fact that the department did not fully support the oil 
companies. Between April and May, Mexico City's 
proposals for compensation ranged from Ramdn Beteta's 
scheme providing payment in oil based on the value of 
the companies' installations in addition to the 
companies' expenditure in exploration. Furthermore, 
Eduardo Suarez suggested that the companies return to 
operating their former installations under a contract 
with the Mexican government.63 Alternatively, the 
Mexican government was prepared to give the oil 
companies 60 percent of Mexican oil at below market 
prices.64
These offers infuriated the oil companies mainly 
because they took no account of their rights to oil in
63 Meyer, p. 94.
64 Armstrong to Welles, 9 May 1938, RG 59, Records of the 
Department of State [812.6363/4003].
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the subsoil. They also refused to abandon hope that 
the Mexican government would return the oil properties 
after facing increasing economic difficulty due to the 
silver purchasing policy, the predicted low output of 
oil due to what they relied on being incompetent 
Mexican management, and the companies’ boycott of 
Mexican oil described in chapter five. In addition, 
Thomas Armstrong, a manager of Standard oil of New 
Jersey, was particularly adamant that the oil 
companies must not be compensated from oil they 
believed was rightfully theirs. They even refused to 
discuss the matter with the Mexican government because 
they were afraid that discussing compensation might 
give the Mexican government the impression that 
Washington and the oil companies accepted the 
expropriation and were no longer going to contest 
it.65
Because of the support in Mexico for the 
expropriation, Feis realised that the chances of the 
Mexican government returning the properties were 
almost nonexistent. After the refusal of the oil 
companies to negotiate a compromise solution with the 
Mexican government he warned them in April that the 
Mexican government might not return the properties and 
suggested an international trusteeship whereby the
65 Ibid.
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Mexican government would retain ownership of the 
properties and let the companies operate them and 
distribute the products.66
The companies, however, refused to give up hope 
of having their properties returned and rejected Feis' 
plan. Instead they suggested submitting to 
arbitration by a group selected from the permanent 
court of arbitration in The Hague both the legality of 
the decree of 18 March in international law and 
whether the Mexican government had caused a denial of 
justice. They were fairly confident that such 
arbitration would result in a decision that would lead 
to the return of the properties.67 The state 
department, however, did not act on the oil companies' 
suggestion. Perhaps Hull and other officials believed 
that such a drastic measure outside inter-American 
arbitration treaties at such an early stage would have 
antagonized Mexico by suggesting Mexican-American 
relations had broken down quite severely.
The oil companies still did not yet know how 
Daniels had delivered the note of 26 March, but they 
had recently learned that the state department had not 
made the note public. The companies were furious 
about the lack of publicity, and they tried to
66 Memorandum of a Conversation, 21 April 1938, RG 59, Records 
of the Department of State [812.6363/3733].
67 Ibid.
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persuade the state department to publicise the note to 
convey their disapproval.68 They believed that 'any 
hesitation to insist on the rules of international 
law' would be 'misconstrued in Mexico as a condonation 
of confiscation.' Armstrong insisted that the state 
department ask the Mexican government 'not to persist 
in a confiscatory act'- a position, he pointed out, 
that the British government had taken.69
The activities of General Saturnino Cedillo, 
governor of the state of San Luis Potosi, which 
developed into a full scale rebellion against Cdrdenas 
on 15 May, tempered any desires of officials in 
Washington to support the oil companies. Hull feared 
that revolution in Mexico might compromise defence by 
bringing someone to power who might not wish to 
cooperate with Washington. Hull told the oil 
companies that 'he saw little possibility of the 
properties being returned unless the United States was 
to take military action', which was not possible due 
to the Good Neighbor policy. He tried, therefore, to 
persuade the oil companies to agree to compromise with 
Mexico. William S. Farish acted as the spokesman for 
the major companies and said that the companies 
insisted that compensation must be paid at the time of
68 Ibid.
69 Armstrong to Welles, 9 May 1938, RG 59, Records of the 
Department of State [812.6363/4003].
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taking. He believed that any retreat from this 
principle would be a victory for Mexico and set an 
example to the rest of the world and, therefore, have 
a potentially disfavourable effect on his company, 'a 
world trade enterprise, doing more than one half of 
its business in foreign trade*. Exasperated by the 
companies' intransigence, Hull proposed that the 
companies either prepare themselves temporarily to 
stop trying to get a settlement until they found 
circumstances more favourable or to negotiate an 
agreement with Mexico straight away.7 ^
Adamant about the position he had been 
articulating, Farish said he would prefer to wait.7!
A few months later, representatives of Sinclair 
believed that the major companies had purposely 
excluded them from this meeting and had made this 
decision without their consent.7  ^ Sinclair's 
competition with Standard Oil of New Jersey for 
control of the northern Persian oil fields in the 
early 1920's is a likely explanation for Jersey 
Standard excluding Sinclair from this important
7® Memorandum of a Conversation by the Chief of the Division of 
American Republics (Duggan), 31 May 1938, US Department of 
State: Foreign Relations of the United States. 1938, Vol. 5 
(Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 
1956), pp.752-55.
7  ^ Ibid.
7^ Memorandum of Laurence Duggan, 31 May 1938, RG 59, Records 
of the Department of State [812.6363/4090].
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decision over Mexico,^3 and Sinclair's exclusion led 
it to eventually negotiate a separate agreement with 
Mexico as chapter six describes.
For more than three years, the companies watched 
the situation and waited for what they thought were 
advantageous conditions under which to try to 
negotiate a settlement. While they were waiting they 
decided to give some of the plans they were pursuing 
apart from negotiations with the state department a 
chance to work. As will be seen in chapter five, they 
did everything possible to sabotage the efforts of the 
Mexican government to run the oil industry, so 
Cdrdenas would realise that he needed the foreign oil 
companies. The companies believed that the economic 
situation might worsen and cause the downfall of the 
Mexican president, bringing to power someone who would 
be prepared to restore their oil p r o p e r t i e s .
Without blatantly expressing disapproval of the 
expropriation, which would have run counter to the 
strong nationalist sentiment in the country, Cedillo 
led the companies to believe he was sympathetic to 
their interests. Even after the Mexican government 
quelled the rebel forces and Cedillo fled, the
73 Venn, Fiona M. : Oil Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century 
(Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1986), p. 59.
7^ Daniels to Roosevelt, 4 June 1938, Papers of Josephus 
Daniels.
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companies remained hopeful until his death in January 
1939 that he would take power.7 5
Although no concrete evidence exists about any 
plans the companies may have made to organise a 
revolution in Mexico, the companies were most probably 
actively planning for the fall of the Cdrdenas 
government. In his diary Adolf Berle recounted that 
representatives of major oil interests asked him in 
the spring of 1939 what the attitude of the state 
department would be if they financed a revolution in 
Mexico to install former president Plutarco Elias 
Calles. The oil companies believed that Calles, whom 
Cdrdenas had exiled, would return foreign properties 
that had been expropriated and encourage the entry of 
American capital into Mexico. Berle, who feared the 
prospect of an unknown regime coming to power in 
Mexico, strongly dissuaded them and said that the 
matter would not only infuriate Cdrdenas and 
governments of South America but also go against 
Washington's pledge of non-intervention in Mexico's 
internal affairs .7^
7^ Meyer, pp. 173-76, p. 80.
7^ Berle, Diary entry, 13 April 1939, Diary, Papers of Adolf 
Berle.
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THE AGRARIAN NEGOTIATIONS
While the oil negotiations were suspended,
Welles and Hull tried initially to solve the 
outstanding agrarian matters with Mexico in a manner 
that would be conducive to a future reciprocal trade 
agreement. The hope was that if the state department 
could get a commitment from the Mexican government to 
make the highest agrarian payments possible on a 
regular schedule, the Mexican government would have 
great difficulty refusing the idea of a similar 
settlement for the oil properties. Since Mexico’s 
financial situation would preclude the payment of 
adequate compensation to the oil companies, the 
Mexican government, Welles and Hull hoped, would have 
no choice but to return the oil properties to American 
oil interests.77 They perhaps also wanted to pre-empt 
possible criticism from the Republican party in the 
November election that the administration was not 
doing enough to solve the outstanding issues between 
Mexico and the United States.
After the oil expropriation, Cdrdenas realised 
that in order for the United States government to take
77 Cronon, pp. 212-13.
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Mexico's promises to compensate the oil companies 
'seriously, the Mexican government would have to heed 
Washington's request for a settlement on agrarian 
matters. Both governments had agreed at the Bucareli 
conference in 1923 to settle claims on agrarian lands 
confiscated from Americans by referring the matter to 
a general claims commission comprised of one 
representative chosen by the Mexican government, 
another chosen by Washington and a neutral person 
selected by both governments. By the time of the oil 
expropriation, Mexico had not paid any compensation on 
expropriated farm lands or for other claims because 
the general claims commission had not come to an 
agreement on matters of any importance. The 
commission did, however, agree to make decisions only 
affecting agrarian properties the Mexican government 
had expropriated before 30 August 1927.78
A few weeks after the oil expropriation Cardenas 
offered to set aside 120,000 pesos each month in order 
to pay for the lands in the Yaqui Valley for which the 
state department had expressed great concern. While 
the American farms in the Yaqui Valley were not small 
by American standards they were when compared to the 
Mexican hacienda. As Daniels wrote:
7® The Secretary of State to the Mexican Ambassador (Castillo 
Nijera), 21 July 1938, US Department of State: Foreign 
Relations of the United States. 1938, Vol. 5 (Washington, D.C.: 
United States Government Printing Office, 1956), pp. 674-8.
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In most cases practically all of 
the financial resources of the 
American farmers in the Yaqui 
Valley are tied up in their lands, 
their equipment, and the 
preparations already made for 
sowing wheat.79
In addition Cdrdenas promised to compensate small
landowners before 1940 and offered agrarian bonds to
large landowners whose properties had been
confiscated.80
Welles, however, objected to such a plan which
gave some American citizens more satisfactory
treatment than others and insisted on compensation
based on 'fair equality' for all whose agricultural
property the Mexican government had taken. Welles'
specific plan was for the Mexican government to pay
$10 million in monthly instalments over the next two
and one-half years to compensate Americans for
agrarian claims by the time Cdrdenas' term of office
expired. The Mexican government rejected the proposal
because Mexico could not afford to pay such a large
sum in so little time.81 Because he had great
sympathy for the Yaqui Valley claimants, Daniels was
irate with Welles for having refused the Mexican offer
7  ^ Daniels to Welles, 7 July 1938, Papers of Josephus Daniels. 
80 cronon, pp. 212-13.
The Under Secretary of State to the Mexican Ambassador 
(Castillo Najera), June 29, 1938,US Department of State: 
Foreign Relations of the United States. 1938, Vol. 5 
(Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 
1956), pp. 667-72.
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and making such an unrealistic counter-proposal in 
r e s p o n s e . At this time, Welles perhaps felt able to 
articulate such views because Roosevelt was not 
involved. As the editor of a newspaper in North 
Carolina, Daniels had championed the cause of indigent 
farmers and believed strongly in the Jeffersonian 
ideal of the importance of small landholders in a 
democracy.83
In July Cordell Hull formally reiterated to the 
Mexican government that the United States would only 
be satisfied with an overall agrarian settlement 
rather than one involving cash to small landowners and 
bonds to larger ones. He also reiterated his strong 
disapproval of the Mexican government's repeated 
seizure of American-owned property in Mexico without 
making prompt, adequate and effective compensation, 
which was necessary under international l a w . 84 
Most importantly, Hull wanted to use the 
agrarian issue to establish a norm whereby close 
commercial relations between the US and Mexico could 
develop. His note reminded the Mexican government 
that the United States had been striving for increased 
economic cooperation and that the government wanted
82 cronon, pp. 214-15.
83 Ibid., p. 135.
84 The Secretary of State to the Mexican Ambassador, 21 July 
1938, US Department of State: Foreign Relations of the United 
States, 1938, Vol. 5 (Washington, D.C.: United States 
Government Printing Office, 1956), pp. 674-678.
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continued cooperation with the Mexican government.
Hull added,
The whole structure of friendly 
intercourse, of international trade 
and commerce and many other vital 
and mutually desirable relations 
between nations indispensable to 
their progress rest upon the single 
and hitherto solid foundation of 
respect on the part of governments 
and of peoples for each other's 
rights under international 
justice.85
The oil companies who were following the 
negotiations closely were pleased with this line, and 
Armstrong voiced his determination that Mexico would 
not get away with some 'paper credit calling for some 
indefinite future payments'.®^ Hull also took another 
step that the oil companies had hoped for by asking 
the Mexican government to agree to arbitrate under the 
terms of the General Treaty of Inter-American 
Arbitration^7 the question of whether the Mexican 
government had complied with the procedure of 
international law regarding compensation when dealing 
with those American citizens who lost their farms and 
agrarian properties to the Mexican government after 30
ibid.
Cronon, pp. 217-18; Armstrong to Hull, 28 July 1938, RG 59, 
Records of the Department of State [812.6363/4548].
®7 The General Treaty of Inter-American Arbitration was signed 
at Washington on 5 January 1929 by the United States, Mexico 
and other Latin American and South American nations, to keep 
peace, to interpret treaties and questions of international law 
and the nature and extent of reparations to be made for the 
breach of an international obligation.
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August 1927. The US, Mexico and other Latin American 
and South American nations had signed this treaty at 
Washington on 5 January 1929 to resolve disagreements 
between the American states. If the arbitrators were 
to find that the Mexican government had not paid 
adequate and prompt compensation, they were to 
determine the amount and terms of p a y m e n t . 88
The companies believed that if the Mexican 
government rejected a solution by an international 
treaty, the state department might start to believe 
their claim that the Mexican government was 
unreasonable and, therefore, realise the situation 
required stronger action. Armstrong was pleased 
because use of the process of selecting arbitrators 
outlined by the General Treaty of Inter-American 
Arbitration meant that Latin Americans were less 
likely to have a majority among the group of 
arbitrators.89
In his blunt reply to Hull, General Hay stated 
that the Mexican land redistribution programme which 
had led to the agrarian expropriation was necessary to 
the political, social and economic stability of the 
country. Although he realised Washington was 
insisting on immediate compensation, he emphasised
Daniels, Diary entry, 30 January 1938, Diary, Papers of 
Josephus Daniels.
Armstrong to Hull, 6 August 1938, RG 59, Records of the 
Department of State [812.6363/4548],
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that Mexico's future 'could not be halted by the 
impossibility of paying immediately [compensation] to 
a small number of foreign owners who seek only a 
lucrative end.' Hay did state, however, that Mexico's 
own laws required payment of compensation but 'the 
time and manner of such payment must be determined by 
her own laws.' He also rejected the idea of 
arbitration because Mexico City believed arbitration 
was only appropriate for 'cases of irreducible 
differences' and might violate Mexican sovereignty by 
imposing 'a certain economic organisation upon 
Mexico'.^0 He suggested that the two sides allow a 
mixed claims commission to determine the amount of 
compensat ion owed.91
Reactions to Hay's reply were extreme. On the 
one hand, Armstrong called Hay's reply 'the precise 
reverse of the established rule of international law' 
and was furious. Extremely concerned about the effect 
the negotiations would have on the oil companies' 
situation, he re-emphasised that Mexico was not 
capable of paying adequate compensation and urged Hull 
to demand the return of the oil properties the way the
Mexican Minister for Foreign Affairs to Daniels, 3 August 
1938, US Department of State: Foreign Relations of the United 
States. 1938, Vol. 5 (Washington, D.C.: United States 
Government Printing Office, 1956), pp. 679-84.
Long Distance Telephone Conversation between Mr. Duggan in 
Washington, D.C. and Ambassador Daniels in Mexico City, 3 
August 1938, 1:05 p.m., Papers of Cordell Hull.
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British government had done. He also reiterated that 
any discussion with the Mexican government about 
compensation would condone what Mexico had done and 
'would result in the exchange of real properties and 
values for a paper credit which Mexico is unable to 
liquidate.'92
Daniels in contrast found Hay's reply 
encouraging and wanted Washington to accept the 
Mexican government's offer to start compensating 
former small holders while a mixed claims commission 
started to evaluate the amount of compensation.93 
Daniels believed that the Mexican government was more 
likely to agree to large payments then than at any 
other time and that, if the United States government 
were to refuse Mexico's offer, an impasse would almost 
certainly occur which would badly damage Mexican- 
American relations. He believed it was important to 
further the Good Neighbor policy by 'conceding more to 
a poor neighbor than we would think of conceding to a 
great country'. For Daniels, the Good Neighbor policy 
necessitated sacrifices to strengthen it as it was, 
next to the Monroe Doctrine, one of the most important 
principles of foreign policy.94
92 Armstrong to Hull, 5 August 1938, RG 59, Records of the 
Department of State [812.6363/4548].
93 Cronon, p. 220.
94 Daniels to Hull, 7 August 1938, Papers of Josephus Daniels.
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Hull's reaction was somewhere between the two 
extremes. Because of the Good Neighbor policy, the 
United States government could not ask for the 
restoration of the properties without giving Mexico a 
reasonable chance to compensate according to 
international law. To do otherwise might appear to 
the Mexican public that the United States government 
was meddling in Mexico's internal affairs which it 
promised not to do at the Buenos Aires conference.
For the Mexican government to restore the properties 
after a request from the United States government 
would not have been politically possible because of 
strong nationalist sentiment among the population. It 
seems that Washington still wanted to use the strategy 
of getting the Mexican government to agree to 
compensation and then decide to return the properties 
after discovering that it could not pay the required 
amount. Above all Hull wanted the Mexican government 
to agree to cease its policy of taking property 
without prompt, adequate compensation and stated that 
Mexico was setting a bad example for other countries 
to follow. He emphasised that Washington wanted a 
satisfactory response to avoid prolonged 
discussions.95
^5 The Secretary of State to the Mexican Ambassador (Castillo 
Najera), 22 August 1938, Foreign Relations of the United 
States. 1938, Vol. 5 (Washington, D.C.: United States 
Government Printing Office, 1956), pp. 685-696.
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Daniels believed Hull's attitude was 'unduly 
severe' in its insistence on payments which he 
believed the Mexicans would find impossible to make. 
Well aware of the potential political power of his 
relationship with Roosevelt, he, therefore, made an 
abortive attempt to involve the president in the 
matter in order to temper Welles and Hull.96 He 
explained to Roosevelt his concern that because of the 
precarious world situation, the security of the United 
States and the success of its foreign policy depended 
on pan-American solidarity and cooperation. He 
believed that previous efforts of the United States to 
get rid of its reputation for using threats against 
Mexico and taking advantage of Mexican resources had 
been beneficial for the US. The fact that the 
American and British oil companies were demanding the 
return of their oil fields, which Daniels was 
convinced required force to achieve, was a potential 
threat to the Good Neighbor policy.97 Occupied with 
growing hostilities in Europe and the imminent 
congressional elections Roosevelt did not yet become 
involved as Daniels had no doubt hoped.
In late September Castillo Ndjera proposed a 
plan to Washington involving a commission which would
96 Daniels, Diary entry, 27 August 1938, Diary, Papers of 
Josephus Daniels; Daniels to Roosevelt, 31 August 1938, Papers 
of Josephus Daniels
97 Daniels to Roosevelt, 31 August 1938, Papers of Josephus 
Daniels.
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determine the value of the land in question, the time 
and amount of payment within six months. He also said 
that Cdrdenas would put in Mexico's budget a minimum 
of $500,000 annually starting the following year to go 
toward land payments. Hull, however, articulated his 
disappointment with the Mexican reply and said that at 
the rate of $500,000 per year the compensation would 
take decades to pay. After the steady expropriation 
of agrarian properties since 1915 as well as the 
recent expropriation of oil properties and the 
railways, Hull also expressed his fear that the 
Mexican government might seize additional properties 
more rapidly than it would pay off the amount due. 
Castillo Ndjera's reply to Hull's concerns were far 
from comforting; he believed the lands were probably 
only worth between $2 and $3 million and reiterated 
that the Mexican government refused to cease further
land seizures.98
9® Memorandum of a Conversation by the Secretary of State, 26 
Sept 1938, Foreign Relations of the United States. 1938, Vol. 5 
(Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 
1956), pp. 709-710.
131
THE AGRARIAN SETTLEMENT AND WASHINGTON'S REACTION TO
THE WORLD SITUATION
Although Hull was exasperated with what he felt 
was intransigence on the part of the Mexican 
government, his increasing concerns about the world 
situation caused him to change his attitude toward the 
settlement of the agrarian lands. He believed that in 
his action toward Czechoslovakia, Hitler was already 
showing signs of 'the Nazi pattern of pre-conquest' 
which had happened before the Anschluss of Austria.99 
He became increasingly concerned about hemispheric 
defence and fostering Mexican good will to guarantee 
Mexico's support for a pan-American declaration of 
solidarity against external threats at the pan- 
American conference in Lima scheduled for 9 
December.3-00 National socialist parties that had 
sprung up in Latin American republics, the anti- 
American propaganda campaigns operating there and the 
aski system whereby Germany would pay for goods with 
aski, trade credits not redeemable in currency, to 
monopolize markets all seemed to threaten Washington's 
relations with countries in the region, and Hull did
"Hull, Cordell: The Memoirs of Cordell Hull. Vol. 1 (London: 
Hodder & Stoughton, 1948), p. 582.
100 Ibid., p. 610.
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not rule out a Nazi military invasion of the South 
American continent. Despite his anger at Mexico, 
therefore, he believed it vital to give concessions on 
the agrarian arrangement to foster goodwill in order 
to win Mexico's support at the Lima conference for a 
declaration of American solidarity to resist any 
threat to the territorial integrity and safety of the 
pan-American nations. He wrote in his memoirs, 
'Nothing could have been more unhappy for the 
forthcoming Lima conference than an acrimonious 
diplomatic battle between our southern neighbor and 
ourselves. ' 102
Adolf Berle, with whom Hull worked closely, 
shared Hull's concerns: 'A pretty continuous 
conference has been going on in the department here, 
which might almost be called the "death watch" of 
Europe.' He then mentioned with great concern that 
'the Mexican situation is in a mess' and expressed 
alarm at the trading of Mexican oil for German planes 
and 'undoubtedly German instructors as well', which 
made a solution to outstanding Mexican-American 
problems all the more urgent. He was also concerned 
about communist influences in Mexico, especially 
through the Confederacidn de Trabajadores Mexicanos,
101 Ibid., pp. 601-2.
102 Ibid., p.610.
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the general Mexican trade union, which he believed was 
'frequently under Communist control' and armed.^03
Roosevelt and Morgenthau were gravely concerned 
that the US was ill-prepared for imminent hostilities 
and believed in the importance of winning the 
solidarity of Latin and South America against possible 
outside threats. Morgenthau wrote to Roosevelt that 
the US must 'while we can peacefully do so' check the 
aggression of Italy, Japan and Germany which after 
Munich he believed would become 'bolder and more 
effective in their attempts to establish areas of 
economic and political support to the south of us.
At a press conference on 15 November the president 
equated national defence with securing the South 
American continent because he believed that with 
advances in aircraft technology, German bases in Latin 
and South America could be used for military threats 
to the US. Advanced technology, he explained, 'had 
changed the whole orientation of this country with 
relations to the continent on which we lived- from 
Canada to Tierra del Fuego'. It was vital to increase 
hemispheric solidarity among the 21 American republics
103 Memorandum of Assistant Secretary of State, 19 September 
1938, Diary of Adolf Berle.
104 Morgenthau to President, 17 October 1938, Morgenthau 
Presidential Diaries.
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and Canada by expanding on what had been achieved at 
the Buenos Aires conference.105
In November Washington, therefore, accepted 
Mexico's latest offer but insisted that Mexico City 
pay $1 million within six months after the experts 
started their valuation of agrarian lands. Mexico was 
then to make annual payments of at least $1 million 
from the time the experts finished their work until 
the total amount owed was paid. Mexico City did not 
have to pledge that it would stop its taking over 
foreign properties in the execution of its land 
redistribution program, and it also insisted that the 
agrarian settlement would not serve as a precedent to 
settle any other outstanding matters between the two 
countries, a certain reference to the oil situation. 
Although $1 million was a terribly large sum for 
Mexico, the Mexican government successfully completed 
the agreed payments for three years until the two 
countries reached a broader settlement in 1941.106 
Hull's decision on the agrarian matter was 
vindicated by the fact that on 10 December Daniels 
informed Hull that Cirdenas had instructed the Mexican
105 white House Press Conference, 15 November 1938, RG 59 
Records of the Department of State [710.H Continental 
Solidarity/2].
106 cronon, p. 228; The Mexican Minister for Foreign Affairs 
(Hay) to the American Ambassador (Daniels), 12 November 1938, 
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1938, Vol. 5 
(Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 
1956), pp. 717-9.
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delegation at Lima to cooperate with Washington. In 
addition Hull was able to secure enough support for 
the declaration of Lima. Although it did not go quite 
far enough for Hull in the direction of pan-American 
cooperation, it marked an important step in the 
direction of closer hemispheric solidarity, by 
securing the pledge that in the case of a military 
attack or infiltration by foreign underground 
movements, the signatories would immediately consult 
one another to decide what joint action to take. ^ 7 
The oil companies were alarmed at the agrarian 
settlement. An attorney for Standard Oil of New 
Jersey nervously asked the state department what it 
planned to do with regard to the oil situation in the 
aftermath of the agrarian agreement.108 Having the 
agrarian situation outstanding had given credibility 
to the companies' refusal to negotiate compensation 
directly with the Mexican government. The agrarian 
settlement set a harmful precedent for them. Their 
hopes both that Washington would at least uphold the 
principle of prompt compensation and that the Mexican 
government would eventually return the oil properties 
after admitting their inability to make payments had 
been dashed. Daniels, on the other hand, was
l®7 Hull, vol. 1, pp. 607-8, p. 610.
10® Memorandum of a Conversation, 14 November 1938, RG 59, 
Records of the Department of State [812.6363/5149].
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extremely pleased at the prospect of the agrarian 
settlement setting a precedent for the negotiations 
about the oil properties. He wrote, 'I think this 
will have a good effect as regards a future 
understanding on oil.'109 Daniels was indeed correct 
because the final settlement of the oil problem in 
1941 was very similar to the agrarian one of November 
1938 and a tremendous disappointment for the oil 
companies. As will be seen in chapter six, it was 
also a decisive factor in causing Sinclair to abandon 
all hope of getting the Mexican government to return 
its former properties.
In conclusion, in two ways the events of 193 8 
were a dress rehearsal for the events leading up to 
the state department's agreement with Mexico on the 
oil matter in November 1941. First, in both cases the 
state department was willing to pursue a relatively 
hard line toward Mexico as long as possible until 
defence concerns made it disadvantageous. Hull giving 
in to Mexico in the agricultural negotiation just 
before the Lima conference foreshadowed what the state 
department eventually did in 1941. Second, just as 
Daniels softened the impact of Hull's policy on Mexico 
by his handling of the note of 26 March, Daniels in
Daniels, Diary entry, 14 November 1938, Diary, Papers of 
Josephus Daniels.
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1941 also intervened after he had resigned as 
ambassador to prevent the state department from 
offending Mexico. In both cases Roosevelt's approval 
was what enabled Daniels to influence policy. As 
Daniels' intervention shows, those closest to 
Roosevelt rather than those with the most seniority 
were usually most able to influence policy.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE REACTION OF WHITEHALL AND THE OIL 
COMPANIES: MARCH 1938-NOVEMBER 1938
The only thing that will really help is joint 
pressure with the United States.1
Gerald Gray Fitzmaurice
In view of the wide divergence between the notes 
of the British and of Secretary Hull, there 
seems no basis for a parallel appeal.2
Josephus Daniels
The British government, blaming the conciliatory 
US attitude for the expropriation, became even more 
frustrated when Washington refused to form a united 
front between the two governments and take a firm 
stand against Mexico. Washington's disapproval of 
London's treatment of Mexico in addition to its 
resentment of British economic presence in the western 
hemisphere ruled out any association with Whitehall's 
policy. Both governments, however, wanted to secure a 
return to the status quo ante. Hull acknowledged the 
Mexican government's right to expropriate under 
international law provided Mexico City paid
1 Fitzmaurice, Minute, 20 March 1938, FO 371 21463 
[A2121/10/26].
^ Josephus Daniels, Memorandum, 21 April 1938, Papers of 
Josephus Daniels.
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compensation. At the same time, however, he tried to 
exacerbate Mexico's economic problems in order to 
prevent Mexico from making payments to the oil 
companies. Hull hoped that Mexico City would soon 
realise its inability to make payments and return the 
properties. Whitehall, however, was more direct, 
stating bluntly that the expropriation was illegal 
because Mexico City was incapable of paying 
compensation and that President Cdrdenas, therefore, 
must return the properties.
The expropriation greatly worried British 
officials responsible for oil matters, yet John 
Balfour narrowed Britain's options in dealing with the 
problem by allowing Minister O'Malley and Ambassador 
Lindsay to influence policy in incompatible 
directions. On the one hand, Lindsay showed great 
reluctance to be too assertive with Washington in 
trying to secure US cooperation because he knew 
Washington resented Whitehall's requests to salvage 
British interests. The best approach to Washington, 
he believed, was a subtle one accompanied by a display 
of independence in handling the matter with Mexico. 
Such was his method, and no one in Whitehall made any 
real effort to change it.
On the other hand, O'Malley made independence 
from Washington nearly impossible. After failing to 
persuade the foreign office to call him home from a
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posting he loathed, he, with Whitehall's approval, 
pursued a provocative policy which resulted in the 
Mexican government severing diplomatic relations with 
Britain. After O'Malley returned home, Whitehall was 
unable to make direct representations to Mexico City 
and, therefore, was all the more reliant on Mexico's 
northern neighbour to take the lead. This dependence 
on Washington, whose cooperation would probably not 
have been forthcoming even in the most favourable of 
circumstances, made Lindsay's plan difficult to 
execute. It also caused Whitehall much anxiety 
because Washington never told British officials in 
advance the direction US policy would take. Apart 
from the Danish legation in Mexico which agreed to 
look after British interests after the severance of 
relations,3 Britain had no direct channel to Mexico to 
counteract the possible ill effects of Washington's 
actions, which British officials suspected would aim 
to remove British interests from Mexico.
It is the purpose of this chapter first to 
analyse the formation of British policy in reaction to 
the expropriation. It will be seen that officials 
responsible for policy in Whitehall were mainly 
influenced by the fact that Britain had no significant 
known indigenous supplies of oil and systematically
3 Cleugh to the Foreign Office, 19 July 1938, FO 371 21474 
[A6244/10/26].
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thought of worst case scenarios in terms of oil 
supplies during wartime. They concluded that the 
failure to prevent other countries from following 
Mexico's example would have a devastating effect on 
Britain's oil supplies. Whitehall's priority, 
therefore, was to conduct policy in such a manner that 
Mexico would appear to have failed miserably in their 
attempts both to expropriate foreign oil properties 
and to have the Mexican government effectively run the 
oil industry. The methods open to Britain to ensure 
the failure of Mexico's policy and prevent 
expropriations elsewhere were securing Washington's 
cooperation to denounce the expropriation, 
participating in a boycott of Mexican oil started by 
the oil companies who had lost properties in Mexico, 
carefully watching events in countries which might be 
tempted to expropriate foreign properties and having 
the navy make frequent visits to Mexican harbours.
That Mexican Eagle was technically a Mexican company 
prevented Britain from referring the matter to the 
League of Nations as it had in 1931 when the Persian 
government cancelled the concession of the Anglo- 
Persian Oil company and the League ruled that the 
Persian government had been guilty of breach of 
contract.4
4 Balfour, Minute, 7 May 1940, FO 371 24215 [A3198/57/26]; 
Confidential Print, South and Central America, 1 December 1938, 
FO 371 20636 [A8808/10/26].
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Second, it will be shown that Whitehall realised 
how desperate its need was for Washington's 
cooperation in dealing with the problem. Both 
Starling and Balfour were highly disappointed when 
Hull and Welles responded to Lindsay's representations 
by giving conflicting information. Whitehall's 
response was deep suspicion of Washington, which it 
believed to be trying to ease British interests out of 
Latin America. Third, O'Malley's actions in the 
period leading up to the breaking of relations will be 
analyzed. The fact that Washington's cooperation was 
not forthcoming was what made Balfour decide to 
conduct policy so that Mexico would think Washington 
and London were working in a united front. This 
decision about policy paved the way for O'Malley to 
provoke Mexico into severing relations with Britain.
Fourth it will be seen that without relations 
with Mexico, Whitehall made even greater efforts to 
secure Washington's help. In approaching the US, 
however, British officials realised the importance of 
not putting too much pressure on Washington for 
cooperation with regard to Mexico or any other matter 
at a time when Britain hoped for eventual US support 
in coping with imminent hostilities. Whitehall 
experienced great frustration because even subtle 
approaches to Washington failed to get a helpful 
response on the situation with Mexico. Finally, the
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exact nature of the hostility between Washington and 
London over how to handle the expropriation is 
analysed.
WHITEHALL'S POLICY
After the expropriation, Whitehall became all 
the more concerned about the example Mexico might set 
to other more important oil producing countries if it 
were allowed to persist in such a radical policy. The 
petroleum department still hoped to rely on Mexico and 
small producers like Colombia and Peru, which had a 
combined output of about 5 million tons per annum, if 
the Mediterranean became blocked during wartime.5 Not 
only had Mexico been Britain's second largest supplier 
of oil during the First World War, but its potential 
importance had become even greater since Mexican Eagle 
had brought in the first well in Poza Rica in 1930, 
the second largest oil pool in the world which 
produced the best quality of Mexican crude oil. After 
the First World War the exhaustion of older oil fields 
and the reluctance of foreign oil companies to make 
substantial new investments in Mexico due to Mexico's 
economic nationalism had caused Mexico's oil output to
5 Starling to Balfour, 9 May 1938, FO 371 21469 [A3663/10/26].
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plummet.6 while Mexico had supplied only five to ten 
percent of Britain's requirements in the previous 
three years, however, it had been regarded as 
potentially important in the recent past due to the 
fear of Italy blocking the Mediterranean, and Starling 
hoped that the country might once again become a major 
supplier of oil to Britain.^
The petroleum department, the oil board, the 
committee of imperial defence and the foreign office 
agreed that due to Mexican nationalism the chances of 
restoring the status quo ante in Mexico were slim. 
Unfortunately for Britain the situation elsewhere in 
terms of oil suppliers was equally unpromising. Of 
the eight largest producers in the world, Britain 
could only rely on Venezuela, which at the time of the 
expropriation supplied approximately 40 percent of 
British oil requirements including vitally important 
100 octane fuel for the British air ministry.® The
6 Cronon, E. David: Josephus Daniels in Mexico (Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1960), pp. 42-3.
^ Starling to Balfour, 9 May 1938, FO 371 21469 [A3663/10/26].
® The eight largest oil producers in the world were the United 
States (60.6 per cent), Russia (11 per cent), Venezuela (9.3 
per cent), Roumania (3.5 per cent), Iran (3.3 per cent), Dutch 
East Indies (2.5 per cent), Mexico (2.2 per cent) and Iraq (1.6 
per cent). These percentages were based on crude production 
figures for 1936. For more information see CAB 50-6, OB 247,
Memorandum by the Petroleum Department, 8 April 1938. Crude
production in thousands of metric tons was as follows in 1936: 
United States (148,610), Russia (27,425), Venezuela (22,620), 
Roumania (8,705), Iran (8,330), Dutch East Indies (6,080), 
Mexico (5,870), Iraq (4,010); in 1937: United States (172,865), 
Russia (28,500), Venezuela (27,205), Roumania (7,155), Iran 
(10,330), Dutch East Indies (7,260), Mexico (6,710), Iraq 
(4,255); in 1938: United States (164,105), Russia (30,185),
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uncertainty about the operation of the US neutrality 
legislation made Starling rule out the United States, 
the largest producer, as a supplier to Britain in an 
emergency. Exports of oil from Russia had decreased 
so dramatically that the British government expected 
them to cease altogether in the event of a war. In 
addition, because of the possibility of hostilities in 
the Mediterranean, it could not rely on oil from Iraq, 
Roumania, Iran or the Dutch East Indies.  ^ it was 
vital, therefore, to make an example of Mexico so that 
other oil exporting countries would not follow the 
same path of expropriation.
The oil board and foreign office became 
particularly alarmed at reports from the petroleum 
department that Mexico was trying to encourage other 
Latin American countries such as Venezuela, Colombia 
and Peru, to nationalize their oil industries.10 
Whitehall's reaction was a mixture of subtle 
intimidation and diplomacy. The admiralty arranged 
for increased visits of the navy to ports in all three
Venezuela (27,485), Roumania (6,610), Iran (10,360), Dutch East 
Indies (7,400), Mexico (5,510), Iraq (4,300). For more 
information see Venn, Fiona M . : Oil Diplomacy in the Twentieth 
Century (London and Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1982), pp. 171-177.
9 CAB 50-7, OB 52, Note by the Oil Board, 11 April 1938; CAB 
50-7, OB 260, Meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defense, 12 
May 1938; Starling to Balfour, 24 March 1938, FO 371 21464 
[A2266/10/26]; CAB 2-7, Minutes of the 322nd meeting of the 
Committee of Imperial Defense, 12 May 1938.
10 Starling to Balfour, 7 May 1938, FO 371 21469 [A3663/10/26].
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countries.H At the request of the oil board, the 
foreign minister instructed the British ministers in 
Caracas, Lima and Bogotd to watch the situation in 
those countries, report any alarming developments, and 
suggest any possible course of action to foster good 
w i l l . 1 ^ The ministers reported to the foreign office 
that the conditions prevailing in Mexico were very 
different from those in Venezuela, Colombia and Peru. 
In addition, the governments of those three countries 
appeared to realise both their need for foreign 
expertise in the oil industries and the contribution 
of foreign oil concessionaires to their treasuries and 
the development of domestic resources. Although the 
danger of expropriations in these countries appeared 
minimal, officials responsible for oil policy, 
however, wanted to prepare for worst case scenarios 
and did not rule out the possibility of circumstances 
changing.13
Sir Robert Vansittart, who had become chief 
diplomatic adviser, summarised the opinion of the 
committee of imperial defence and the American 
department, which hoped that Mexico's worsening
11 Confidential Print, South and Central America, 1 December 
1938, FO 371 20636 [A8808/10/26].
12 Memorandum of the Committee of Imperial Defence, 9 May 1938, 
FO 371 21469 [A3663/10/26].
13 Confidential Print, South and Central America, 1 December 
1938, FO 371 20636 [A8808/10/26].
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economic problems would help make an example of 
Mexico:
Mexico was in for a bad time in the 
near future, and if part of their 
misfortune were ascribed even if 
incorrectly to our action so much
the better.14
Mexico had been suffering from sharp rises in 
commodity prices, the fall of the peso, and food 
shortages. Cdrdenas' programmes to reform agriculture 
and organize public works had severely drained the 
treasury, and Mexico lacked the necessary foreign 
exchange to pay for needed foodstuffs from abroad.15 
The flight of foreign exchange due to lack of 
confidence in the economy and the considerable 
decrease in private investment aggravated Mexico's 
problems.
The committee of imperial defence and the 
American department both realised that a British 
boycott of Mexican oil and oil products, which had 
amounted to more than 18 percent of Mexico's exports 
in 1937, would make matters even worse for Mexico.16 
Whitehall, therefore, refused to allow Mexican oil to 
be a part of any government contract and secured the
14 CAB 2-7, Minutes of the 322nd Meeting of the Committee of 
Imperial Defense, 12 May 1938.
Scroggs, William 0.: 'Mexican Oil in World Politics',
Foreign Affairs Quarterly XVII (1938), p. 173.
16 Meyer, Lorenzo: Mexico and the United States in the Oil 
Controversy.1918-1942 (Austin: University of Texas Press,
1972), p. 201.
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cooperation of banks and financial houses to refuse 
credits to individuals and companies dealing in 
Mexican oil. Whitehall also persuaded colonial 
governments to refuse to purchase Mexican oil.
In addition, both British and American oil 
interests which had been expropriated persuaded other 
companies not to supply the Mexican oil industry with 
tankers or spare parts. Although Washington refused 
to allow any government agency to purchase Mexican 
oil, it did not exercise the same amount of control 
over American businesses as Whitehall exercised over 
British ones. Maverick independent American oil 
companies, therefore, took advantage of the situation 
to sell Mexican oil in Germany and the United States. 
Italy also provided a market for Mexican o i l . 17 The 
boycott, which will be analyzed in chapter five, 
started to work well after the war started, however, 
when the Allied blockade prevented oil from reaching 
Germany and Italy. Mexican oil, however, was still 
being sold in the United States.
17 CAB 50-7, OB 294, 13th Annual Report, 24 January 1938.
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WHITEHALL'S EFFORTS TO GET US COOPERATION
In addition to the boycott, Balfour and 
Starling, while not optimistic about Washington's 
helpfulness, were desperate for the state department's 
cooperation in voicing strong disapproval of what the 
Mexican government had done. Starling knew a stern 
statement from Britain would have little effect on 
Mexico in comparison with one from the United States. 
Because he realised that Washington was resentful of 
being asked to save the British from bad situations, 
he was hesitant about making a request that the United 
States alone voice strong disapproval. in order to 
avoid alienating Washington, Balfour decided to seek 
the cooperation of the state department in issuing a 
joint statement of disapproval. Although he realised 
it would be extremely difficult to persuade Washington 
to stray from what he called their 'passive attitude', 
he believed requesting cooperation was worth trying. 
Balfour firmly believed that Britain's only hope was 
to make an example of Mexico to demonstrate to other 
countries that the British government 'do not tamely 
submit' to the expropriation, and that working with
18 Starling to Balfour, 22 March 1938, F0 371 21463 
[A2215/10/26] .
150
the United States government was the most effective 
way to achieve this m e s s a g e . ^
Balfour and Starling drafted an aide mdmoire to 
Washington advocating a 'concerted or parallel appeal' 
to the Mexican government to negotiate a solution the 
United States and Britain could accept, and instructed 
Sir Ronald Lindsay to try to convince the state 
department to support it.20 Lindsay approached both 
Hull and Welles and received conflicting information. 
Hull revealed that Washington's policy was a mixture 
of approval and punishment. In a press statement on 
30 March Hull had adhered to both international law 
and the Good Neighbor policy by accepting in principle 
Mexico's expropriation as long as it paid adequate, 
effective and prompt compensation. At the same time, 
however, Washington suspended direct purchases of 
silver from the Mexican government to cripple Mexico's 
already ailing economy thereby making compensation 
virtually impossible. Lindsay also learned that in 
addition to changing its silver policy, Washington had 
sent a stern note of 26 March to the Mexican 
government demanding a 'prompt reply' to its demand 
for a specific plan of payments for the expropriated
19 Balfour, Minute, 23 March 1938, FO 371 21463 [A2164/10/26].
British Aide Memoir, 25 March 1938, enclosed in Welles to 
Duggan, 28 March 1938, RG 59, Records of the Department of 
State [812.6363/3311].
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oil properties and an assurance that the payments 
would be made.21
Lindsay left the meeting with the impression 
that Washington was far less conciliatory toward 
Mexico than he had thought, but Welles soon gave him 
an entirely different impression. Welles purposely 
tried to mislead him by saying that the true policy of 
the United States was that given by Hull in the 
statement to the press on 30 March, which was 
celebrated in Mexico as a sign that Washington was in 
agreement with the oil expropriation. Welles 
neglected to mention the much less lenient note of 26 
March and the punitive silver p o l i c y . 22 The 
conflicting comments of Welles and Hull baffled 
Whitehall. As Sir George Mounsey, superintending 
under secretary of the American department, wrote,
'The United States government's attitude is most 
puzzling. They seem to have taken a sledge hammer and 
now to be pretending that they d i d n ' t . '23
Welles also took charge of replying to the aide 
mdmoire. He instructed Duggan that the reply should 
be 'friendly and courteous' but insisted that he
21 Memorandum of a Conversation between Hull and Lindsay, 30 
March 1938, RG 59, Records of the Department of State 
[812.6363/1321].
22 Memorandum of a Conversation between Lindsay and Welles, 1 
April 1938, RG 59, Records of the Department of State 
[812.6363/3325].
23 Mounsey, Minute, 1 April 1938, FO 371 21464 [A2482/10/26] .
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disregard the request for a parallel appeal.
Irritated by Britain's request, he continued, 'Our
position on that matter has been made known by me to
the British ambassador on several occasions.'24
Ambassador Daniels shared Welles' feelings and on 21
April 1938 sent a memorandum to the state department
saying that 'In view of the wide divergence between
the notes of the British and of Secretary Hull, there
seems no basis for a parallel a p p e a l . ' 25
While Balfour and Starling were pleased with the
note of 26 March and the silver policy, they were
nevertheless disappointed at the failure to secure
Washington's cooperation in making a joint approach to
Mexico. The petroleum department, which had always
been suspicious of the United States, believed,
It is hard to ascertain what their 
policy is, but there are certain 
suspicions that they may not object 
to the removal of foreign interests 
in Latin American countries, which 
in the end may open up a 
possibility of the US interests 
getting back to the exclusion of 
the rest. 2 6
The foreign office believed that in the case of 
Mexico, Washington owed Britain cooperation because of
24 Welles to Duggan, 28 March 1938 RG 59, Records of the 
Department of State [812.6363/3311].
25 Daniels, Memorandum, 21 April 1938, Papers of Josephus 
Daniels.
26 Petroleum Department, Memorandum, 8 April 1938, F0 371 21469 
[A3663/10/26].
153
the compromises the British had made in the Middle 
East by allowing the United States a half share in the 
Anglo-Iranian holding of the Iraq Petroleum Company in 
1922, agreeing to the participation of US interests in 
the Bahrain Island petroleum concession in 1936 which 
eventually went completely to US interests, and 
deciding to allow US interests to participate in 
Kuwait in 1935 on an equal basis with the Anglo- 
Persian Oil Company. The British secretary of state 
for the colonies had also announced on 9 July 1936 
that the British would extend the open door principle 
to their colonial empire.27
O'MALLEY'S DIPLOMACY
Because of Washington's refusal to cooperate, 
Balfour decided to create the illusion of a united 
front between the two governments. The first British 
note to Mexico dated 21 March had stated simply that 
Britain reserved its full rights in the matter of the 
expropriation.28 on news of Washington's note of 26 
March, Balfour decided to instruct O'Malley to make a 
representation to the Mexican government similar to
27 Foreign Office to Lindsay, 24 March 1938, FO 371 21463 
[A2215/10/26].
2® O'Malley to Foreign Office, 21 March 1938, FO 371 21464 
[A2613/10/26].
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Washington's in the hope that Mexico would conclude 
that the two countries were working together. Instead 
of a strictly parallel approach, however, Balfour 
wrote to O ’Malley authorising him to take an attitude 
that was harsher than Washington's by informing 
Cdrdenas bluntly that the British government believed 
the expropriation to be unjustified and requesting 
that the Mexican government restore the expropriated 
properties to the companies.29 This policy met with 
the approval of Lord Newton in the house of lords. He 
commented:
Unless we can secure co-operation 
with the Americans, or unless we 
follow their example, whether 
they’re acting with us or not, the 
chance of our doing any good is 
very remote.30
O'Malley's suspicion of Washington initially 
made him hesitate to execute the foreign office's 
instructions. He feared that Washington might draw 
attention to the relatively uncompromising attitude of 
Whitehall in order to focus Mexican resentment on 
Britain in order to persuade the Mexicans to come to 
an agreement favouring American interests at Britain's 
expense.31 O'Malley also feared that Hull, who was
29 Foreign Office to O'Malley, 30 March 1938, FO 371 21464 
[A2482/10/26].
30 House of Lords, Parliamentary Debates. (London: H.M.S.O., 
1938), 30 March 1938.
3  ^ O ’Malley to Foreign Office, 30 March 1938, FO 371 21464 
[A2487/10/26].
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trying to secure Mexico as an export market for United
States goods, might agree to a compromise solution of
the oil problem in order to achieve the lowering of
the Mexican tariff, which Cdrdenas had recently
increased in January. The fact that the Mexican
government had paid an instalment to the United States
on 1 January for the amount of compensation due for
properties damaged during the revolutionary violence
between 1910 and 1920 while it had left a similar
British instalment unpaid made him all the more
suspicious that the two countries were working
together at the expense of British interests.32
In addition, O'Malley knew that the Mexican
government had manipulated publicity about the 26
March note and the press statement of 30 March to give
the Mexican public the illusion of a favourable
reaction from the United States government. He
realised that 'Mexican exhilaration is probably at its
peak' and that
to act while the president and 
public are still puffed up by the 
recent exchange of declarations 
with the US might lead to his 
treating our representation with 
contempt to which we would have no 
effective reply.33
32 O'Malley to Foreign Office, 31 March 1938, FO 371 21464 
[A2536/10/26].
33 O'Malley to Foreign Office, 3 April 1938, FO 371 21465 
[A2636/10/26].
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He also believed that Washington's attitude would 
probably become increasingly harsh. When it did and 
the Mexican government realised the problems of 
running the oil industry, the excitement of the 
expropriation would have waned and it would be 'time 
for plain speaking'.34
Managing Director of Royal/Dutch Shell Frederick 
Godber, as well as Frederick Starling and Balfour all 
disagreed with O'Malley's concern about Mexico City 
playing off British and American interests against one 
another. They assumed that the Mexican government 
would do so no matter what and that Britain had 
nothing to lose by taking a firm line.35 Although 
Balfour saw some merit in the rest of O'Malley's 
arguments, he believed it was 'unwise to defer plain 
speaking'. Not only did he want to demonstrate to the 
Mexican public that the British government refused to 
accept the expropriation, but he also wanted to 
demonstrate to Washington that Britain was able to act 
independently. Balfour also predicted that criticism 
in the press and parliament would increase if the 
British government were to stay passive, and, 
therefore, instructed O'Malley to make representations
34 ibid.
35 Balfour, Minute, 4 April 1938, FO 371 21465 [A2593/10/26] .
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to the Mexican government straight away along the 
lines of their initial request to h i m . 36
O'Malley's worries that Washington would play 
off one interest against another must have been rather 
limited because, without further protest, he drafted 
and delivered a very sharply worded note of accusation 
to Mexico. Like Washington's note of 26 March, 
O'Malley's note, dated 8 April 1938, said that 
Whitehall did not 'question the general right of the 
Government to expropriate in the public interest and 
on payment of adequate compensation', but, it added, 
'this principle ... [did] not serve to justify 
expropriations essentially arbitrary in character.' 
Through O'Malley, Britain accused the Mexican 
government of 'confiscation carried out under a veil 
of legality' and 'a transgression of the principles of 
international law.' The note emphasised that the only 
way to remedy the situation was to return the oil 
companies' properties.37
The Mexican government denied that the act was 
arbitrary and promised Whitehall it would pay adequate 
compensation. It asserted that the British government 
had no right to intervene on behalf of Mexican Eagle's
36 Foreign Office to O'Malley, 6 April 1938, FO 371 21465 
[A2636/10/26] .
^7 His Majesty's Government to the Mexican Government, 8 April 
1938, 'Correspondence with the Mexican Government regarding the 
Expropriation of the Oil Properties in Mexico', £E, 1938, XXXI, 
Cmd 5758 (London: H.M.S.O., 1976).
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shareholders. Mexican Eagle, Cdrdenas claimed, was a 
Mexican company, and a statement on the back of the 
share certificates indicated that shareholders in the 
company had at the time of acquiring shares renounced 
the right to invoke diplomatic support in any 
disagreement involving the company.38
The Mexican arguments infuriated O'Malley. He 
believed that a firm approach to Mexico and a clear 
statement of policy would result in the return of the 
properties to Mexican Eagle. While O'Malley was angry 
at Washington's insistence on compensation and called 
it 'fundamentally disingenuous and prejudicial to 
British interests', he knew that the state department 
realised that Mexico could not fulfil its promise to 
pay. He suspected that the United States government 
was merely trying to come to an agreement with Mexico 
on compensation at the exclusion of British interests, 
and he strongly felt the need discreetly to stop the 
progress of Washington's plan without giving 
offence.39
Rather than addressing Washington directly about 
his anxieties, O'Malley recommended that Whitehall 
expose the Mexican government's unfortunate financial 
situation, which he hoped would make its offer of
ibid.
39 O'Malley to Foreign Office, 25 April 1938, FO 371 21468 
[A3295/10/26].
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compensation look completely absurd. He wrote, 'We 
have so far as I know no weapons but world opinion and 
must surely bid up to the full strength of this hand.' 
He also wanted to give publicity to the unpaid special 
claims instalment in light of the virtual emptiness of 
the Mexican treasury. He saw 'nothing to gain by 
understatement' and drafted a reply to the Mexican 
government which he himself admitted was 'fairly 
severe'.40 As he told Balfour, who tacitly gave his 
approval, his aim was to refute the arguments of the 
Mexican government and discredit it in the eyes of as 
many people in Mexico as possible in hopes that it 
would be ousted.41
In addition to discrediting the Mexican 
government, O'Malley self-servingly suggested that the 
foreign secretary withdraw him from M e x i c o . 42 as head 
of the southern department, O'Malley's professional 
interests before going to Mexico in October 1937 lay 
primarily with European affairs. After his abortive 
attempt to contest his dreaded diplomatic appointment, 
O'Malley, who came from a prominent Irish Catholic 
family, lost virtually all ability to influence 
matters involving Europe to become minister to a 
highly anti-Catholic government in a country he
40 ibid.
41 O ’Malley to Balfour, 10 May 1938, FO 371 21471 
[A4064/10/26].
42 ibid.
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loathed. In addition, the move to Mexico cost him 
about £1,000 out of his own pocket, and the expense of 
maintaining the legation in Mexico City made it 
impossible for him to continue the lease on the family 
home in Ockham.43 it seems, therefore, that he was 
heavily influenced by his personal prejudices and 
desire to return to Britain at the expense of what 
would have been most beneficial to his country.
The reasons he presented for recalling him were, 
first, he believed that due to economic problems, a 
revolution was imminent in which Castillo Ndjera would 
probably emerge as the new leader o'f Mexico, and he 
did not want the British in any way to be held 
responsible for having contributed to it. 44 Second, 
although he did not necessarily think an Anglo-Mexican 
oil partnership was likely in the near future, he 
hoped for an eventual one in petroleum production. 
After the predicted change of government, he hoped 
that Mexico City, would, as it had done when it 
encouraged Weetman Pearson to prospect for oil in 
Mexico before the Great War, seek British cooperation 
in oil matters to counter the influence of the United
States.
43 O'Malley, Owen: Phantom Caravan (London: John Murray, 1954), 
pp. 164-166.
44 O'Malley to Foreign Office, 12 May 1938 FO 371 21469 
[A3731/10/26].
45 O'Malley to Balfour, 5 April 1938, FO 371 21468 
[A3314/10/26].
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While Balfour did not see the need to withdraw
O'Malley, he believed that a note discrediting
Mexico's offer of compensation would both help
maintain British oil supplies in an emergency and
satisfy its sense of resentment toward the United
States. He bitterly resented what he thought were
efforts of the United States government to help
manoeuvre the oil companies into a disadvantageous
arrangement involving compensation. Balfour was
convinced that such an arrangement would allow the
Mexican government to represent the result as a
'victory for themselves which would inevitably serve
as an example to other Latin American countries to
imitate at some later d a t e . ' 4 6
Balfour also shared O'Malley's feelings of
disgust at the discussions of compensation between
Mexico City and Washington. More than ever Balfour
regarded it as unfortunate that the United States
government had not taken the same firm line as the
British. He bitterly resented what he thought were
Washington's efforts to help manoeuvre the companies
into a disadvantageous arrangement involving
compensation which the Mexican government would be
At liberty to abuse whilst at the 
same time representing the result 
as a victory for themselves which
^6 American Department, Memorandum, 16 May 1938, FO 371 21470 
[A3927/10/26].
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would inevitably serve as an 
example to other Latin American 
countries to imitate at some later 
date.47
While O'Malley failed to persuade the foreign
office to recall him, the final letter he drafted to
the Mexican government provoked Cardenas to sever
relations with Britain, which left him no choice but
to return to Britain. The note, dated 11 May,
reminded the Mexican government of the sum due to
Britain from damages to British property during
revolutionary activity between 20 November 1910 and 31
May 1920. Mexico had agreed to pay 3,795,697.53 pesos
in December 1935 in 11 annual instalments starting 1
January 1936 and had paid the first two instalments on
time. The third instalment, which had fallen due on 1
January 1938, remained unpaid, and O'Malley accused
the Mexican government of discrimination, complaining
that 'a similar debt to the United States government
had been punctually discharged'. He also reminded
Mexico City of its external debt, much of which was
owed to British subjects. To embarrass the government
more thoroughly, O'Malley commented on Mexico's
internal debt and said:
His Majesty's Government... cannot 
but regard the failure of the 
Mexican Government to discharge 
even their existing obligations as 
in itself rendering unjustified an
47 Ibid.
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expropriation, an essential 
condition of the validity of which 
would be the payment of full and 
adequate compensation amounting in 
this case to a very large sum.48
When the British minister presented the note to 
the Mexican government, Foreign Minister Eduardo Hay 
tried to convince him to omit the highly offensive 
section about Mexico's internal d e b t . 4 9  O'Malley, 
regarding it as an integral part of his plan, 
refused. Consistent with what Hay had told O'Malley, 
the Mexican government claimed Whitehall had no right 
to 'analyse the interior situation of Mexico, and ... 
the complex circumstances...which explain, and even 
justify, the attitude of [the Mexican government]'.50 
One of the Mexican newspapers, ultimas Noticias 
described the note as 'malevolently intended', the 
purpose of which was 'nothing more than to humiliate 
us and justify in advance a hostile attitude towards 
our country with regard to the petroleum conflict.'51 
O'Malley's note resulted in a cheque for the 
amount that had been due on 1 January, together with
His Majesty's Government to the Mexican Government, 11 May 
1938, 'Correspondence with the Mexican Government regarding the 
Expropriation of the Oil Properties in Mexico', ££, 1938, XXXI, 
Cmd 5758 (London: H.M.S.O., 1976).
49 Boal to Secretary of State, 12 May 1938, RG 59, Records of 
the Department of State [712.41/74].
The Mexican Government to His Majesty's Government, 13 May 
1938, 'Correspondence with the Mexican Government regarding the 
Expropriation of the Oil Properties in Mexico', ££, 1938, XXXI, 
Cmd 5758 (London: H.M.S.O., 1976).
51 Boal to Secretary of State, 13 May 1938, RG 59, Records of 
the Department of State [712.41/45].
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a statement confirming the withdrawal of the Mexican 
minister from London. Mexico also reminded the 
British government of an agreement of 31 December 
1935 allowing Mexico to defer payments as long as it 
paid interest. Since Britain itself had defaulted on 
its war debts to the United States, the Mexican 
government reminded Whitehall that 'even the most 
powerful states cannot boast they are up to date in 
their payment of all their pecuniary obligations'.52 
Left with no graceful alternative, the British 
government instructed O'Malley to close the legation 
in Mexico in the hope that this action would 
accelerate the fall of the supposedly weak Cdrdenas 
government.53 The foreign office found nothing to 
criticise in O'Malley's handling of the matter and 
instead blamed Mexico for the breach in relations.
Sir Alexander Cadogan, who had recently replaced 
Vansittart as permanent undersecretary at the foreign 
office, made no change of policy. When the Mexican 
chargd d'affaires expressed regret at the break in 
relations, Cadogan ignored the possibility that 
O'Malley's letter was even partially responsible and 
merely responded that 'it didn't seem that his
52 The Mexican Government to His Majesty's Government, 13 May 
1938, 'Correspondence with the Mexican Government regarding the 
Expropriation of the Oil Properties in Mexico', £E, 1938, XXXI, 
Cmd 5758 (London: H.M.S.O., 1976).
53 Foreign Office, Memorandum, 16 May 1938, FO 371 21470 
[A3927/10/26].
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government had chosen a terribly good way to go about 
it'.54 The break in relations left the British 
government all the more reliant on the United States 
government/ which heightened British fears of a US- 
Mexican deal made at the expense of British interests. 
Balfour for one believed that Cctrdenas was pleased to 
get the British out of the way so he could come to a 
compromise settlement with W a s h i n g t o n . 5 5
WHITEHALL'S INCREASED RELIANCE ON WASHINGTON AND 
LINDSAY'S DIPLOMACY
After the break in relations between Mexico and 
the British government, the only hope of solving the 
oil problem to Britain's satisfaction was a volte-face 
by Cdrdenas or the assumption of power by a moderate- 
minded government after a revolution. The British 
government recognised that both of these scenarios 
depended upon the action of the US government with 
regard to the e x p r o p r i a t i o n . 56 without a strong 
statement of disapproval from the United States, even 
economic hardships caused by the boycott would be
54 Dilks, David, (ed.): The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadoaan 
(London: Cassell & Company, 1971), 14 May 1938, p. 77.
55 Balfour, Minute, 16 May 1938, FO 371 21469 [A3743/10/26].
56 Foreign Office, Memorandum, 14 June 1938, FO 371 21472 
[A4728/10/26].
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unlikely to change Mexico's attitude. David Scott, 
Gerald Grey Fitzmaurice, Starling, and Balfour agreed 
that so long as the Mexican government believed or was 
able to lead most of the Mexican population to believe 
that the US condoned their act, it would not change.5*7 
While O'Malley was drafting his last note to 
Mexico, the foreign office instructed Lindsay to try 
to persuade Washington to issue a statement of 
disapproval and cooperate with Whitehall.58 Lindsay, 
however, did not present Britain's case forcefully to 
Washington. Although Hull was away from Washington at 
the time as he frequently was, Balfour was upset that 
Lindsay tended to talk to Welles, the state department 
official in charge of Latin American affairs, rather 
than Hull or Roosevelt. As Balfour wrote:
I rather wish he would not solely 
confine his attention to Welles who 
is the state department official 
least sympathetically disposed 
towards an understanding of our 
attitude.59
Balfour, however, did nothing directly to stop Lindsay 
from making representations to the undersecretary.
On 5 May Lindsay expressed British concern to 
Welles about a 'middle of the road' solution which
57 Balfour, Memorandum, 27 May 1938, FO 371 21471 
[A4305/10/26].
58 Foreign Office to Lindsay, 4 May 1938, FO 371 21469 
[A3404/10/26].
59 Balfour, Memorandum, 7 May 1938, FO 371 21469 [A3590/10/26].
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might encourage other countries to imitate Mexico. To 
placate Welles, Lindsay admitted that he was very 
disappointed the British government did not follow the 
same line as Washington in its dealings with the 
American republics especially in the challenging 
situation posed by the Mexican government. Welles 
replied to Lindsay that fear of the expropriation 
fever spreading was 'not serious' and that the policy 
of moderation pursued by the US offered hope of 
compensation.60
Lindsay's seemingly strange actions with regard 
to Mexico reflected his belief that the only way to 
secure US cooperation in matters of defence generally 
was to recognise Washington's suspicion of foreign 
governments trying to influence its policy, and to 
refrain from taking any strong diplomatic initiatives 
in the US. He noticed the ineffectiveness of 
Whitehall's diplomatic representations to Washington 
and believed strongly that US cooperation would come 
only from Whitehall allowing Washington to take the 
lead in matters and make decisions independently of 
foreign pressure.61 His attitude toward the Anglo- 
American trade agreement which was finalized in
60 Memorandum of a conversation with Lindsay and Under 
Secretary Welles, 5 May 1938, RG 59, Records of the Department 
of State [812.6363/4002].
61 Reynolds, David: iha.. Creation. .of, the. Anglo-American Alliance 
1937-41: A Study in Competitive Co-operation (London: Europa 
Publications, 1981), pp. 10-11.
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October 1938 illustrates this belief. Washington had 
tried to negotiate such an agreement for months, and 
Lindsay, supported by Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden 
had argued that Britain must accept the agreement in 
order to improve relations between Washington and 
London.62 jn approaching Welles on the Mexican 
problem, Lindsay was clearly thinking about Anglo- 
American relations in the broader context of Britain's 
need for US help in matters such as naval cooperation 
in the Far East, munitions and finances.
Lindsay reported to the foreign office after his 
meeting with Welles that the state department might 
adopt a firmer response to Mexico and that 
representations by the British government would only 
cause a delay. Lindsay explained that the state 
department was upset with the way Mexico had treated 
American interests, but felt unable to take too harsh 
a stand for fear an alternative government would take 
over. He was, therefore, against overtly requesting 
Washington to take a firmer stand and wanted 
Washington to decide to do so independently of British 
importuning.63
The foreign office increasingly came to resent 
Welles not only for his lack of cooperation but also
62 Ibid., pp. 17-18.
62 Lindsay to Foreign Office, 6 May 1938, FO 371 21469 
[A3590/10/26].
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for his work towards getting a compromise solution 
with Mexico. On 30 April he described a plan to 
Lindsay that he said the state department was trying 
to get the oil companies to accept. Herbert Feis had 
presented a similar plan to the companies on 21 April. 
According to the plan, the Mexican government was 
nominally to own the properties while the companies 
were to control the production and the marketing of 
the o i l .  64 The Mexican government was to receive the 
proceeds from the sale of the oil less a percentage to 
the oil companies to compensate them for the 
e x p r o p r i a t i o n . 65 The plan Welles had described to 
Lindsay put the British government in a terrible 
position. Rejecting the plan would run the risk of 
having the US come to an agreement with Mexico while 
leaving Britain to fend for itself. If Britain were 
to accept such an agreement, it would run the risk of 
alienating the companies and setting a bad example for 
other countries. Balfour believed that Lindsay had 
made the situation worse by merely listening to Welles 
rather than trying to convince him to stop supporting
64 Lindsay to Foreign Office, 4 May 1938, FO 371 21469 
[A3404/10/26].
65 O'Malley to Foreign Office, 20 May 1938, FO 371 21470 
[A4009/10/26]; Starling to Balfour, 17 May 1938, FO 371 21471 
[A4108/10/26].
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the compromise and to take stronger action in 
Mexico.66
Because nothing the British government had tried 
seemed to work, Foreign Secretary Viscount Halifax 
started to panic about the boycott's level of 
effectiveness and the neutrality laws in the United 
States. The Mexican government finding alternative 
markets for its oil shook Halifax's confidence in the 
boycott as a means to prevent other countries 
expropriating foreign oil holdings, and he expressed 
anxiety about the prospect of Washington applying the 
cash and carry provision of the neutrality laws to 
oil. If this happened, a serious drop in oil supplies 
for the navy and air force from the United States 
would occur. He reiterated the worry of the oil 
board, the petroleum department and the American 
department that such a change might occur during 
wartime if Italy blocked the Mediterranean and 
prevented Britain's access to oil from Russia, the 
Dutch East Indies, Roumania and Iraq. If these 
countries were to follow Mexico's example, Britain 
would then have substantially to limit the activities 
of the navy, air force and other mechanised services. 
It was vital, therefore, to show other remaining 
suppliers, such as Iran, Venezuela, Mexico, Colombia
66 Foreign Office to Lindsay, 4 May 1938, FO 371 21469 
[A3404/10/26].
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and Peru, that expropriation of the oil industry 
brought serious consequences.^ 7
Halifax appreciated that Britain was caught 
between the fear of too forcefully pressing the United 
States government to act and the fear that if it did 
not pressure Washington to voice disapproval clearly 
to Mexico, the situation would not improve for the 
British. Halifax accepted that it was crucial for 
Washington to voice disapproval of what Cdrdenas had 
done. He was, however, very wary of appearing to put 
pressure upon the president because it was so 
important to foster American good will at a time when 
hostilities were likely. Nevertheless he felt that a 
subtle request to the United States was worth a try, 
and on 5 June 1938 he requested Lindsay to present his 
views on how Washington could improve the situation. 
Consistent with his reluctance to be too forceful with 
Washington, Lindsay spoke to Welles rather than Hull 
and neglected to mention that the concerns he voiced 
were those of Halifax himself. As with his other 
representations, Lindsay failed to get any helpful 
response out of Welles.68
Encouraged by Halifax's active interest in the 
matter, representatives of Mexican Eagle and Standard 
Oil of New Jersey asked Lindsay to voice Whitehall's
67 Balfour, Minute, 29 June 1938, FO 371 21473 [5182/10/26].
68 Ibid.
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concerns to the state department again. The companies 
wanted Roosevelt to make up for the approving 
statement he had made in Warm Springs on 1 April by 
voicing his disapproval of the expropriation.
Reluctant as ever, Lindsay refused, saying that he 
would need further instructions from the British 
government in order to carry out the request.69
Halifax, however, took the initiative by 
approaching United States Ambassador Joseph Kennedy to 
get the president to dispel the idea current in Mexico 
that Washington approved of the expropriation.
Halifax, now seriously concerned about the situation, 
bluntly told Kennedy that Cdrdenas would not have gone 
through with the expropriation if he had not believed 
the United States government would react with 'some 
degree of sympathy' which Daniels had in fact conveyed 
to Mexico. Kennedy admitted this was probably true.
He and Hull had told Roosevelt that his comments in 
Warm Springs had been a mistake, and they urged him to 
make a stronger statement.
Much to Britain's disappointment, Roosevelt did 
not dispel the impression he had given in Warm 
Springs. In early July at the dedication of the 
cornerstone of the federal building in New York's
69 Starling to Balfour, 9 July 1938, FO 371 21473 
[A5457/10/26].
Memorandum of a Conversation between Halifax and Kennedy, 11 
July 1938, FO 371 21473 [A5379/10/26].
173
world fair grounds, Roosevelt emphasised the 
reciprocal nature of the Good Neighbor policy which 
the New York Times believed referred to the Mexican 
oil situation. Whatever it referred to, the British 
government and the oil companies believed the 
statement did not go nearly far enough in pressuring 
the Mexican government into allowing the companies 
back into Mexico.
Later the same month there was suspicion in 
Whitehall briefly that at last the United States 
government had decided to voice strong disapproval to 
Mexico. After Washington and the oil companies 
decided on 31 May to hold off negotiations for the 
time being, Washington turned to the issue of Mexico's 
failure to compensate US citizens whose agrarian 
properties had been confiscated since 1927. On 22 
July it condemned the confiscations and proposed 
a r b i t r a t i o n . "72 Whitehall was hopeful that the note 
was a sign that the United States was prepared to take 
equally stern measures with the Mexican government 
over oil.^3
Lindsay to Foreign Office, 12 July 1938, FO 371 21474 
[A5654/10/26].
starling to Balfour, 23 July 1938, FO 371 21474 
[A5746/10/26].
*73 cieugh to Foreign Office, 20 July 1938, FO 371 21474 
[A5659/10/26]; Starling to Balfour, 22 July 1938, FO 371 21474 
[A5736/10/26].
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To the grave disappointment of the British, 
Washington finished the correspondence with Mexico in 
November with an agrarian agreement which set the 
precedent of compensation for the oil companies.
After hearing about the agreement, according to which 
the Mexican government was to pay compensation on a 
fixed schedule over a period of five years, the amount 
to be determined by a committee of Mexican and 
American experts, Lindsay called on Welles and 
nervously tried to get information about what 
Washington planned to do about the oil situation in 
the aftermath of the agrarian settlement.7  ^ Welles' 
vague response probably made the British government 
feel worse, having tried desperately to avoid a 
compensatory solution to the oil problem which would 
set an encouraging example to other countries 
contemplating expropriation.
MUTUAL RESENTMENT
In Whitehall, resentment toward the US 
government existed at the highest levels. The 
foreign secretary said in a meeting of the
Memorandum of a Conversation between Lindsay and Welles, 17 
November 1938, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, 
[812.6363/5112 1/2].
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cabinet that it was unfortunate that the United 
States was not taking the same firm line as 
Britain.75 David Scott, promoted to assistant 
undersecretary of state for foreign affairs at 
the end of May, similarly complained that it 
would be very difficult for the British 
government to influence Washington to take a 
firm line because Washington seemed to be 
concerned more about domestic policy than 
anything.7 6 Balfour particularly resented 
America's advantageous position in terms of oil 
supplies:
Unlike the United States, the 
British rely on [other] countries 
for oil supplies vital to their 
national defence and it is for this 
reason if for no other, that it has 
been considered necessary to pursue 
a firm course.77
As Balfour believed, any note from Britain would have
little effect, but if the US were to issue a firm
note, the Mexican government might change its
policy.7®
Britain's task of getting the United States to 
take a harder stand, however, was as difficult as ever
7  ^CAB 23/93, Cabinet Meeting, 18 May 1938.
76 Foreign Office, Memorandum, 14 June 1938, FO 371 21472
[A4728/10/26].
77 American Department, Memorandum, 16 May 1938, F0 371 21470
[A3927/10/26].
7® Foreign Office, Memorandum, 14 June 1938, FO 371 21472 
[A4728/10/26].
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because Washington continued to have no sympathy for 
the British position, and some in Washington even 
bitterly resented the attitude Britain had taken. For 
the most part, American officials thought the British 
were being unreasonable and were pleased with the 
allusion the Mexican government had made in their note 
to the British debt to the United States from World 
War I. Upon hearing news of the note Morgenthau said, 
'I feel very kindly disposed to the Mexicans.' The 
president agreed and called it 'a peach'.79 in 
addition, Pierre Boal was critical of Britain for 
misinterpreting Mexico City's payment of an instalment 
on a debt to the US before it made a similar payment 
to Britain. It was not a case of discrimination, he 
argued, because the United States had concluded its 
special claims settlement earlier than Britain, and 
therefore the Mexican government had given it 
precedence as to payment.80
Daniels in particular found the British point of 
view as expressed in its last note to Mexico damaging 
to the whole situation because he believed it had 
stiffened 'the determination of the government to go 
forward along the course taken.' Furthermore, he 
condemned the British denial of Mexico's right to
79 Morgenthau, Diary entry, 12 May 1938, Diary #124.
Boal to Secretary of State, 12 May 1938, RG 59, Records of 
the Department of State [812.6363/3899].
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expropriate in the public interests as an effort to 
control Mexico. Britain's attitude made him recall 
the efforts during Mexico's revolution of British 
Minister in Mexico Sir Francis Stronge and American 
Ambassador Henry Lane Wilson to maintain privileges of 
foreigners exploiting Mexico's natural resources by 
helping Victoriano Huerta secure the presidency at the 
expense of Francisco Madero in 1913.81 Given 
Washington's lack of concern over the severity of the 
situation for Britain as well as the break in Anglo- 
Mexican diplomatic relations, Whitehall in the months 
ahead was to experience added frustration in trying to 
persuade Mexico to accept a settlement that would 
ensure oil supplies in an emergency.
In conclusion, the oil board, petroleum 
department, foreign office and the committee of 
imperial defence gave priority to making an example of 
Mexico to secure oil supplies for an emergency. 
Although Washington's help was unlikely to be 
forthcoming from the start, Whitehall was desperate 
enough to at least try to secure it. Taking an 
approach that stood the least chance of irritating 
Washington at a time when Britain needed US help in
Daniels to Hull, 9 April 1938, Papers of Josephus Daniels; 
Schulzinger, Robert D.: American Diplomacy in the Twentieth 
Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), p. 53.
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coping with the threat of war was very important. 
Without relations with Mexico, Whitehall's many 
requests for US help continued to elicit unhelpful 
replies. Washington had the upper hand in the 
situation more than ever and refused to communicate 
its policy with Whitehall. Whitehall became 
increasingly anxious that Washington might conduct 
policy at the exclusion of Britain's oil interests. 
Worse still Washington might set a precedent which 
would run counter to Whitehall's efforts to make an 
example of Mexico and thereby put British oil supplies 
in jeopardy. In losing the ability to communicate 
directly with Mexico City, Britain lost the ability to 
give the appearance of independence from the United 
States which was so important in approaching 
Washington. As the following chapters show, however, 
the lack of diplomatic relations did not substantially 
affect Anglo-US relations.
The blame for Britain being put in such a 
position lies principally with Owen O'Malley.
Although his final note to Mexico had the approval of 
the foreign office, he alone received General Hay's 
warning that any reference to Mexico's internal debt 
would gravely offend the Mexican government, and he
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alone chose to ignore the w a r n i n g . ® 2  He admitted that 
his posting to Mexico was 'seven months of arduous, 
obscure and unfruitful effort put forth in an 
atmosphere of physical exhaustion and mental 
perplexity.' He had nothing but contempt and disgust 
for Mexicans and expressed his grave doubts that the 
'mingling of Spanish blood with the blood of numerous 
tribes of degenerate Indians' could make 'any 
permanently valuable contribution to humanity'.®®
His arguments for being recalled and exposing 
what he thought was Mexican insincerity about paying 
compensation to the oil interests contain logical 
gaps. His ostensible goal of demonstrating to the 
Mexican public and the world that the Mexican 
government could not pay compensation hardly 
necessitated the British government recalling him. 
Furthermore his argument about the benefits of 
recalling him depended on a revolution occurring in 
Mexico which despite, unsubstantiated speculation 
about the British government and Shell planning a 
revolution, he could not guarantee.®^ It could be 
argued that perhaps O'Malley, like others in the
82 Young to Balfour, 3 May 1938, FO 371 21468 [A3500/10/26]; 
Boal to Secretary of State, 12 May 1938, RG 59, Records of the 
Department of State [712.41/74].
8  ^ O'Malley to Foreign Office, 1 June 1938, FO 371 21472 
[A4932/10/26].
8  ^ O'Malley to Foreign Office, 15 May 1938, FO 371 21470 
[A3770/10/26].
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British government, had been worried about the boycott 
of Mexican oil not lasting and wanted to make an 
example of Mexico before it broke down completely. 
O'Malley, however, should have known that jeopardizing 
Anglo-Mexican relations would not further this goal 
because so long as the United States had strong 
relations with Mexico, relations with Britain were 
relatively unimportant to Mexico, and Mexican 
nationalism made Cdrdenas determined to make the 
expropriation succeed.
There is no doubt that O'Malley, after being 
forced into a situation which he despised and which 
caused him to sacrifice both his family home and his 
influence over the events in Europe, had great 
motivation to remove himself from such misery. Both 
the machinery of government as well as the timing of 
the expropriation just after the Anschluss, which 
focused Whitehall's attention on Europe rather than 
Mexico, allowed him to exercise enough influence over 
policy to provoke a break in relations to secure his 
return to Britain. His claim that he examined his 
conscience to see if in fact 'mischievous 
exasperation' or 'pugnacity' had led him to propose an 
unduly harsh policy toward Mexico rings of 
disingenuousness.85 The very fact that he singled out
O'Malley to Foreign Office, 1 June 1938, FO 371 21472 
[A4932/10/26].
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these emotions among so many other unmentioned 
possibilities indicates that they did indeed play a 
role in his actions.
182
CHAPTER FIVE 
THE BOYCOTT: MARCH 1938-SEPTEMBER 1939
Although finn in our attitude, we 
sought also to be friendly, in keeping 
with the spirit of the Good NeighborA
Cordell Hull
The one remaining hope lay in the 
possibility that Mexico's difficulties 
in production, shipping and 
disposition of her oil might compel 
the government to seek reconciliation 
wi th the companies.2
Frederick Starling
The Anglo-Dutch and American oil companies 
decided just after the expropriation to do whatever 
possible to cut off Mexican oil from the vital 
foreign market. Their tactics included getting the 
cooperation of tanker owners to deny the Mexican 
government access to tankers and persuading other 
oil companies not to purchase Mexican oil. The 
reactions of London and Washington to the oil 
companies' boycott illustrate the different 
priorities of the two governments. John Balfour 
and Frederick Starling saw the issue principally 
from the angle of defence and believed that
1 Hull, Cordell: The Memoirs of Cordell Hull. Vol. 1 
(London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1948), p. 610.
2 Starling to Balfour, 4 May 1938, FO 371 21464 
[A2479/10/27].
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supporting the oil companies' boycott was vital to 
maintaining Britain's oil supplies. Frederick 
Starling, who largely took the lead in forming 
policy toward the boycott, hoped to get Mexico to 
return to the status quo ante, thereby discouraging 
other countries from expropriating British oil 
properties and helping to secure oil supplies 
world-wide in the event of war.
Both Starling and Balfour supported Mexican 
Eagle by having government agencies refuse to 
purchase Mexican oil, strongly dissuading British 
companies from doing business with Mexico and 
convincing other countries not to purchase Mexican 
oil. The cooperation Whitehall secured from the 
Bank of England was invaluable in obtaining the 
cooperation of the City of London to prevent 
British businessmen from selling Mexican oil by 
denying them the necessary finances to meet the 
obligations of distributing the oil. The American 
department and the petroleum department, despite 
criticism from the department of overseas trade, 
were so dedicated to the boycott that they also 
insisted other British businesses like Turner 
Brothers Asbestos Company and Tyneside shipbuilder 
Swan Hunter refrain from dealing with Mexico even 
at the loss of their business to American and 
German interests.
Washington maintained its priority of 
establishing a standard of respect for US interests
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in Mexico before an eventual trade agreement with 
Mexico could be established. In support of the oil 
companies' boycott, Washington refused to permit 
any government agency to purchase Mexican oil or to 
loan money to Mexico. Whenever possible Hull 
advised companies wanting to market Mexican oil 
against doing so, although some of them took no 
notice of the advice, and officials in Washington 
usually requested other governments wishing to 
purchase Mexican oil not to do so. In addition, 
the Export-Import Bank denied a loan to a company 
wanting to do business involving Mexican oil.
Washington did not communicate or cooperate 
with London on matters involving the boycott of 
Mexican oil. As a result, Whitehall concluded that 
Washington was not taking action effectively to 
support the boycott. Whitehall was particularly 
angry that American independent oil producers 
continued to market Mexican oil with little 
apparent resistance from Washington. To 
Whitehall's frustration, the state department 
seemed reluctant to put pressure on other Latin 
American governments not to buy Mexican oil for 
fear of triggering a reaction in countries 
sympathetic to the expropriation.3 in reality 
however, Washington was doing whatever it could 
possibly do consistent with the Good Neighbor
3 Meyer, p. 209.
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Policy to support the interests of the expropriated 
companies. Unlike Whitehall, which had so much at 
stake in terms of oil supplies, Washington usually 
did not want to run the risk of compromising 
relations between nations by putting too much 
pressure on foreign governments not to purchase 
Mexican oil. Also, Washington did not have the 
leverage in the banking world which was invaluable 
to Whitehall in controlling the activities of 
British companies wanting to sell Mexican oil.
THE OIL COMPANIES' BOYCOTT AND MEXICO'S RESPONSE
By organizing the boycott of Mexican oil, 
British and American oil interests hoped that the 
resulting increase in economic hardships and 
heightened social unrest would force President 
Cdrdenas to leave office or return to the status 
quo ante on ownership of the oil properties. Among 
the ways the companies tried to achieve this goal 
was to pay oil workers to strike^ and to exacerbate 
the fall of the peso on the foreign exchange market 
by withdrawing their money from Mexican banks and 
dumping balances on the exchange markets. The 
companies also tried to stop the important influx
^ Daniels to Secretary of state, 8 June 1939, RG 59, Records 
of the Department of State [8122.6363/5838].
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of foreign exchange from tourism by launching a 
campaign of negative publicity reporting gruesome 
murders, random acts of terrorism and other 
incidents designed to keep tourists away from 
Mexico. Even filling station attendants in the 
border states were drawn into the campaign and 
quite often successfully persuaded motorists not to 
continue on their planned journeys to Mexico. As a 
result of the propaganda, the income of dollars 
from tourism for 1938 decreased by one third from 
the previous year.5
Because the market for oil in Mexico and the 
rest of Latin America was relatively small at the 
time, the success of the oil industry depended 
greatly on sales abroad.® Knowing Pemex had very 
few serviceable tankers, Jersey Standard and Royal 
Dutch/Shell in April 1938 convinced tanker owners 
not to sell or lease tankers to the Mexican 
government,7 and thereby denied Mexico access to 88 
percent of the world's tankers.® Most of the 
independent tanker companies and operators whom 
Mexican Finance Minister Eduardo Suarez approached 
refused to lease him tankers because the major
5 Meyer, p. 204.
6 Meyer, Lorenzo and Vazquez, Josefina Zoraida: The United 
States and Mexico (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1985), p. 151.
7 Memorandum of a Conversation between Duggan and Armstrong, 
9 April 1938, RG 59, Records of the Department of State 
[812.6363/3459] .
® Everest, Allan Seymor: Morgenthau. the New Deal and Silver 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1950), p.91.
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companies threatened them with the permanent loss 
of their business if they dealt with Mexico. Only 
a few tanker operators offered to sell him tankers, 
and he planned to buy as many as possible and sell 
Mexican oil at ruinously low prices. The oil 
companies, however, were able to undermine the 
Mexican competition by lowering their oil prices.9 
Standard Oil intimidated British and American 
independent oil companies transporting, refining 
and selling Mexican crude oil by bringing suits in 
American and European courts with the claim that 
the oil had been stolen. This litigation was not 
successful because most courts did not want to make 
a ruling on the legality of the expropriation. 
Furthermore, proving that the oil had come from an 
expropriated property was particularly difficult. 
The prospect of involvement in a lawsuit with one 
of the major oil companies, however, was the most 
decisive factor in making many independents avoid 
deals involving Mexican oil.10
In addition to intimidating independent oil 
companies with lawsuits, Standard Oil of New Jersey 
had the Ethyl Gasoline Corporation, which it 
controlled with General Motors, refuse to sell 
Mexico tetraethyl lead, an antidetonant necessary
^ Herschel Johnson to Hull, 14 April 1938, RG 59, Records of 
the Department of State [812.6363/3703].
10 Gordon, Wendall C.: The Expropriation of Foreian-owned 
Property in Mexico (Washington D.C.: American Council on 
Public Affairs, 1941), p. 126.
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for processing gasoline and improving the quality 
of refined petroleum products.H Without 
tetraethyl lead Mexican gasoline could not without 
special equipment be refined to a high enough 
octane rating necessary to run an automobile 
motor.12 This aspect of the boycott alone forced 
Mexico to stop exporting refined petroleum 
products, downgrade the quality of the domestically 
consumed fuel and import gasoline with a high 
enough octane rating for aircraft and other needs. 
Pemex was, however, able to produce some 
tetraethyl, but at a much higher cost than it used 
to buy it. Only after the American companies 
realised that their monopoly on tetraethyl was 
under threat did they agree to resume selling to 
Mexico.13
The major oil companies also tried to deprive 
Pemex of technicians and equipment necessary for 
the lucrative running of the oil industry. They 
threatened to withhold all orders from any company 
that sold equipment to the Mexican g o v e r n m e n t . 1 4  
Makers of oil-drilling equipment and replacement 
parts in the United States returned cheques from 
the Mexican government for orders with the comment
11 Randall, Stephen J: United States Foreign Oil Policy 
1919-1948 (Kingston: McGill-Queens University Press, 1985), 
p.100; Meyer, p. 203.
12 Unidentified newspaper clipping, 19 June 1938, RG 38, 
Records of the Chief of Naval Operations.
12 Meyer, p. 203.
14 Meyer, Lorenzo and Vazquez, Josefina Zoraida, p. 151.
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that they simply could not afford to risk losing 
the business of Standard Oil. Mexican Foreign 
Minister Eduardo Hay complained to Daniels that the 
continued refusal of US manufacturers and dealers 
to sell to Pemex would force the Mexican government 
to turn to Germany where it would be able to barter 
oil for the necessary machinery, a prospect which 
caused Daniels anxiety.15
The cutting off of markets abroad was 
devastating for Mexico, and the boycott soon forced 
Mexico to sell oil to Japan, Germany and Italy. 
Between 50 and 60 percent of oil drilled in Mexico 
at the time of the expropriation was for foreign 
consumption. Although Mexican production declined 
dramatically after the expropriation, Mexico City 
still desperately needed markets for its oil. 
Because the boycott happened at a time when Japan, 
Italy and Germany desperately needed oil, Mexico 
City found markets rather quickly. Japan lacked 
the raw materials such as rubber and oil which the 
military needed to fulfil its ambitions, and the 
German policy on oil while the country prepared for 
war was to get as many possible stores from abroad 
and leave as much of its own oil as possible in the 
ground.16
15 Diary entry, 29 October 1938, Papers of Josephus Daniels. 
15 Tugendhat, Christopher and Hamilton, Adrian: Oil: the 
Biggest Business (London: Eyre Methuen, 1975), p. 115.
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Mexico City, therefore, organised many barter 
arrangements with Germany, Italy and, to a lesser 
extent, Japan, exchanging Mexican oil for 
technicians, machinery, tankers or other 
material. ^  For example, on 20 October 1938, the 
Mexican petroleum administration arranged a deal 
with the Italian oil company, Azienda Generale 
Italiana Petrole, in which the company agreed to 
buy $350 million worth of Mexican oil in exchange 
for tankers. Other deals with Italy involved rayon 
y a r n . 18 in jUne 1938, according to an article in 
the New York Times which was confirmed by the 
British consulate, a Japanese tanker pulled into a 
Mexican port and took away 12 thousand tons of fuel 
oil.19
INDEPENDENT OIL COMPANIES AND THE REACTION OF
WASHINGTON
The issues that arose from the dealings of 
Eastern States Petroleum Company did more than any 
others to provoke mutual resentment between British
1*7 According to figures Lorenzo Meyer cites, between the 
expropriation and the start of World War II, Germany 
accounted for 48% of Mexican oil exports, while Italy 
accounted for 17% and Japan a less significant figure, which 
Meyer fails to provide. The US accounted for 20%. [Meyer, 
Lorenzo: Mexico and the United States in the Oil 
Controversy. 1918-1942 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 
1972), p. 209].
Rippy, Merrill: Oil and the Mexican Revolution (Leiden: 
E.J. Brill, 1972), pp. 255-6.
Paz Salinas, p. 133.
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and US interests. Eastern States was an American 
company which had negotiated a contract to sell 
10,000 barrels of Poza Rica crude per day, most of 
which went to Germany, Italy and Sweden. In 1938 
it pursued further negotiations to increase its 
purchases to 15,000, nearly the entire production 
of light crude from the oil field known to have so 
much p o t e n t i a l . 2 0  The company had secured the 
agreement of US customs to allow it a rebate on the 
duty from bringing Poza Rica crude into the United 
States for refining as long as the company exported 
the oil rather than sold it within the US.21 
In addition to the fact that an American 
company was selling the oil from the most promising 
field in Mexico which Mexican Eagle had discovered, 
Whitehall became very concerned that under the 
arrangement between Eastern States and US Customs 
Mexican oil would obtain a certificate of US origin 
and enter Britain. The British company Harris and 
Dixon had an agreement with the American company 
dating from November 1937 whereby it agreed to buy 
a certain amount of motor spirit or kerosene from 
Eastern States over a period of two and a half 
years. Eastern States had wanted Harris and Dixon 
to accept supplies that had originated in Mexico,
20 Lockett to Daniels, 10 October 1938, RG 151, Records of 
the Bureau for Foreign and Domestic Commerce [File 312: Oils 
and Minerals-Mexico]
21 Telegram, New York to LC asdebatic, 28 October 1938, FO 
371 21477 [A8255/10/26].
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but the British company refused.22 when Captain 
Crookshank, secretary of mines, heard what Eastern 
States had done, he told Ivor Guest, chairman of 
Harris and Dixon, that he categorically did not 
want oil of Mexican origin to enter Britain. Guest 
responded by mentioning the practical difficulty of 
knowing the origin of any petroleum product they or 
any company planned to buy.23
Mexican Eagle bitterly resented the activities 
of Eastern States. At the urging of Godber, 
managing director of Royal/Dutch Shell, Starling 
persuaded the foreign office to call on Lindsay to 
complain to the state department.24 to Whitehall's 
and Mexican Eagle's frustration, however, Lindsay 
was unable to convince Washington to take strong 
enough action to stop the deal with Eastern States. 
The exasperated G. H. Thompson of the foreign 
office wrote that the situation with Eastern 
States 'scarcely suggests the US government can be 
counted upon for much help in preventing the export 
of "stolen" oil. We know they c a n n o t . '25 starling 
believed that the arrangement of Eastern States not 
only placed another refinery at Mexico's disposal
22 Starling to Balfour, 4 November 1938, FO 371 21477 
[A8221/10/26].
22 Note of an Interview between the Secretary for Mines and 
Chairman and Director of Harris and Dixon's, 1 November 
1938, FO 371 21477 [A8251/10/26].
24 starling to Balfour, 31 October 1938, FO 371 21477 
[A8221/10/26]; Foreign Office to Lindsay, 4 November 1938,
FO 371 21477 [A8251/10/26].
25 Thompson, Minute, 28 November 1938, FO 371 21478 
[A8981/10/26].
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and helped strengthen Mexico, but also greatly 
embarrassed the British government and the 
governments which had been cooperating in the 
boycott.26
In contrast to what London thought, Washington 
did make it difficult for Eastern States to 
continue with its arrangement of importing Mexican 
oil and refining it. Standard Oil of New Jersey 
approached Herbert Bursley, assistant chief of the 
division of American republics, about Eastern 
States' arrangement with customs and said that 
aiding the sale of the Mexican oil in such a manner 
gave the message to Mexico and the world that 
Washington tacitly approved of the e x p r o p r i a t i o n . 2 7  
The commissioner of customs agreed to investigate 
whether Eastern States was in violation of the 
Anti-Dumping Act of May 1921 because it was 
purchasing crude from Mexico at prices below those 
of the world market.28 while Standard's efforts to 
get Eastern States convicted under this act failed, 
the procedure of the investigation which took 
several months harmed the company. The treasury 
department forced Eastern States to post bond to 
ensure it could pay the expenses in case of a
26 Starling to Balfour, 31 October 1938, FO 371 21477 
[A8221/10/26]; Foreign Office to Lindsay, 4 November 1938, 
FO 371 21477 [A8251/10/26].
27 Memorandum of a Conversation between Bohannon and 
Bursley, 28 October 1938, RG 59, Records of the Department 
of State [812.6363/5027].
2® Meyer, 203.
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decision against it and refused to pay any of its 
rebate money for the duration of the 
i n v e s t i g a t i o n . 29 Also, the Export Import Bank 
denied a loan to the company even after it 
complained that the major oil companies' pressure 
on its former banking contacts caused them to deny 
the company collateralized bank loans.20
When the large oil companies tried to prevent 
another American interest from organizing barter 
agreements between Germany and Mexico, Washington 
tried to stop such arrangements interfering with US 
trade but failed to involve itself too much for 
fear of making a precedent. American businessman 
William Rhodes Davis, who had lost his company 
Sabalo Transportation during the expropriation, 
entered into an agreement with the Mexican 
government whereby his company Eurotank would ship 
Mexican petroleum products mostly to Hamburg where 
he owned a refinery. According to the agreement 
Davis was to pay for what he was taking out of 
Mexico, 60 percent in German machinery and 40 
percent in cash.21 Before Eurotank could collect 
any given shipment, the Mexican government required 
that Davis open the 40 percent cash credit with the 
First National Bank of Boston. When Davis had
29 unmarked, undated document in Papers of Josephus Daniels.
Whittmore, Vice President of the Export-Import Bank, to 
Duggan, 4 October 1938, RG 59, Records of the Department of 
State [812/6363/4902].
31 Herschell Johnson to Secretary of State, 16 June 1938, RG 
59 [812.6363/4270].
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problems opening the credit, which he blamed on the
activities of the large oil companies who were
trying to obstruct his business, the Mexican
government prevented some of his tankers which had
arrived in Mexico from sailing.32
Daniels, Feis and Lockett were all anxious
about the Davis contract. Lockett took action by
persuading Suarez that in future any barter
arrangement with Davis would involve the barter of
American refinery equipment. When Davis attempted
another arrangement involving technical help and
refinery equipment to revamp Mexican refineries in
exchange for oil, Suarez insisted that certain
equipment be bought in the United States and found
a company, Winkler Koch Company, who were prepared
to sell to it.33
However, when Standard Oil tried
unsuccessfully to get Davis convicted under the
Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917, Washington
investigated the matter but ultimately did not
persecute the company for fear of setting a
precedent. As Duggan wrote:
The implication of such a 
proceeding would be that our 
government is now prepared to 
persecute dealers in products
32 Lockett to Daniels, 26 July 1938, enclosed in Daniels to 
Hull, 26 July 1938, RG 59, Records of the Department of 
State [812.6363/Davis and Company/92].
33 Lockett to Daniels, 6 June 1938, RG 151, Records of the 
Bureau for Foreign and Domestic Commerce [File 312: Oils and 
Minerals-Mexico]; Lockett to Daniels, 10 August 1938, RG 
151, Records of the Bureau for Foreign and Domestic Commerce 
[File 312: Oils and Minerals-Mexico].
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expropriated without compensation 
from Americans throughout the world 
if these are the subject of 
diplomatic negotiations. This 
seems like a very large order.34
The investigation, however, threatened the company
financially because its resulting uncertainty
created the need for financial assistance which
bankers were withholding. The activities of the
large oil companies in trying to interfere with or
take over his business interests also caused Davis
great concern. He claimed that they even offered
to buy his obligations from the First National Bank
of B o s t o n . 35 when Davis complained to the US
commercial attachd in Mexico about the major oil
companies sabotaging his efforts with governments
and large banks throughout the world, nothing was
done.36
34 Lockett to Daniels, 3 August 1938, RG 151, Records of the
Bureau for Foreign and Domestic Commerce [File 312: Oils and
Minerals-Mexico]; Duggan to Secretary of State, 23 September 
1938, RG 59, Records of the Department of State 
[812.6363/4879].
35 Lockett to Daniels, 6 December 1938, RG 151, Records of 
the Bureau for Foreign and Domestic Commerce [File 312: Oils 
and Minerals-Mexico].
35 Lockett to Daniels, 3 August 1938, RG 151, Records of the
Bureau for Foreign and Domestic Commerce [File 312: Oils and
Minerals-Mexico].
197
WHITEHALL'S REACTION TO INDEPENDENT COMPANIES 
SELLING MEXICAN OIL
Participation in the boycott became official 
policy after representatives of the treasury, board 
of trade, petroleum department and foreign office 
decided in favour of economic reprisals on 29 March 
1938 and then obtained the approval of the 
committee for imperial defence. They all agreed 
that the benefit of economic pressure was the 
example it would set for other countries 
contemplating Mexico's e x a m p l e . 37 Balfour in 
particular realised that economic pressure would 
probably not result in the return of the oil 
companies to working their former properties. But 
he believed that Mexico was probably headed for a 
revolution and hoped that the outside world would 
draw the conclusion that the boycott caused the 
revolution and that expropriations could not be 
done with impunity.38
The petroleum department played a central role 
in making the boycott official British policy with 
its memorandum regarding the situation in the 
aftermath of the expropriation, which was passed 
from the oil board to the committee of imperial
37 Interdepartmental Meeting at the Foreign Office, 29 March 
1938, FO 371 21464 [A2472/10/26].
38 Balfour, Minute, 9 May 1938, FO 371 21469 [A3663/10/26] .
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defence where it was approved.39 The memorandum 
emphasised in particular that access to oil 
supplies abroad in an emergency necessitated having 
organized facilities for refining, storing and 
transporting in important oil producing countries. 
Due to the absence of cooperation from Washington 
in the diplomatic handling of the situation, 
resorting to economic sanctions was Britain's last 
hope of making an example of Mexico to protect 
these facilities world-wide.40
After official policy was decided in favour of 
the boycott the treasury secured the cooperation of 
banks and financial houses to deny requests for 
credit to businesses that traded in Mexican oil.41 
In addition Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, 
announced in parliament that no government 
department would purchase Mexican oil, 42 an(j on 27 
April 1938 R.A. Butler, parliamentary 
undersecretary at the foreign office, announced in 
the house of commons that British subjects 
marketing Mexican oil were embarrassing the British 
government.43
39 Meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defense, 12 May 
1938, FO 371 21469 [A3663/10/26].
4® Petroleum Department, Memorandum, 8 April 1938,
FO 381 21469 [A3663/10/26].
4^ John Simon to Montagu Norman, 22 April 1938, Gl/495 
4261/5, Bank of England Papers.
42 House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates. (London, 
H.M.S.O., 1938), 29 April 1938.
42 House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates. (London, 
H.M.S.O., 1938), 27 April 1938.
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Balfour was furious about the new arrangement 
between Davis and the Mexican government, the 
boycott's seemingly diminishing effectiveness and 
the fact that American independent oil companies 
persisted in dealing in Mexican oil. Balfour was 
especially worried that Mexico was obtaining German 
drilling machinery and material for the refineries 
from US firms rather than British material and 
equipment from British firms as previously. Most 
importantly, Balfour was upset that because of 
activities of people like Davis, the Mexican 
government was able to continue producing oil.^4 
Mexican Eagle was equally angry about Washington's 
policy. Godber complained to Starling that Davis 
was the main purchaser of Mexican oil and was 
ruining their efforts to bring the Mexican 
government around to a more conciliatory attitude 
towards foreign oil interests.45
Balfour and Starling were so committed to the 
boycott that they insisted that British businesses 
who wanted to deal in Mexican oil forego 
opportunities that went to foreign competitors. 
Harrison Ltd. of London had agreed to cooperate 
with Davis to help supply tankers for the haulage
44 Balfour, Minute, 14 December 1938, FO 371 21478 
[A9251/10/26].
45 starling to Balfour, 22 September 1938, FO 371 21476 
[A7363/10/26]; Herschel Johnson to Secretary of State, 25 
May 1938, RG 59, Records of the Department of State 
[812.6363/Davis and Company/44].
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of Mexican o i l , 46 and because of the objections of
the British government Harrison had to tell Suarez
the company could not continue the negotiations.
The withdrawal of Harrison left Davis, seemingly
unrestrained by Washington, as the sole negotiator
in the deal.47
Starling and Balfour also called upon other
British interests to make sacrifices for the
boycott and risk losing their business to foreign
interests. Turner Brothers Asbestos Company, Ltd.
reported that in August the Mexican petroleum
administration sent it an order, and that because
of the advice of the department of overseas trade,
it turned the order down. It made clear to the
department of overseas trade the fact that its
adherence to the boycott by refusing to trade with
the Mexican oil administration was costing the
company a considerable amount of business which was
going to American and German competitors.48 The
company wrote to the department,
It is unreasonable to expect us to 
incur the serious financial 
sacrifices involved in compliance 
with [Whitehall's] wishes unless 
there is some clear indication that 
these sacrifices are serving a 
really useful purpose and that it
4^ Lockett to Boal, 3 May 1938, RG 151, Records of the 
Bureau for Foreign and Domestic Commerce [File 312: Oils and 
Minerals-Mexico].
47 Boal to Secretary of State, 2 May 1938, RG 59, Records of 
the Department of State [812.6363/3751].
48 Department of Overseas Trade to Foreign Office, 18 August 
1938, FO 371 21475 [A6553/10/26].
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will not be necessary to continue 
them indefinitely.
Turner Brothers complained that some British firms
were surreptitiously doing business with Mexico and
wanted assurances that adherence to the boycott was
widespread among British business. Otherwise, 'it
would seem rather quixotic of us to continue as at
present if we are in a small minority in doing
so.■
G.H. Thompson of the foreign office was
relatively sympathetic to trade matters and tried
unsuccessfully to caution other members of the
foreign office against what he considered an
unjustifiably optimistic attitude on the part of
the oil companies about what the boycott was
capable of achieving. When the department of
overseas trade forwarded the complaints of Turner
Brothers and others to him, he had 'every sympathy
with the manufacturing interests who incurred
appreciable losses in supporting the boycott policy
of the oil companies.' He minuted,
I can not see how we can expect 
equipment makers and others to 
continue losing opportunities and 
passively in time the Mexican 
market altogether. The question 
seems all the more urgent having 
regard to the fact that Germany is 
to pay for part of her oil from 
Mexico in machinery.50
49 Turner Brothers Asbestos Company to the Comptroller 
General, Department of Overseas Trade, 4 December 1938, FO 
371 21478 [A9323/10/26].
Thompson, Minute, 12 December 1938, FO 371 21478 
[A9323/10/26].
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His opinion did not have time to take hold
because Starling took charge of the replies to the
companies who were making the complaints and told
them that Britain had to maintain the boycott to
set an example for Mexico because of
the serious effect on British 
enterprise abroad which would 
result if action similar to that 
taken by the Mexican government in 
expropriating properties of the oil 
companies were followed by other 
governments.
This decision also affected the interests of Swan 
Hunter, who also wanted to do business with 
Mexico. 51-
Starling, with Balfour's support, controlled 
most of the policy with regard to British 
independent oil interests wanting to do business 
with Mexico. When Godber learned the news that the 
American Ben Smith and Francis William Rickett, a 
British citizen, of Thames Haven Company, allegedly 
backed by Lord Inverforth, director of Parent 
Petroleum Interests, had been negotiating a 
contract with the Mexican government for the 
disposal of the entire output of Mexican oil, he 
was furious and complained to Starling that 
something official had to be d o n e . 52 starling 
shared Godber's feelings of outrage at Rickett, who 
a few years before had signed a deal in Ethiopia
51 Starling to Balfour, 23 December 1938, FO 371 21478 
[A9634/10/26].
52 Starling to Balfour, 7 April 1938, FO 371 21465 
[A2669/10/26].
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for the African Exploration and Development 
Corporation, and took as effective steps as 
possible to stop him. Starling was especially 
concerned that such actions by independents might 
harm British commercial enterprises in foreign 
countries and was very irate that people who were 
dealing in what he considered stolen goods were 
depriving the Mexican Eagle of the last hope of 
getting their properties returned. Starling, 
therefore, insisted that the British government 
'place any obstacle that it can in the way of the 
disposal of Mexican oil in British territory,'53 
and the foreign office instructed O'Malley to 
inform people like Rickett that their activities 
were embarrassing the British government.54 
Rickett reluctantly agreed to stop his activities 
involving Mexican oil.55
Not trusting Rickett to keep his word,
Starling also accepted Godber's advice to do 
something to dissuade British banks from helping 
h i m . 56 starling requested that S. D. Waley, 
principal assistant secretary in the treasury, tell 
the City of London to withhold financial aid from 
Inverforth and Rickett and other interests who were
53 Starling to Balfour, 4 May 1938, FO 371 21464 
[A2479/10/26].
54 Foreign Office to O'Malley, FO 371 21465, 7 April 1938, 
[A2703/10/26].
55 O'Malley to Godber, 9 April 1938, FO 371 21466 
[A2973/10/26].
56 Starling to Balfour, 7 April 1938, FO 371 21465 
[A2669/10/26].
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determined to deal in Mexican oil in a similar way 
that US banks were withholding assistance at the 
request of Farish.57 The City came to the support 
of the government by printing letters in the London 
papers expressing their opposition to any British 
financial institutions contributing in any way to 
the disposal of the Mexican oil.58 starling, 
through the treasury, also persuaded the Bank of 
England to have British banks scrutinise 
applications for credit and refuse to loan money to 
companies that wanted to sell Mexican oil.59 
Indeed, the British government's action 
successfully obstructed the deal with Rickett, and 
Suarez blamed Lloyd's Bank’s withdrawal of support 
and Whitehall's pressure for ending Mexico's 
negotiations with Rickett and Smith.60
Whitehall at the initiative of Starling, not 
only responded to the direct wishes of the oil 
companies but also used its policy as an example to 
Washington. After hearing that Hull had recently 
questioned representatives of the US oil companies 
about Inverforth's activities, Balfour was 
determined subtly to 'make it clear to the State
57 Starling to Waley, 7 April 1938; John Simon to Montagu 
Norman, 22 April 1938, Gl/495 4261/5, Bank of England 
Papers.
58 Herschel Johnson to Hull, 14 April 1938, RG 59, Records 
of the Department of State [812.6363/3703].
59 John Simon to Montagu Norman, 22 April 1938, Gl/495 
4261/5, Bank of England Papers.
80 Daniels to Secretary of State, 13 April 1938, RG 59, 
Records of the Department of State [812.6363/3465].
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Department that we deplore the attempts of 
Inverforth and others to exploit the situation.'61 
He hoped the state department would decide to 
assume a similar policy with American independent 
companies dealing in Mexican oil. On Balfour's 
i n s t r u c t i o n s , ^2 Lindsay mentioned to Laurence 
Duggan, chief of the division of American republics 
of the state department, the British government's 
reaction to Rickett and Rickett's expressed 
intention to cooperate with Whitehall. Careful as 
usual not to offend Washington, Lindsay 
acknowledged it was difficult for the US to get the 
degree of cooperation from US business that 
Whitehall got from British business, but also made 
a general statement that there were many more 
people like Rickett ready to take advantage of the 
situation - a subtle and tactful hint that 
Washington should stop the American Ben Smith who 
had been involved in the deal with Rickett.63 
Despite Whitehall's efforts, Rickett was 
determined to come to a deal with Mexico and hoped 
to win official approval by mentioning imminent 
talks between Suarez, Castillo Ndjera and the White 
House in order to play on the British government's
6^ Balfour, Minute, 7 April 1938, FO 371 21465 
[A2711/10/26].
62 Balfour, Minute, 6 April 1938, FO 371 21465 
[A2703/10/26].
63 Memorandum of a Conversation between Lindsay and Duggan, 
11 April 1938, RG 59, Records of the Department of State 
[812.6363/3511].
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fear of an exclusive US-Mexico agreement. Rickett 
also mentioned the activities of Davis and implied 
that it would be useful for British interests in 
general for him to get a foot in Mexico in case of 
a Mexican-American oil settlement which would 
exclude British interests. He also believed he 
needed to ease Davis away from Mexico to prevent 
oil falling into undesirable hands.64 He realised 
the importance of Mexican oil to British supplies 
in an emergency and offered to help the British 
government settle the oil problem with Mexico. He 
also told the British government that the Parent 
Petroleum Company in which he was interested should 
be allowed to secure Mexican oil for their refinery 
in D u b l i n . 65 Although Rickett used arguments that 
drew on genuine British anxieties, the British 
government was so committed to the boycott that his 
suggestions were cast aside.
Starling and Balfour also refused to support 
the activities of the British company, Centralamer 
Ltd., which Mexico City had allowed before the 
expropriation to drill in the rich Poza Rica field 
and dispose of oil produced by the government 
organisation Pemex as well as royalty oil received 
by the government for certain concessions worked by
®4 Rickett to Sir George Mounsey, 17 January 1939, FO 371 
22771 [A481/4/26].
Rickett to Sir George Mounsey, 14 April 1939, FO 371 
21466 [A2817/4/26]; Balfour, Minute, 24 April 1939, FO 371 
21466 [A2817/4/26].
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the oil companies.66 starling and Under Secretary 
of the Mines Department Sir Alfred Faulkner, who 
rarely got involved in the Mexican matter, strongly 
disagreed with the company's arguments that the 
position of the major oil companies who had lost 
their properties was irrevocable and that Whitehall 
should, therefore, approve of Centralamer selling 
Mexican oil. Faulkner told him that Centralamer•s 
pursuit of Mexican oil was highly embarrassing and 
emphasised the obligation of the British government 
to do everything possible to restore Mexican 
Eagle's previous position in the Mexican oil 
industry. Starling and the secretary for mines 
also were very concerned about what Washington 
would think in light of the rumour that Mexican 
Eagle controlled Centralamer. Starling believed 
that if Centralamer persisted with its contract, it 
would harm the chances of getting the cooperation 
of the United States government which disapproved 
of British oil interests operating in Mexico.67
Starling, therefore, requested that Sir George 
Mounsey of the American department inform 
Centralamer that the British government strongly 
condemned its activities. The company's chairman, 
however, stubbornly refused to break the contract 
with Mexico because it had originated before the
66 Department of Overseas Trade to Foreign Office, 11 August 
1938, FO 371 21475 [A6732/10/26].
67 starling to Balfour, 29 March 1938, FO 371 21464 
[A2433/10/26].
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e x p r o p r i a t i o n . 6 8  Whitehall was not able to stop 
Centralamer's activities until it got the 
cooperation of the City of London to help prevent
the deal materialising.69
WASHINGTON'S AND LONDON'S REACTIONS TO COUNTRIES 
TRYING TO PURCHASE MEXICAN OIL
Whitehall was resentful not only of 
Washington's seemingly relaxed policies toward 
maverick American independents, but also of its 
reaction to other countries trying to purchase 
Mexican oil. Balfour and Starling wanted to inform 
Washington Whitehall was supporting the boycott 
and, thereby, to set an example for Washington to 
lend their full support to British policy. At 
Balfour and Starling's instruction, Lindsay told 
Washington of Whitehall's request to the government 
in Australia not to accept any more Mexican oil. 
Balfour and Starling also wanted Lindsay to 
emphasise the dangers of the increasing shipments 
of oil to Germany and the news that an Italian 
delegation including representatives of the Azienda 
Generale Italiana Petrole were going to Mexico to
6® George Mounsey, Minute, 30 March 1938, FO 371 21464 
[A2481/10/26].
69 John Simon to Montagu Norman, 22 April 1938, Gl/495 
4261/5, Bank of England Papers.
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discuss possible purchases of substantial amounts 
of oil.70
Despite what officials in Whitehall thought 
about US policy, the state department did try to 
discourage countries from purchasing Mexican oil. 
When Washington learned that Uruguay's National 
Administration of Fuel, Alcohol and Portland 
Cement, a government organisation, had bought 10 
thousand tonnes of fuel oil from the Mexican 
government at a price that was between 13 cents and 
15 cents per barrel less than market quotations at 
the time, Hull urged the government to use caution 
about purchasing oil when its ownership was 
unclear.71 Whitehall warned Uruguay that 
purchasing Mexican oil would be construed as an 
unfriendly a c t ,  72 anj Uruguay finally agreed not to 
purchase Mexican oil after Shell offered Uruguay a 
lower price for comparable oil from e l s e w h e r e . 73
Both Godber and Thomas Armstrong, a manager of 
Jersey Standard, were very upset when they learned 
about a proposed barter deal between the Mexican 
government and Swiss manufacturers of machinery. 
Armstrong complained to the state department and
70 Lindsay to Scott, October 1938, FO 371 21476 
[A7909/10/26].
71 William Dawson, Montevideo, to Secretary of State, 9 June 
1938, RG 59, Records of the Department of State 
[812.6363/4223]? Hull to the American Legation in 
Montevideo, 24 August 1938, RG 59, Records of the Department 
of State [812.6363/4629].
72 Mr. Milington-Drake (Montevideo) to Foreign Office, 27 
August 1938, FO 371 21553 [A6823/1001/45].
73 Coleman to Mr. Busk, 8 September 1938 , FO 371 21553 [A 
7000/1001/46].
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suggested that the department make the most of the
close commercial relationship between the two
countries by having the American minister in Berne
advise the Swiss government against the
arrangement. Berle, however, rejected the request
because he feared that if Washington became
involved in such matters, it would eventually have
'disputes with the whole world*. He also thought
it was unrealistic for the oil companies to expect
the boycott completely to keep Mexican oil from
foreign markets:
The Standard Oil Company formulated 
a policy on the ground that no 
Mexican oil could be transported or 
sold; we did not agree and told 
them so. Now they wish the United 
States government to back up their 
hopelessly wrong estimate of the 
situation.74
By contrast, Starling and Balfour were very 
willing to support Godber in the matter. When he 
complained to the petroleum department, Starling 
and Balfour agreed that it was of utmost importance 
to do everything possible to prevent oil going to 
Switzerland.75 Balfour was prepared to resort to 
pressure with regard to the negotiations for the 
trade treaty in order to get the Swiss government 
to abandon discussions with Mexico City. He was 
ready to get the approval of the board of trade for
74 Armstrong to Duggan, 2 September 1938, RG 59, Records of 
the Department of State [812.6363/4779].
75 Colman to Holman, 2 September 1938, FO 371 21475 
[A7025/10/26].
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such pressure when the Swiss-Mexican negotiations 
fell apart on their own accord.7 6
The case of Argentina was different for 
Washington because the United States had more at 
stake in terms of trade. Mexican oil imports posed 
a threat to the US imports there, and the state 
department as a result was more direct with the 
Argentine government. When a Mexican 
representative tried to convince the Argentine 
government to exchange Mexican oil for various 
products,77 the state department reminded it that 
the US had refrained from putting its wheat on the 
same market with Argentine grain in Brazil. In 
return, the department asked for Argentina's 
cooperation in not buying Mexican oil.7** The 
British ambassador also made representations to the 
Argentine government against Mexican oil entering 
Argentina.7  ^ Afraid of the consequences, the 
Argentine government informed the Mexican embassy 
that it could not use foreign exchange to import 
Mexican o i l . 8 C >
The state department also took fairly strong 
action when it learned that the Nicaraguan
78 Balfour, Minute, 10 December 1938, FO 371 21478 
[A9342/10/26].
77 Memorandum of the Division of American Republics, 24 
September 1938, RG 59, Records of the Department of State 
[812.6363/4903].
Meyer, p. 208.
79 starling to Balfour, 28 July 1938, FO 371 22774 
[A5926/10/26].
80 Meyer, p. 208.
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government, through a private firm, whose partners 
included some of the dictator Anastasio Somoza's 
closest associates, had acquired 1,200 tons of 
Mexican asphalt while it was building a highway 
with US aid. The state department decided to take 
a strong stand because it suspected that the 
Nicaraguan government had been using US funds to 
purchase asphalt from Mexico which it could have 
bought from a Nicaraguan subsidiary of Standard Oil 
who agreed to meet Mexico's price. Washington sent 
a US envoy to Managua to protest the transactions 
to Somoza, who told him that he was purchasing 
Mexican products out of fear that if he did not, 
the Mexican government would give aid to his 
political adversary, General C h a m o r r o . 81 After the 
representation, there were no more direct purchases 
of Mexican oil by the Nicaraguan government until a 
private company emerged which distributed Mexican 
oil throughout the country. As before, Washington 
protested, and Somoza finally agreed to take all 
steps possible to keep Mexican oil and oil products
out of Nicaragua.82
Pressure from Washington in Guatemala was far 
more subtle than in Nicaragua and Argentina. For 
the Mexican government, Guatemala was particularly
Mrs R.M. Hughes, 'Mexican Oil in Latin America', 6 May 
1939, RG 59, Records of the Department of State 
[812.6363/5805].
Meyer, pp. 207-9; Wood, Bryce: The Making of the Good 
Neighbor Policy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), 
p. 233.
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attractive because it was the only market that was 
largely accessible by rail. Before January 1939, 
670 barrels of Mexican gasoline entered the 
country, and later in the year a Guatemalan firm 
was created to distribute Mexican oil. Washington 
reacted by having the US legation seek information 
about Mexican oil entering Guatemala. In response, 
a Guatemalan representative defended his 
government's action, explaining that while his 
government did not like taking Mexican products it 
was not able legally to prevent the importation of 
Mexican gasoline. Shell officials eventually 
persuaded Guatemalan officials not to purchase 
Mexican oil by offering them the alternative of 
buying oil from Shell.83
When a Mexican representative went to Brazil 
and sought to exchange Mexican oil for various 
products, the Brazilian minister for foreign 
affairs did not cooperate and tried to stop the 
sale of Mexican oil in his c o u n t r y . 84 The US 
embassy observed his efforts and encouraged him in 
his opposition to other cabinet members who wanted 
to organise an agreement with the Mexican 
government to import Mexican oil. US efforts 
failed, however. Despite the foreign minister's
Mrs. R.M. Hughes, 'Mexican Oil in Latin America', 6 May 
1939, RG 59, Records of the Department of State 
[812.6363/5805].
®4 Memorandum of the Division of American Republics, 24 
September 1938, RG 59, Records of the Department of State 
[812.6363/4903].
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opposition, the Brazilian government succumbed to 
the temptation of Mexico's low prices. A large 
company to distribute Mexican oil in Brazil was 
created and continued to import Mexican oil until 
the end of 1941.®®
When the Mexican government gave oil to the 
Chilean government to alleviate shortages in the 
aftermath of an earthquake, Washington denied a 
request to exempt Chilean naval transport carrying 
4,500 tonnes of Mexican petroleum from tolls at the 
Panama Canal.®® standard Oil was furious when it 
heard of the Mexican government's alleged plans to 
contribute to the campaign of Chilean President 
Pedro Aguirre Cerda in the forthcoming elections in 
return for the promise that if he won he would 
purchase Mexican oil.®7 Although Standard sharply 
criticised the Mexican government for what it 
believed was interference in the internal affairs 
of another country, Washington took no decisive 
action when the government of Chile bought small 
quantities of Mexican fuel for its Navy from 1939 
until 1942.®®
After Centralamer offered to sell the French 
government 100,000 tonnes of Mexican oil for
8® Meyer, p. 208.
8® Mrs. R.M. Hughes, 'Mexican Oil in Latin America', 6 May 
1939, RG 59, Records of the Department of State 
[812.6363/5805].
87 Memorandum of the Division of American Republics, 24 
September 1938, RG 59, Records of the Department of State 
[812.6363/4903].
88 Meyer, p. 208.
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defence, Washington tried to stop it. The French 
government badly needed oil and wanted to purchase 
oil from Mexico, and the French foreign ministry 
approached the state department enquiring about its 
attitude towards Mexican oil being sold very 
cheaply and perhaps displacing petroleum normally 
supplied by US firms. Duggan realised that French 
distributors with long-standing contracts to 
purchase and distribute oil from various sources 
were putting pressure on the French government to 
prohibit the importation of oil from Mexico. He 
also believed the French government wanted to be 
able to oblige the wishes of the French 
distributors along with an announcement that French 
policy had official approval from Washington and 
London. Hull expressed his opinion that it was 
'highly undesirable' for Washington to give the 
French permission to allow Mexican oil into 
France.89
The French government, even less self- 
sufficient than the British in oil, was more 
worried than Whitehall about oil supplies in an 
emergency. Like London, it was concerned that the 
US neutrality legislation would prevent it from 
getting supplies from the US. The French received 
much of its oil from sources where British 
influence was predominant and relied on British
Lawrence Duggan to Welles, 4 August 1938, RG 59, Records 
of the Department of State [812.6363/4665].
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tankers for approximately 16 percent of its 
imports. It, therefore, liked the idea of getting 
oil from Mexico because it was relatively easily 
accessible by sea.90
The matter was complicated by a set of talks 
which the French government had initiated in March 
1937 towards an Anglo-French oil purchasing 
agreement to guarantee supplies of oil in an 
emergency. The petroleum department, the air 
ministry and the service departments were concerned 
that Anglo-French cooperation in oil would give 
Hitler the impression that the two countries were 
preparing an alliance designed to encircle Germany 
and inspire more aggression.91 Official 
negotiations between the two sides did not start 
until June 1938 at which time the French did not 
succeed in getting all of the information they felt 
they needed. By the Spring of 1939 the governments 
had met and drawn up principles of cooperation 
regarding oil supplies, but despite the progress, 
the two sides lacked a sense of common purpose. 
After the Spring, they met infrequently, and the 
discussions did nothing to alleviate the French 
government's anxieties over oil s u p p l i e s . 9 2
90 Payton-Smith, D.J.: Oil; A Study of War-time Policy and 
Administration (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 
1971), p. 71.
91 Payton-Smith, pp. 69-71; Balfour and Nicholls, Minutes, 9 
April 1938 FO 371 21465 [A2806/10/26].
92 Payton-Smith, p. 73-4.
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Starling, who led the British reaction to 
Centralamer's offer to France, believed that while
100,000 tonnes would not do much to stop Mexico's 
worries about markets, its purchase would set a bad 
example.93 After hearing Starling's concerns, 
Balfour emphasized the importance of persuading the 
French government not to purchase the oil from 
C e n t r a l a m e r .94 Given the strong opinions in the 
foreign office and the petroleum department on the 
one hand and the British government's knowledge 
about France's grave worries about its oil supplies 
for emergencies on the other hand, Whitehall was in 
a delicate position. Balfour, therefore, decided 
not to insist that France refuse the offer of 
Mexican oil. He asked Sir Eric Phipps, the British 
ambassador to France, merely to hint to the French 
government to cooperate with the British in the 
boycott, and to make a strong but general statement 
that Whitehall highly disapproved of the activities 
of independent oil companies who wanted to sell 
Mexican oil. He was so careful not to exacerbate 
any French feelings of resentment with regard to 
the conversations about the joint purchasing 
agreement that he did not want Phipps to let on
93 Starling to Ashton-Gwatkin, 25 March 1938, FO 371 21464 
[A2471/10/26].
94 Minute of Balfour, 31 March 1938, FO 371 21464 
[42471/10/26]; Balfour to Phipps, 1 April 1938, FO 371 21464 
[A2471/10/26].
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that Whitehall knew about Centralamer's specific 
offer to France.95
The French government1s response gave the 
British government the impression that French 
cooperation in the boycott could be won by progress 
in the Anglo-French oil negotiations. The Quai 
d'Orsay stated that before the former French 
government resigned it had decided that it would 
not stand in the way of any policy pursued by the 
British or US governments with regard to the 
Mexican oil expropriation. Most importantly, he 
expressed hope that the French refusal to purchase 
Mexican oil would influence the British government 
to expedite the establishment of an effective 
Franco-British purchasing p o l i c y . y e t  when the 
French government started to feel even more 
desperate in May 1938 about its oil supplies, it 
wavered in its agreement to cooperate with the 
British and American governments in the boycott.
The Mexican government increased the French 
temptation to purchase Mexican oil by saying if the 
French did not purchase it, Mexico would sell it in 
Italy or Germany. Charles Corbin, the French 
ambassador to Britain, therefore, told Alexander 
Cadogan that in present circumstances this outcome 
would be very undesirable and that the French
Balfour to Phipps, 1 April 1938, FO 371 21464 
[A2471/10/26].
96 Phipps to Halifax, 9 April 1938, FO 371 21465 
[A2806/10/26] .
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government had not yet decided what to do about 
Mexico's offer.97
Roger Cambon, the counsellor in the French 
Embassy in London, later appealed to Holman for 
fairness in the face of France's need for oil. 
Germany's and Italy's acquisition of large 
quantities of oil infuriated the French. It was 
one thing for France to agree to forego small 
quantities of Mexican oil to support the boycott 
policy, but so long as large amounts of oil were 
involved, the French were not prepared to let the 
opportunity pass to buy oil which otherwise would 
have fallen into German or Italian hands. The 
French government saw no reason to adhere to a 
policy which was not successful for Britain and was 
setting back French preparedness for the w a r . 98 
The British thus realised that news of large 
shipments to Germany and Italy in August and 
September would strengthen the French government's 
resolve not to participate in the b o y c o t t . 99 
Despite the pressure, the British attitude remained 
the same.
Another problem for Whitehall was to convince 
the French government to prevent Mexican oil in 
transit from being stored in France. Starling in
97 Cadogan, Memorandum, 20 May 1938, FO 371 21470 
[A3960/10/26 ].
9® Holman to Starling, 23 August 1938, FO 371 21475 
[A6561/10/26].
99 Balfour, Minute, 9 September, 1939, FO 371 21476 
[A7026/10/26].
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particular was furious when he learned that large 
consignments of Mexican oil had arrived at the port 
of Le Havre from Mexico and were discharged into 
the storage tanks of the Compagnie Industrielle 
Maritime, a company which had the exclusive 
concession in the port for the operation of storage 
tanks for petroleum production.100 He took the 
initiative and had Holman talk to Cambon to stop 
such activities.101 Holman casually mentioned the 
recent case of Mexican oil being stored at Le 
Havre, and Cambon promised to tell Paris.102
The French government was initially reluctant 
to cooperate with the British on the matter, and at 
the news of Mexican oil going to Italy and Germany, 
it allowed one or two more cargoes of Mexican oil 
to enter France. The French government, however, 
became increasingly aware of the danger of Mexico's 
example spreading, and eventually Mexican Eagle 
succeeded in obtaining French support. Cambon 
informed Balfour that large private French oil 
corporations as well as the French government were 
refraining from purchasing Mexican oil. Although 
Mexican Eagle ultimately failed to seize Mexican 
cargoes through the French court system,103
100 Samuel Wiley to Hull, 25 October 1938, RG 59, Records of 
the Department of State [812.6363/Davis and Company/141] .
101 starling to Holman, 9 August 1938, FO 371 21474 
[A6268/10/26].
102 Holman to Starling, 23 August 1938, FO 371 21475 
[A6561/10/26].
103 starling to Balfour, 30 November 1938, FO 371 21478 
[A9047/10/26].
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Starling was satisfied that French authorities had 
helped Mexican Eagle 'behind the scenes'.104 The 
French however were still not prepared to give up 
their hope of obtaining Mexican oil and tried to 
mediate between Mexico City and London to come to 
an agreement so France could purchase Mexican oil 
without complications. French efforts stopped 
abruptly when the Mexican government accepted the 
French offer of posing as a mediator on condition 
that the British government recognise the legality
of the nationalisation.^05
WASHINGTON'S POLICY AND ITS CRITICS
Washington's stopping special purchases of 
Mexican silver and allowing the price on the world 
market to decrease soon drew criticism from some 
American officials worried that it would drive 
Mexico into close trade and perhaps military ties 
with the fascist powers, especially while the 
boycott was taking place. Robert McGregor, 
American consulate general in Mexico, suspected 
Mexico was re-exporting to other Latin American
104 perowne to Campbell, 14 August 1939, FO 371 22774 
[A5542/4/26].
105 Mexican Embassy in Paris to Georges Bonnet, 12 January 
1939, FO 371 22775 [A6395/4/26]; Meyer, p.184.
countries some of the German machinery it received 
in exchange for Mexican oil at prices which 
competed with those of US goods and that increased 
Mexican trade with Germany was threatening other 
Latin American markets for US g o o d s . M c G r e g o r  
warned of 'far reaching' repercussions in Mexico of 
any further decline in silver prices in Mexico.107 
Herbert Bursley, assistant chief of the division of 
American republics expressed his concern that 
American goods were becoming unaffordable to 
Mexicans because of the exchange r a t e . 108 Daniels, 
a staunch critic of the boycott who wanted to 
protect Mexico's economic well-being, repeatedly 
wrote to Hull. Both he and Lockett knew that the 
Mexican government desperately needed to sell their 
oil for cash in order to get dollar exchange which 
was needed to purchase US goods.109 Daniels 
bluntly told Hull that the United States had the 
most to lose from the barter transactions because 
former US markets in Mexico were receiving goods 
from German and other competitors.H O  Although US 
exports to Mexico declined 35.5 percent during the
106 Meyer, p. 213.
10*7 Robert G. McGregor, Analysis of the Mexican Silver
Industry, 30 January 1939, RG 59, Records of the Department 
of State [812.6342/36].
108 Herbert Bursley to Mr. Briggs, 30 November 1938, RG 59, 
Records of the Department of State [611.1231/296].
10® Lockett to Daniels, 19 October 1938, RG 151, Records of
the Bureau for Foreign and Domestic Commerce [File 312: Oils
and Minerals-Mexico].
H O  Daniels to Hull, 9 December 1938, Papers of Josephus 
Daniels.
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first nine months of 1938 from the same period in
1937, Daniels and other critics of US policy seemed
to forget the fact that Mexico had increased its
tariff rates on US goods at the beginning of 1938
which had badly impacted the sale of US goods in
M e x i c o . m
Daniels was concerned not only about US
interests that wanted to trade with Mexico but also
about defence, and he warned Hull:
If as is almost certain Mexico must 
barter oil for German, Japanese and 
Italian goods or be drowned in oil, 
the United States business houses 
and manufactures will lose the big 
market [they have] enjoyed in 
Mexico, and we know from experience 
in some South American countries, 
that trade influences other 
associations.
Daniels also railed against the oil companies whose
intransigence in refusing to negotiate with Mexico
and whose pursuit of the boycott he found highly
destructive.
The loss of this market does not 
seem to concern the Standard oil 
and other American oil companies.
Just as long as they make money for 
themselves they seem indifferent as 
to what happens either to other 
business concerns or to the Good 
Neighbor policy upon which we set 
such store.
H I  Robert G. McGregor, Analysis of the Mexican Silver 
Industry, 30 January 1939, RG 59, Records of the Department 
of State [812.6342/36].
112 Daniels to Hull, 22 August 1938, President's Secretary's 
File, Papers of Franklin Roosevelt.
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Daniels tried to convince Hull to get the oil 
companies to negotiate with Mexico, but Hull for 
the moment was adhering to the oil companies' wish 
to refrain from negotiations.
In conclusion, the boycott failed to achieve 
its main objective of getting the Mexican 
government to return the properties to the oil 
companies. The initial effect of the boycott, 
however, was quite devastating with the loss of 
much of Mexico's foreign market for oil after March 
1938, and as a result the Mexican government had 
substantially to curb oil production, Mexico's 
third most important economic activity. In 1938 
exports fell to 14,562,250 barrels from 24,960,335 
in 1937. The situation, however, improved greatly 
between January 1939 and the start of war in 
September. During that time, approximately
1,750,000 barrels per month were sold to foreign 
buyers. This figure compared relatively well to 
the average monthly foreign sales of 2,080,028, in 
1937, and because Pemex 's output was spoken for in 
August, it had to stop taking orders. The Allied 
blockade after the outbreak of war in Europe, 
however, caused exports once again sharply to 
decrease due to the loss of the German and Italian 
markets. Although new customers were found for 
some of Mexico's output, sales did not return to 
levels reached before August 1939. Cardenas was
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determined that the nationalisation should succeed, 
however, and the Mexican oil industry eventually 
came to rely on domestic consumption.
In the absence of relations with Mexico, the 
boycott of Mexican oil seemed to be Whitehall's 
only hope of getting Mexico to return the oil 
properties. To Starling, abandonment of the 
boycott would allow Mexico City the opportunity to 
show its policy as a triumph in the eyes of the 
world and leave Whitehall the awkward task of 
explaining the adoption of a new policy to foreign 
governments who had already been asked to support 
the embargo.^ 5  Britain's anxiety over oil 
supplies inspired Whitehall to support the oil 
companies' boycott fully with, for example, an 
announcement in Parliament discouraging British 
interests from making arrangements harmful to the 
boycott and the Bank of England's request that 
British banks scrutinise applications for credit 
for companies wishing to deal in Mexican oil. The 
close relationship between Whitehall and British 
business and banking interests made Whitehall's 
efforts to enforce the boycott more successful than 
Washington's, and officials in Whitehall greatly 
resented American officials who did not seem to be 
doing enough to support the boycott.
114 Meyer, p. 201.
Confidential Print, November 1938, FO 371 21477 
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Despite Britain's opinion, Washington did lend 
substantial support to the boycott. Unlike 
Whitehall, however, Washington, did not make broad 
declarations of policy the way Whitehall did and 
tended to deal with each situation involving the 
boycott as it arose. Washington's priority was 
increased US trade rather than access to overseas 
oil, and the advice Washington generally gave to 
countries and US citizens wanting to purchase 
Mexican oil was consistent with this goal. For 
example, Washington's efforts to get Nicaragua to 
purchase asphalt from a Nicaraguan subsidiary of 
Standard Oil rather than Mexico was a direct 
attempt to promote a US interest. Furthermore, 
Washington’s intervention in the Davis arrangement 
to barter German equipment for Mexican oil was not 
only done to stop the sale of Mexican oil but also 
to promote the interests of US refinery makers over 
their German competitors. Whitehall's perception 
of US policy as an inactive one was the result once 
again of Washington refraining from cooperating 
with Britain.
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CHAPTER SIX
US AND OIL COMPANY POLICY AFTER THE AGRARIAN 
SETTLEMENT: NOVEMBER 1938-MAY 1940
Not that we love the oil companies, hut...we have 
to preserve some sort of norm by which relations 
can be carried on.l
Adolf Berle
By far the most important turning point for 
the oil companies in Mexico was Sinclair's 
settlement of April 1940, whereby the company, 
which had controlled a substantial 25 per cent of 
production and 40 per cent of refining and 
distribution of the American oil interests in 
Mexico, agreed to accept compensation which did not 
take into account oil in the subsoil. While the 
agrarian settlement of November 1938 had caused the 
oil companies considerable anxiety, the agreement 
between Mexico City and Sinclair greatly 
strengthened the hand of the Mexican government, 
making any chances of Mexico returning the 
properties all the more remote. During this time, 
Hull remained caught between two clashing 
priorities. On the one hand he needed to take a 
firm stand with economic sanctions to protect US
1 Adolf Berle, Memorandum, 14 December 1939, Papers of A. 
Berle.
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commercial interests operating abroad and to 
silence voices in congress critical of the 
administration for not being stern enough with 
Mexico. On the other hand, he realised the 
increasing need for sound relations with Mexico for 
defence which inhibited him from demanding the 
return of the properties. Hull, therefore, 
continued to pursue a policy of compromise. Welles 
broadly agreed with his tactics, but seemed to 
diverge from Hull's policy when Roosevelt became 
involved.
The present chapter describes how Sinclair's 
plan to negotiate with Mexico made the major oil 
companies go back on their decision at the end of 
May 1938 not to communicate with Mexico. It then 
shows that criticism from congress encouraged 
Roosevelt to become involved in the Mexican matter. 
Next it examines the impact of the outbreak of war 
in Europe in September 1939, which surprisingly did 
not change Washington's policy because heightened 
pressure from the oil companies coincided with the 
increase in general concern about defence. By the 
end of the year the oil companies, having failed in 
their negotiations with Mexico, insisted that 
Washington adhere to its policy expressed before 
the expropriation to increase its support in their 
dealings with Mexico after they had exhausted all 
legal recourses in the country. By December 1939, 
therefore, the necessity of improving relations
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with Mexico City and the need to take firm enough 
measures to protect US commercial interests 
operating abroad continued to vie equally for 
Washington's attention. Hull, therefore, continued 
to refrain from directly demanding the return of 
the oil properties and continued to use economic 
sanctions, hoping Mexico would return the oil 
properties. Not only did he place a highly 
restrictive import quota on Mexican oil, but the 
congressional debates on the future of the Silver 
Purchase Act allowed him and other state department 
officials to prolong the uncertainty which was 
harming the Mexican peso.
The chapter shows that rather than demanding 
the return of the oil properties, Hull turned to 
arbitration of the amount Mexico owed the oil
companies as a way to get them restored and chose a
form of arbitration which would exclude British 
interests. By getting Mexico to agree to
arbitration of the amount it owed the oil
companies, which Hull believed Mexico would not be 
able to pay, President Cdrdenas would have to 
return the properties. It is also seen that just as 
Mexico City rejected Hull's plan for arbitration, 
it announced Sinclair's agreement, and the reaction 
of the major oil companies is discussed.
It is the purpose of this chapter to analyse 
and explain the strategy of the companies and 
Washington's policy toward the oil problem between
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November 1938 and April 1940. During this time, 
the oil companies insisted that they manage their 
former properties so the expropriation would not 
look like a success, but the Mexican government, 
due to nationalist feelings, could not allow 
foreigners so much control. Hull continued to 
pursue economic sanctions in an effort to drive 
Mexico to make a satisfactory agreement with the 
US; however, domestic pressure on the 
administration to take a stronger stand to protect 
US interests in Mexico did not translate into 
consistent efforts from Roosevelt to protect the 
interests of the oil companies.
THE OIL COMPANIES* DECISION TO NEGOTIATE WITH
MEXICO
In late 1938 Sinclair made the decision to 
start negotiations with Mexico City without the 
major oil companies. The company had had a history 
of competition with major oil interests, and in the 
early 1920*s had competed with Standard Oil and 
Anglo-Persian in trying to secure a concession in 
North Persia. The agricultural settlement had 
shown that Washington was not likely to give 
adequate support for oil company interests.2 As a
2 Venn, Fiona M . : Oil Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century 
(London and Basingstoke: Macmillan 1982), p. 58.
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smaller independent company with most of its 
investment in the United States, Sinclair did not 
regard preventing other expropriations world-wide 
by punishing Mexico as crucial. Furthermore 
Sinclair had perhaps come to distrust the major oil 
companies because of their efforts to exclude it 
from their meeting of 31 May 1938 with Hull, at 
which they had decided to stop negotiating with the 
Mexican government. Laurence Duggan’s explanation 
that Hull had wanted the meeting to be small with 
only one representative of the oil companies 
attending was not credible because Standard Oil of 
New Jersey had sent three.3 Most importantly, 
Sinclair's properties in Mexico had not made any 
contribution to the profits of the corporation in 
the year before the expropriation.4
For the task of negotiating with Mexico City, 
Sinclair chose the 55 year old attorney, Patrick 
Hurley, whom the company had kept on retainer for 
several years. His background and political 
experience made him ideal for the job. His 
association with native American peoples in the US 
and the fact that he had been a colonel in the 
reserves since the First World War appealed to 
General Cdrdenas who was of Indian descent.
Although Hurley was the son of Irish immigrants, he
3 Laurence Duggan, Memorandum, 31 May 1938, RG 59, Records 
of the Department of State [812.6363/4090].
^ New York Times. 8 April 1938, p. 29, column 4.
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had attended the Indian University in Muskogee, 
Oklahoma, and after obtaining a law degree, he took 
on Indian cases. In addition, Hurley's humble 
background as the son of a very poor farming and 
mining family made him a very suitable petitioner 
to the president who was championing the cause of 
oppressed peoples in Mexico, and Cdrdenas at the 
end of the negotiations awarded him the prestigious 
Aztec Eagle while Sinclair paid him $1 million.5
Sinclair's decision shocked the major oil 
companies and led them to adopt a devious plan.
They realised that if Sinclair, with its 
considerable investment in Mexico, came to a 
separate settlement with the Mexican government, 
their chances of convincing Cdrdenas to allow them 
at the very least to work their holdings would 
become negl i g i b l e . 6 They, therefore, persuaded 
Sinclair to postpone its attempts at negotiation, 
so they could organize their own talks with Mexico 
City and cause them to stalemate in hopes that 
Washington would afterwards demand the return of 
their oil properties.
Hiring Donald Richberg, to negotiate on their 
behalf was an important part of their plan to win 
the approval of Washington. As former 
administrator of the National Recovery
5 Buhite, passim.
6 Cronon, E. David: Josephus Daniels in Mexico (Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1979), p. 237.
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Administration and a practicing railroad labour 
attorney, Richberg tried to bring compromises in 
disputes among business, labour and government.7 
Although the oil companies planned to sabotage 
Richberg's negotiations by refusing to compromise 
with Cdrdenas, Richberg was sincere in his attempts 
at negotiations. He was also a frequent visitor to 
the White House and had the confidence of the 
administration. Only recently he had helped the 
president in his failed efforts to stop elderly 
members of the supreme court from dismantling his 
New Deal programmes by suggesting the president 
introduce legislation to retire all federal court 
judges from active service when they turned 70.® 
Despite the fact that the supreme court plan had 
greatly damaged Roosevelt politically, abortive 
attempts at an oil settlement led by such a 
prominent Washington insider would surely convince 
Washington that Mexico City was unreasonable and 
inspire the state department to insist that 
Cdrdenas restore the properties.
The major oil companies, with Richberg's help, 
drew up a memorandum in January 1939 on which to 
base negotiations with Mexico. It represented the 
minimum that they were prepared to accept and left
7 Vadney, Thomas E.: The Wayward Liberal; A Political 
Biography of Donald Richberg (Lexington: University Press of 
Kentucky, 1970), p. 122.
8 Rosenman, Samuel I.: Working with Roosevelt (London:
Rupert Hart-Davis, 1952), p. 143.
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the Mexican government little room for bargaining. 
First, they demanded a long-term contract under 
which the companies would manage their former 
properties. Second, while they were willing to pay 
the Mexican government taxes and royalties, they 
insisted that they do so only according to a fixed 
schedule of rates. Third, they also demanded an 
agreement upon reasonable, specified labour 
conditions. Fourth, they required reimbursement 
for losses they suffered during the time that the 
Mexican government was in control of their oil 
properties. Fifth, the companies wanted to embody 
the arrangement in a commercial treaty between 
Mexico and the United States. Sixth, as a token 
gesture of compromise, they were willing to agree 
that at the end of the contract, all their claims 
and interests in the Mexican oil properties would 
be transferred to the Mexican government without 
payment or any other consideration.9
ROOSEVELT'S INVOLVEMENT
As the companies had hoped, both Richberg's 
involvement and growing opposition in congress led 
to unprecedented involvement of the president in 
the matter at the beginning of 1939. At the time,
9 Memorandum of the Oil Companies, 3 April 1939, F0 371 
22774 [A3723/4/26].
235
Roosevelt could ill afford further criticism. His 
sweeping re-election of 193 6 had been an 
endorsement of his first term and had left him with 
75 Democrats in the senate and a majority in the 
house of representatives. The 1938 elections, 
however, in which he lost 81 seats in the house and 
8 in the senate showed his popularity starting to 
wane. He faced an increasingly threatening 
coalition of Republicans and disaffected 
conservative Democrats led by Vice President John 
Nance Garner, who was angry with the president for 
his failure to balance the budget and chastise sit 
down strikers. The break-away group also included 
southerners and old-time Democrats who particularly 
resented the president's reliance on members of the 
former brain trust, a group of academics who 
advised Roosevelt when he was governor of New York 
and during his presidential campaign. Although the 
group dissolved after the election of November 
1932, its members continued to advise Roosevelt and 
seemed to wield a disproportionate amount of 
influence given the fact that they did not have to 
face elections. The scandal caused by the 
president's efforts to retire septuagenarian 
conservatives from the supreme court was 
particularly harmful to his popularity. The 
recession of 1937-38 and the low price of wheat and 
corn also cost the president support especially 
among midwestern farmers.
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The Mexican oil problem was a target of 
criticism for both opponents and allies of the 
administration. In January 1939, Democratic 
Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee 
Samuel Davis McReynolds from the farming state of 
Tennessee submitted a resolution critical of the US 
silver purchasing policy. He claimed that silver 
purchases subsidized Mexico's objectionable 
confiscatory policies and called for a 
congressional investigation of recent events in 
Mexico. He was very irate that Cdrdenas had 
confiscated the oil properties of US citizens and 
increased Mexico's commercial ties with Germany and 
Japan by selling them oil from those properties.
He was worried that eventually those countries 
would obtain a dangerous amount of influence over 
Mexico and threaten the Monroe Doctrine. For good 
measure he also expressed fear of the influence of 
communism in Mexico because of Leon Trotsky's 
presence there.10
Democratic Representative from New York Martin 
Kennedy directly attacked the state department's 
policy towards Mexico. He lamented the loss of 
trade with Mexico and suspected that Germany, Italy 
and Japan had arranged to get Mexican oil even 
before the expropriation.11 He was also concerned
10 Samuel D. McReynolds, Senate Resolution 72, 76th 
Congress, 1st session, 27 January 1939, Papers of Josephus 
Daniels.
11 Martin J. Kennedy, House Resolution 78, 76th Congress,
1st session, 1 February 1939, Papers of Josephus Daniels.
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that Mexico was a potential threat to US security 
because it was disposing of oil in Germany in 
return for German planes which were easily 
converted for military use. He railed that while 
Mexican policy toward the US became increasingly 
unfriendly, Washington, instead of being firmer 
with Mexico, allowed Cdrdenas to obtain such 
planes. He also called for Ambassador Daniels' 
return for questioning about what he and the state 
department had done to secure adequate compensation 
for lost investments in Mexico.12
Hamilton Fish, a Republican isolationist and 
senior member of the house foreign affairs 
committee, who had a history of opposing Hull in 
congress, introduced a resolution at the end of 
February asking Roosevelt to tell the house the 
extent and value of American properties 
expropriated in Mexico since 1933. In addition he 
demanded information about Daniels suppressing the 
note of 26 March as well as Mexico bartering oil 
for German farm, road or factory machinery that 
used to be purchased in the US. He also wanted 
confirmation of reports that US trade in Mexico had 
decreased by 50 per cent while German trade had 
increased by that amount.1^
Hull was able to put a temporary stop to these 
resolutions by informing Key Pittman, chairman of
12 26 February, 1939, New York Times, p. 30, column 1.
13 28 February 1939, New York Times, p. 7, column 1.
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the senate foreign relations committee, and 
McReynolds that the resolutions coincided with 
attempts by the major oil companies to negotiate 
with the Mexican government and that investigating 
the situation would have a deleterious effect on 
the concurrent negotiations. Hull had an excellent 
working relationship with McReynolds whom he 
described as 'my Tennessee colleague and friend*. 
They had served in congress together, and both had 
been circuit court judges in Tennessee. Hull also 
had a close working relationship with Pittman, 
although the two did not always see eye to eye on 
matters, most significantly on Hull's trade 
agreement program. Hull tried to convince Pittman 
that once the oil problem was solved, 'progress 
towards satisfactory settlement of other highly 
important and urgent questions pending between this 
country and Mexico would be furthered.'1^
Congressional criticism coincided with the 
president's endorsement of the oil companies' 
memorandum. The president even became anxious for 
the first time about the impression Mexicans had 
gained from his casual interview with the press on 
1 April 1938 in Warm Springs in which he appeared 
to condone the expropriation and the taking of 
property without compensation. To try to correct
14 Hull to Pittman, 7 February 1939, RG 59, Records of the 
Department of State [812.6363/5388]; Hull to McReynolds, 7 
February 1939, RG 59, Records of the Department of State 
[812.6363/5408].
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this impression, the president had Daniels tell 
Cdrdenas that fair compensation must accompany 
expropriation according to international law. He 
also had him inform Cdrdenas that he found what the 
oil companies were offering in the memorandum 
Richberg was presenting 'eminently practical' and 
that an early settlement was desirable.15
Negotiations almost immediately reached an 
impasse by March. Cdrdenas bluntly refused to 
allow the oil companies to manage their former 
properties. Instead, he proposed that the 
government and petroleum companies form a jointly- 
owned 'financial society'16 in which the Mexican 
government would be the major shareholder. In this 
society, the oil companies would be allowed profits 
and influence in financial and economic matters 
involving the oil industry in proportion with the 
combined value of their former properties and 
whatever new investments they m a d e . 17 The Mexican 
government was prepared to compensate the companies 
for the loss of their former properties, but not 
for lost profits from the time the Mexican 
government took over their properties. Also, 
Mexican Minister of Finance Eduardo Suarez objected 
to a long contract because he feared that the oil
15 Roosevelt to Daniels, 15 February 1939, Official Files, 
Papers of Franklin D. Roosevelt.
16 Memorandum of a Conversation between Cardenas and 
Daniels, 15 March 1939, Papers of Josephus Daniels.
17 Castillo Najera to Richberg, enclosed in Castillo Najera 
to Welles, 21 March 1939, RG 59, Records of the Department 
of State [812.6363/5636].
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companies would deplete Mexico's oil reserves or 
that fossil fuels would eventually become less 
widely used during such a c o n t r a c t . 18 jn addition, 
Cdrdenas wanted the companies' interests to be 
consolidated into one company so that the Mexican 
government would have an agreement with only one 
entity.1^
The oil companies furiously objected to the
Mexican government's insistence upon managing the
oil properties, but were pleased that a breakdown
of negotiations seemed imminent.20 As Van Hasselt,
president and managing director of Mexican Eagle
Oil Company, later wrote:
Richberg has drawn the Mexicans 
into making a proposal which is so 
one sided and unfair that he will 
have no difficulty in proving to 
Washington the impossibility of the 
Mexicans' attitude.21
Not only did the companies believe that Mexican
management would ruin their plan to make the
Mexican oil expropriation appear a failure in the
eyes of the world, but they also had little faith
in the ability of the Mexican government to run the
oil industry. They, therefore, refused to be a
part of a financial society to which they would
18 Daniels to Secretary of State, 11 March 1939, RG 59, 
Records of the Department of State [812.6363/5569].
19 The Ambassador in Mexico (Daniels) to the Secretary of 
State, 23 March 1939, US Department of State: Foreign 
Relations of the United States: The American Republics. Vol. 
5, 1939 (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing 
Office, 1957), pp. 671-2.
20 Richberg to Hull, 12 June 1939, Papers of Cordell Hull.
21 Memorandum of a Conversation between Godber and Hasselt, 
28 March 1939, FO 371 22773 [A2485/4/26].
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contribute most of the capital but over which they 
would have little or no control.22 The companies 
particularly objected to the Mexican government's 
offer of compensation for the loss of the oil 
companies' former properties because any such 
compensation would mean acknowledging the validity 
of the expropriation decree which denied their 
rights to the subsoil petroleum. The companies 
felt so strongly about this point that they had 
forbidden Richberg even to talk about compensation 
or valuation with Mexico City. Faced with 
stalemate, Richberg returned to the States for 
other, pre-arranged, unrelated legal work and 
consultation with the oil companies and state 
department.23
Determined not to give in to Mexico, the 
companies drew up a second memorandum in April 1939 
in which they continued to insist on their previous 
demands and angrily expressed their need for state 
department action. Having failed in their attempts 
to negotiate with Cdrdenas, they wanted Hull 
formally to 'demand a return of the properties to 
the management of their owners in accord with the 
British and Netherlands governments'. They
22 Unsigned Memorandum, 7 April 1939, Papers of Cordell 
Hull.
23 Rees to Foreign Office, 20 March 1939, FO 371 22772 
[A2141/4/26].
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believed that such a demand was 'the only way in 
which the wrong [could] be r e m e d i e d . ' 2 4
Richberg, however, sought to dampen the tone 
of the oil companies' memorandum because he did not 
want to offend Washington or harden the attitude of 
the Mexican government. He prudently persuaded the 
oil companies not to show Hull the memorandum which 
so bluntly stated the companies' requirements of 
W a s h i n g t o n . 2 5  instead of asking for a strong state 
department demarche demanding the return of the 
properties to oil company management, Richberg 
merely told Hull and Welles that the oil companies 
desperately needed their support26 by putting 'non 
public' pressure on Mexico, and Hull and Welles 
agreed to do whatever p o s s i b l e . 2 7  Richberg did, 
however, stick up for the interests of the oil 
companies when he informed Mexico city before 
returning to Mexico for further negotiations that:
...further conferences would be 
fruitless if the Mexican government 
insisted upon raising the hopeless 
valuation question or maintaining a 
political control of the properties 
after they had been restored to
private management.28
24 Memorandum of the Oil Companies, 3 April 1939, FO 371 
22774 [A3723/4/26].
25 Minutes of a Meeting with Richberg, 5 April 1939, FO 371 
22773 [A3508/4/26].
26 Hasselt to Godber, 6 April 1939, FO 371 22773 
[A2897/4/26].
27 Minutes of a Meeting with Richberg, 5 April 1939, FO 371 
22773 [A3508/4/26].
28 Richberg, Donald R.: Mv Hero. The Indiscreet Memoirs of 
an Eventful but Unheroic Life. (New York: G.P. Putnam’s 
Sons, 1954), p. 259.
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When Richberg returned to Mexico and presented 
Cdrdenas with the companies' latest memorandum in 
May, he emphasised again the companies' need to 
control the oil industry without interference from 
the Mexican government^ and their need for a 
specific, fixed schedule of taxes and royalties.30 
In reply, Cdrdenas expressed his willingness to 
allow the companies to unite into four companies 
instead of one and tried to soften Richberg's 
proposals by offering to make a deal with only the 
American interests at the exclusion of Mexican 
Eagle.31 Richberg, however, turned the offer down, 
knowing the oil companies' insistence on upholding 
the united front.32 cdrdenas then stalled the 
negotiations by saying that he would have to seek 
the approval of his advisers on some of the matters 
raised by Richberg before proceeding further.33 
To avoid further stalemate, Hull and 
Roosevelt, anxious to appear to support the oil 
companies to silence critics, told Castillo Ndjera 
that they were in total agreement with Richberg's 
demands.34 The Mexican government however refused 
formally in July to consider the oil companies'
29 New York to NLT Ciamexag, 12 May 1939, FO 371 22773 
[A3508/4/26].
30 Richberg, 'Tentative Basis for a Typical Agreement', 3 
April 1939, FO 371 22773 [A3508/4/26].
31 Richberg to Hull, 12 June 1939, Papers of Cordell Hull.
32 Conversation between Wilkinson and Leigh Jones, 11 May 
1939, FO 371 22773 [A3508/4/26].
33 Starling to Balfour, 12 August 1939, FO 371 22775 
[A5627/4/26].
34 Starling to Balfour, 20 June 1939, FO 371 22774 
[A4375/4/26].
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demands on profits and management. The four 
corporations which Mexico wanted the companies to 
form were to be Mexican, and Mexico City was to 
appoint the majority of the board's d i r e c t o r s . 35 
The government also proposed a scheme by which it 
would manage the properties, with the companies 
providing very little input. Furthermore, instead 
of agreeing to fixing rates of wages, royalties and 
taxes in the contract, the government requested a 
division of the profits after wages, operating 
expenses and taxes had been deducted on terms to be 
decided by the Mexican board of conciliation and 
arbitration.36
The Mexican reply even angered Richberg, who 
believed that the Mexican government sought far too 
much control. He warned Castillo Ndjera that 
further foreign investment in Mexico was out of the 
question unless the companies regained control. 
Richberg also angrily informed the ambassador that 
the Mexican proposals were 'totally unacceptable to 
my clients' and 'entirely incompatible with the 
tenor of our previous conversation'. He curtly 
added:
I am regretfully forced to 
conclude that the efforts 
heretofore made to arrive at an 
understanding of basic principles 
have now been abandoned; and 
without such an understanding,
35 Castillo Najera to Welles, 5 July 1939, RG 59, Records of 
the Department of State [812.6363/5636].
36 Richberg to Castillo Najera, 17 July 1939, FO 371 22775 
[A5627/4/27].
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further negotiations would be 
useless.37
Soon after it became clear to the oil 
companies that the Mexican government was not going 
to yield on the most important matters to the oil 
companies, Roosevelt, hoping to get a settlement on 
the oil issue to silence his critics, unwittingly 
made the situation worse for the oil companies. 
Castillo Nctjera delivered a letter to him from 
Cdrdenas dated 29 July in which he blamed the 
failure of the negotiation on the 'intransigence' 
of the oil companies, who insisted on making claims 
that were incompatible with Mexican law. The 
ambassador claimed that the Mexican government had 
made a huge concession when it agreed to allow the 
companies to unite into four companies instead of 
one. He said that the companies' insistence on 
managing the oil industry was ridiculous because 
they would most likely clash with oil industry 
workers in the same way they did before the 
expropriation. He reminded Roosevelt that labour 
problems before the expropriation had caused huge 
difficulties in the supply of oil which exacerbated 
Mexico's economic problems. He said that all the 
American companies were entitled to ask for was 
compensation, and in case the negotiations failed,
37 Richberg to Castillo Najera, 17 July 1939, enclosed in 
the President of Standard Oil Company of New Jersey (W. S. 
Farish) to the Secretary of State, 10 August 1939, US 
Department of State: Foreign Relations of the United States: 
The American Republics. Vol. 5, 1939 (Washington, D.C.: 
United States Government Printing Office, 1957), pp. 690-91.
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he reiterated his offer to let the companies handle 
the export of some of the petroleum which the 
Mexican government would provide at a discount to 
compensate the companies for their capital 
invested.38
When Castillo Ndjera handed the note to 
Roosevelt in the presence of Welles, the president 
spontaneously made a suggestion which he requested 
Welles and Castillo Ndjera to discuss further.39 
His suggestion was for each of the four proposed 
corporations to have a board of directors comprised 
of a more balanced selection of people. 
Specifically, he wanted the stockholders and the 
Mexican government to each name three board members 
while the six they named would select the final 
'neutral' three from a list of nine competent 
business people approved by both governments. The 
nine were not to be citizens of Mexico, the United 
States, Holland or Britain. This arrangement was 
only to last for a few years until a permanent 
settlement could be reached.
This plan was a direct threat to the 
companies' strategy of demonstrating that the 
Mexican government was being unreasonable so the 
state department would be obliged to demand the
38 Ldzaro Cardenas to Franklin Roosevelt, 29 July 1939, RG 
59, Records of the Department of State [812.6363/5636 3/8].
39 Hasselt to Godber, 10 August 1939, FO 371 22775 
[A5987/4/26].
40 Hasselt, Notes on the XYZ Affair, 8 August 1939, FO 371 
22775 [A5987/4/26].
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return of the oil companies' properties. If the 
Mexican government accepted it, the companies could 
only protest at the price of offending the 
president of the United States.41 Shell's Van 
Hasselt, the most outspoken opponent of the plan, 
found the formula for management 'completely 
unacceptable'. He mentioned that neutral directors 
who met the requirements of nationality and 
business competence would be nearly impossible to 
find. Most importantly he refused to share control 
of the management of the oil industry with the 
Mexican government and felt outraged at the amount 
of control the Mexican government, who would be 
investing no money in the oil industry, would have. 
The Mexican directors, he believed, would be 'a 
constant source of trouble' and primarily serve the 
interests of the Mexico City. Equally 
objectionable was the plan's failure in any way to 
'condemn the initial injustice committed when the 
properties [were] confiscated without the 
possibility of adequate and prompt compensation 
being tendered.'42
Roosevelt's suggestion to Castillo Najera 
illustrates his desire to solve the oil matter and 
his ambivalence to big business which allowed him 
suddenly to propose a policy inconsistent with his
41 Hasselt to Godber, 10 August 1939, FO 371 22775 
[A5987/4/26].
42 Hasselt, Notes on the XYZ Affair, 8 August 1939, FO 371 
22775 [A5987/4/26].
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own recent action as well as those of the state 
department. The suggestion gave support for joint 
control by the companies and the Mexican government 
and was scarcely compatible with his own message to 
Daniels in February 1939 affirming that the 
companies' first memorandum, in which they insisted 
on managing their former properties, was 'eminently 
practical'. His suggestion was also a departure 
from the unspoken policy of the state department 
which was to demand compensation from the Mexican 
government, which it knew Mexico would not be able 
to pay in hopes that the Mexican government would 
allow the companies to return to managing their 
properties. Duggan had earlier articulated support 
for the companies' goal and informed the Mexican 
government that the plan Richberg was presenting 
was the only viable solution.43
Welles' support of Roosevelt's solution was a 
marked departure from his previous support of the 
oil companies. Although he had little choice but 
to go along with the scheme, his cooperation with 
Roosevelt in this instance was certainly consistent 
with his changes of policy in the past, and in this 
instance gave him an opportunity to endear himself 
to Roosevelt to enhance his own influence in the 
administration. Before Roosevelt made his
43 Memorandum of a Conversation by the Chief of the Division 
of the American Republics (Duggan), 19 June 1939, US 
Department of State: Foreign Relations of the United States: 
The American Republics. Vol. 5, 1939 (Washington, D.C.: 
United States Government Printing Office, 1957), pp. 680-83.
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suggestion, Welles had angrily informed the Mexican 
embassy earlier in July 1939 that Mexico's reply to 
the oil companies' second memorandum 'departed 
completely from the general bases agreed upon 
between the ambassador and Richberg' and introduced 
elements which the companies would find 'totally 
unacceptable'. The enraged Welles had threatened 
that if the negotiations failed, Washington would 
have to support the oil companies in 'what we 
regard as a legitimate and well-founded complaint 
on the part of US nationals that the Mexican 
government had seized their properties' and was 
'utilising the properties to Mexico's own 
benefit'.44
In contrast, after Roosevelt suggested that 
Welles and Castillo Ndjera work on his proposed 
solution, Welles tried to convince the companies 
and the Mexican government to accept it.45 Welles 
pointed out to Castillo Ndjera that Roosevelt's 
solution would allow Mexico City to continue to 
manage the properties rather than turning them back 
to the oil companies. He said that he was 
optimistic the companies would accept the solution 
because it would not leave the Mexican government
44 Memorandum of a Conversation by the Under Secretary of 
state (Welles), 20 July 1939, US Department of State: 
Foreign Relations of the United States: The American 
Republics. Vol. 5, 1939 (Washington, D.C.: United States 
Government Printing Office, 1957), pp. 686-7.
45 Hasselt to Godber, 10 August 1939, F0 371 22775 
[A5987/4/26].
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in complete control.46 Welles, however, failed to 
persuade the Mexican government to accept it.47 
Welles went back to being firm toward Mexico 
shortly after Roosevelt stopped showing interest in 
Mexico for the time being.
In response, Roosevelt wrote to Cdrdenas in 
late August saying that the swift rejection of his 
proposed solution by both parties was 'most 
disheartening'. He expressed concern that such an 
issue could damage relations between the two 
countries and said that Mexico had no other choice 
than to pay prompt and just compensation, 
suggesting that the amount and timing be determined 
by impartial a r b i t r a t i o n . 48 to make matters worse 
Cdrdenas also rejected this proposal because he 
believed arbitration was only for extreme cases 
where negotiations had completely failed, which he 
believed had not yet h a p p e n e d . 49
46 Memorandum of a Conversation by the Under Secretary of 
State (Welles), 2 August 1939, US Department of State: 
Foreign Relations of the United States: The American 
Republics. Vol. 5, 1939 (Washington, D.C.: United States 
Government Printing Office, 1957), pp. 688-90.
47 Memorandum of a Conversation between Welles and Castillo 
Najera, 10 August 1939, RG 59, Records of the Department of 
State [812.6363/6014].
48 Roosevelt to Cardenas, 31 August 1939, Papers of Josephus 
Daniels.
49 Cardenas to Roosevelt, 7 October 1939, Official File 146, 
Papers of Franklin D. Roosevelt.
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THE START OF WAR AND WASHINGTON'S POLICY
The start of war in September 1939 had 
increased the importance of settling outstanding 
issues with Mexico for reasons of hemispheric 
defence. However, Hull and Welles saw the need to 
continue protecting the interests of the oil 
companies at the same time for two reasons. First, 
two months after European hostilities started, the 
companies had exhausted legal recourses in Mexico 
and failed in their negotiations. The oil 
companies' efforts with the Mexican legal system, 
which started in April 1938 when they filed for an 
injunction against the expropriation decree on the 
grounds that it was unconstitutional, had proved 
futile by December 1939 when the Mexican supreme 
court upheld its legality.50 The supreme court 
ruled after the expropriation that compensation on 
the spot was not necessary because Mexico was not 
capable of paying it and the expropriation was 
necessary for national interest. It was time, 
therefore, for Washington to make good its promise 
to become more involved in the matter. Second,
Hull was still trying to protect US commercial 
interests abroad, hoping to negotiate a trade 
agreement. As Berle said in December, 'Not that we
50 Gaither, Roscoe, B.: Expropriation in Mexico: The Facts 
and the Law (New York: William Morrow & Company, 1940), p. 
155.
252
love the oil companies, but we have to preserve 
some sort of norm by which relations can be carried 
on.'51
Welles in December responded to the pressure 
from the oil companies to demand the return of 
their properties by saying that the recent decision 
of the Mexican supreme court made it 'entirely 
impossible for the Department of State to remain 
quiet much longer'.52 Defence concerns, however, 
led Hull and Welles to continue with an indirect 
approach rather than simply to demand that Mexico 
return the oil properties. Hull insisted on 
arbitration, and similar to his strategy in 1938, 
he continued to use punitive economic measures 
designed to harm Mexico's economy further, making 
the payment of adequate compensation upon which the 
legality of the expropriation hinged impossible 
and, thereby, putting pressure on Mexico to return
the oil properties.53
The Venezuelan trade agreement provided Hull 
with an ideal opportunity to make an example of the 
Mexican oil expropriation. He had negotiated the 
agreement in November 1939 whereby American farmers 
and factory owners received concessions. In return 
Venezuela, whose oil exports comprised 90 per cent
Adolf Berle, Memorandum, 14 December 1939, Papers of A. 
Berle.
52 Memorandum of a Conversation between Richberg and Welles, 
5 December 1939, Papers of Cordell Hull.
53 Daniels to the Secretary of State, 13 December 1939, RG 
59, Records of the Department of State [812.51/2416].
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of their export trade, received a quota of 71.9 per 
cent of the oil import market which was allowed to 
enter the United States at a 50 per cent discount 
on duties. For Venezuela's cooperation in a trade 
agreement and respect for US citizens who had 
invested in the country, Venezuela had received an 
enormous quota.54 The Netherlands and Colombia got 
20.3 per cent and 4 per cent respectively of the 
remaining quota, while Mexico in contrast was 
obliged to compete for the last 3.8 per cent with 
other countries which were not given specific 
quotas. Oil entering the US outside a specified 
quota was subject to a tariff of 100 per c e n t . 5 5
Having promised the oil companies he would not 
remain silent on the matter any longer and with 
Roosevelt's attention diverted from Mexico, Welles 
informed Castillo Ndjera of the import quota and 
sternly warned that any attempt to export petroleum 
to the US on the part of Mexico would ‘create such 
a storm of indignation as to have very seriously 
prejudicial effects upon the friendly relations 
between the two countries.' Welles' approach to 
Mexico and the fact that the US administration knew 
that with Europe at war Mexico no longer had access 
to its traditional overseas markets leave little 
room for doubt that punishing Mexico was a
54 Memorandum Regarding Concessions to Venezuela on 
Petroleum, 5 February 1940, Papers of Cordell Hull.
55 Corrigan suggested the US help Venezuela with the revival 
of their livestock industry.
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substantial factor in the decision to force Mexico 
to share such a minute quota. At the same time, 
Welles also tried to get Castillo Ndjera to agree 
to the general principle of arbitration while 
refusing to specify what Washington thought 
arbitration should cover. Cdrdenas rejected the 
proposal because he wanted a direct settlement 
between the oil companies and Mexico.56 Welles was 
furious and claimed not to understand Mexico's 
argument:
I could not conceive of either one 
of our two governments being 
unwilling to submit to an impartial 
arbitration differences which arose 
between them which it had been 
found impossible to settle through 
the diplomatic channel and which 
resort to the Mexican courts 
seemed also incapable of 
settling.57
SILVER POLICY
Congressional debates on the Silver Purchase 
Act had badly hurt the Mexican peso, and the state 
department did nothing to alleviate Mexico City's 
worries. At the end of 1939 Republican Senator
56 Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Welles) of a 
Conversation with the Mexican Ambassador (Castillo Najera), 
11 December 1939, US Department of State: Foreign Relations 
of the United States: The American Republics. Vol. 5, 1939 
(Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 
1957), pp. 714-5.
57 Memorandum of a Conversation between Castillo Najera and 
Welles, 5 February 1940, RG 59, Records of the Department of 
State [812.6363/6486].
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John G. Townsend of Delaware re-introduced
legislation recommending the suspension of foreign
purchases of silver to congress. He had introduced
a similar bill in January 1939, when Nevada's Key
Pittman, who had been responsible for the passage
of the Silver Purchase Act of 1934, succeeded in
tabling it. But the initiative had had a
devastating effect on the peso. When Townsend
brought it up again, the resulting speculation that
Washington was going to stop purchases abroad
caused further loss of confidence in Mexican
currency. The peso became so weak that on 9
December the Bank of Mexico decided to withdraw
from the foreign exchange m a r k e t . 58
The discussion of the Townsend bill in
congress continued for several months. Because of
Mexico's economic problems, the Mexican government
was desperate to learn of Washington's plans for
buying silver. But when Ramdn Beteta enquired in
December about the US silver plans so the Mexican
government could perhaps try to plan ahead to
protect its c u r r e n c y , 59 the attitude of Herbert
Bursley was one of total non-cooperation:
It seems to me that the Mexican 
government is worried and uncertain 
as a result of a situation of its 
own making and that it is not
58 Cochran to Morgenthau, 14 December 1939, Morgenthau 
Diary.
59 Daniels to Secretary of State, 12 December 1939, RG 59, 
Records of the Department of State [812.51/2415].
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incumbent upon this government to 
relieve that concern.60
Hull similarly wrote to the American embassy in
Mexico in December that they should tell Beteta
that it was not possible for the department to
furnish the Mexican government with information on
US silver plans.61 Nor was Morgenthau any more
forthcoming with Eduardo Suarez when he visited in
January. When Suarez expressed his anxiety about
the future sale of silver, Morgenthau casually
replied, 'If that's your only worry you are very
fortunate'.62
Furthermore, comments about the recalcitrance
of Mexico featured prominently in the campaign to
get the Townsend bill passed. Townsend used
Mexico's refusal to arbitrate to get support for
his bill. He argued that the Mexican decision to
refuse arbitration came at a time when the senate
was debating his bill to end American purchases of
foreign silver. He continued,
It is absurd that our government 
during all the period that the 
seizure of American property in 
Mexico has been going on and during 
all the period that the Mexican 
government has been putting off or 
evading the question of 
compensation should have continued
60 Bursley to Welles, 16 December 1939, RG 59, Records of 
the Department of state [812.51/2415].
61 Hull to American Embassy in Mexico, 20 December 1939, RG 
59, Records of the Department of State [812.51/2415].
62 Memorandum of a Conversation between Morgenthau and 
Suarez, 8 January 1940, Morgenthau Diary.
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to lend substantial financial 
support through silver purchases.63
The bill eventually failed because the 
silverites in congress were very strong, and the 
timing of the bill was not conducive to its 
success. While Harry Dexter White, Morgenthau's 
aide, privately believed that foreign silver 
purchases were ridiculous, he argued that stopping 
silver purchases before the next election would 
hurt the Democrats by giving the appearance that 
the administration itself was admitting its 
monetary policy had been a failure. He wrote that 
the Republican party would make it appear that the 
administration did not recognise its mistake for 
several years until Republicans 'rammed it down 
their throats.'64 while the senate passed the 
bill in late April, administration leaders in the 
house refused to consider the bill because they 
thought it should have originated in the house due 
to its measure dealing with a trading tax on 
silver.65
63 Townsend, 9 May 1940, Congressional Record. Senate, 
(Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 
1940), v. 86 (part 6) Congress 76, session 3.
64 Everest, Allan, Seymor: Morgenthau. the New Deal and 
Silver (New York: King’s Crown Press, Columbia University, 
1950), pp. 76-77; Conversation between Daniel Bell and 
Richard Wagner, 13 February 1940, Morgenthau Diary; 
Conversation between Alben W. Barkley and Daniel Bell, 13 
February 1940, Morgenthau Diary.
65 Bursley to Welles, 16 December 1939, RG 59, Records of 
the Department of State [812.51/2415].
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THE EFFECT OF WASHINGTON'S COMPROMISE POLICY
Washington's compromise policy angered both 
Mexico and the oil companies. Not only was the 
state department's approach not firm enough for the 
companies, but also its insistence on using the 
General Treaty of Inter-American Arbitration^ 
prohibited the involvement of Britain and the 
Netherlands who were not signatories to the treaty. 
Farish in February 1940 complained to Hull that use 
of the treaty would threaten the united front of 
American, British and Dutch oil interests in 
Mexico. Instead, he advocated use of the 
Convention for the Pacific Settlement of 
International Disputes, signed at the Hague on 18 
October 1907, which Mexico, Britain and the US had 
all signed. This convention provided for 
arbitration by the permanent court of arbitration 
at the Hague, and the governments resorting to this 
court for settlement of their differences were 
entitled to help select the arbitrators.^7
The state department and Farish strongly 
disagreed on this matter of policy. Hull referred 
Farish' concerns to Green Hackworth, legal adviser
i
i ........ ..........
i
I 66 signed at Washington on 5 January 1929 by the United
| States, Mexico and other Latin American and South American
nations to keep peace, to interpret treaties and questions 
of international law and the nature and extent of the 
reparation to be made for the breach of an international 
obligation.
67 Farish to Secretary of State, 6 February 1940, RG 59, 
Records of the Department of State [812.6363/6502 1/2].
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to the state department, who replied that the 
department did not like the idea of using the 
convention. While the administration recognised 
that the Netherlands and Britain had similar 
controversies with the Mexican government, 
Washington regarded the oil matter as 'exclusively 
a matter between the two countries'.®® Farish, 
however, stubbornly warned that the companies would 
refuse to assent to submission of their claims 
against Mexico under the terms of the Inter- 
American Arbitration Treaty of 1929.
Hull’s policy also angered Mexico City. When 
the Mexican government submitted to Washington its 
objections to arbitration, it insisted that the 
'right of expropriation is beyond discussion.' In 
addition it reiterated that arbitration was 
inappropriate until the two sides had reached a 
total impasse in their direct negotiations. 
Furthermore the Mexican government disliked the use 
of the 1907 convention because Mexican Eagle was a 
Mexican rather than a British company, and hence in 
this case the question of international arbitration 
was irrelevant. Instead of arbitration the Mexican 
government expressed its willingness to discuss 
compensation directly with the companies. In the 
event that the companies refused to discuss
Hackworth to Farish, 6 February 1940, RG 59, Records of 
the Department of State [812.6363/6502 1/2].
69 Farish to Secretary of State, 13 February 1940, RG 59, 
Records of the Department of State [812.6363/6504 1/2).
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arbitration, it proposed that the Mexican and 
American governments should appoint experts to 
arrive at an agreement on compensation.70
The Mexican government's 'most unsatisfactory' 
reaction and the oil companies' independent line on 
arbitration infuriated Counsellor of the State 
Department Walton Moore. He asserted that the 
Mexican argument that expropriation could not be 
discussed completely failed to take into account 
the principle that for expropriation to be legal, 
the owners needed to receive prompt, just and 
adequate compensation which the Mexican government 
had not ensured in this case. Furthermore he 
thought the appointment of experts on the basis 
proposed by the Mexican government would be futile 
because the experts would not have any legal 
authority.71
Hull endorsed Moore's point about the need for 
suitable compensation if expropriation were to be 
acceptable. In a note to the Mexican government of 
3 April he accused it of failing to adhere to the 
principles necessary for friendly trade relations 
'and many other vital and mutually desirable 
relations'. He also complained that because of
Cardenas to Roosevelt, 16 March 1940, RG 59, Records of 
the Department of State [812.6363/6600].
71 Memorandum by the Counsellor of the State Department 
(Moore), 20 March 1940, US Department of State: Foreign 
Relations of the United States: The American Republics. Vol. 
5, 1940 (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing 
Office, 1961), pp. 1006-7.
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this outstanding problem the US government had not 
been able to negotiate settlements of other 
outstanding matters between the two countries and 
referred to the world situation which made the 
settlement of such issues all the more necessary.72
Hull rejected Mexico's proposal for settling 
the dispute. He pointed out that designated 
experts would not have any authority to render 
final binding decisions and that such a procedure 
had no legal basis. He also disagreed that 
arbitration was premature because Washington had 
been insisting on compensation ever since the oil 
expropriation. He then suggested again that the 
two governments submit to arbitration 'all the 
questions involved in the oil controversy' and to 
empower a tribunal with the authority to determine 
the amount the Mexican government owed American 
nationals who had lost their properties in Mexico 
and to determine the conditions and methods of 
payment. Showing his unwillingness to be 
associated with a country whose policy had ended in 
a break of relations, he named only American 
nationals. In addition, he outlined a solution to 
adjust the matter of general claims so that after 
the settlement of these two questions, the two
72 Secretary of State to the Mexican Ambassador (Castillo 
Najera), 3 April 1940, US Department of State: Foreign 
Relations of the United States: The American Republics. Vol. 
5, 1940 (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing 
Office, 1961), pp. 1009-13.
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countries could come to an agreement on all 
outstanding matters between them.73
THE SINCLAIR SETTLEMENT
As Hull sent the Mexican embassy in Washington 
the note above on 3 April, Ambassador Castillo 
Ndjera told Welles that the Mexican government and 
the Sinclair group had come to a settlement.
Unable to change its mind about wanting to break 
the united front in late 1938, the company had 
retained Hurley to hold talks with Mexico City 
after the negotiations between the Mexican 
government and Richberg had failed. Sinclair 
agreed to accept compensation in the amount of $14 
million to be paid half in oil and half in American 
dollars while the Mexican government agreed to pay 
Sinclair a total of $8.5 million in periodic 
instalments of $1 million dollars over the 
subsequent three years. The Mexican government 
also agreed to sell Sinclair 20 million barrels of 
oil over four subsequent years at 20 to 30 cents 
below the world market price. Although Hurley had 
hoped to get the companies to work their former 
properties and to get a higher figure for
73 Ibid.
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compensation, he decided to accept the Mexican 
offer because it was better than no agreement at
all.74
The Sinclair settlement greatly strengthened 
Mexico's stand against arbitration. In its reply 
to the US note of 3 April, Mexico City reiterated 
its willingness to pay compensation to the oil 
companies and mentioned that any delay in the 
repayment was the fault of the oil companies who 
refused to allow valuation of their former 
properties. It also denied there was any rule in 
international law which made the legality of 
expropriation reliant on immediate compensation.
In addition, the Mexican government once again 
emphasised its opposition to arbitration which it 
believed must not be used until it had exercised 
all of its sovereign rights through its own courts 
and a 'denial of justice can be proved.' At the 
time Mexican courts were trying to determine the 
value of the properties, an exercise in which the 
companies refused to cooperate. In addition the 
Mexican government insisted that the expropriation 
was a domestic matter and that the treaty of 
arbitration was only for international 
differences.75
74 Memorandum of a Conversation with Welles, Hurley, Bursley 
and Hackworth, 6 May 1940, RG 59, Records of the Department 
of State [812.6363/6899].
75 Hay to Daniels, 4 May 1940, RG 59, Records of the 
Department of State [812.6363/7100]? Hay to Daniels, 1 May 
1940, RG 59, Records of the Department of State 
[812.6363/6892].
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Not only did Sinclair's agreement set the 
dreaded precedent of compensation for the major oil 
companies, but the low figure for compensation 
reflected the fact that Sinclair had given up 
insisting on compensation for subsoil rights, which 
the major companies had deemed v i t a l . 7 6 Although 
Hurley during negotiations had wanted the oil to 
come from government-owned properties which had not 
been confiscated from foreigners, he had to abandon 
this goal because the Mexican government believed 
that it owned the subsoil rights to all properties. 
Therefore, Hurley had accepted an agreement that 
involved payment to the oil interests involved not 
only with oil from Sinclair's own properties but 
also with oil which other companies not party to 
the agreement believed still to be theirs. The 
major companies were naturally annoyed that the 
Sinclair settlement disregarded this issue.77 
Farish feared the Mexican government would try to 
use the agreement as proof of the legality of the 
expropriation and nervously wrote to Hull that 
'Sinclair cannot contract away the rights of the
76 Memorandum of a Conversation by the Chief of the Division 
of the American Republics (Duggan), 19 February 1940, US 
Department of State: Foreign Relations of the United States: 
The American Republics. Vol. 5, 1940 (Washington, D.C.: 
United States Government Printing Office, 1961), pp. 999- 
1000.
77 Memorandum of a Conversation with Welles, Hurley, Bursley 
and Hackworth, 6 May 1940, RG 59, Records of the Department 
of State [812.6363/6899].
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other companies or of the United States 
government. ' 78
REACTION OF THE OIL COMPANIES
The major oil companies did all they could to 
sabotage the agreement. They put out news that 
Sinclair's imports of Mexican oil were ruining the 
price of crude in the US. Hurley responded that 
Mexican oil imports by Sinclair were minuscule and 
could not possibly have any dramatic effect on 
domestic prices. They also accused Sinclair of 
accepting stolen property, and Hurley had to 
testify before a house committee on this matter.
In summer 1940, Texas senators Tom Connally and 
Morris Sheppard persuaded the senate to pass a law 
prohibiting any product or property expropriated by 
foreign governments to be imported into the US. In 
the house, Massachusetts Representative John 
McCormack, a Catholic, sponsored the measure 
because of his disapproval of Mexico's anti­
clerical position. Although there is no persuasive 
evidence of the oil companies' support, Hurley 
believed that the proposed legislation came from 
Standard Oil of New Jersey and countered the
78 Farish to Hull, 20 July 1940, RG 59, Records of the 
Department of State [812.6363/6981].
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accusation by saying that Sinclair's Mexican oil 
had come from its former properties.7^
THE EFFECT OF THE SINCLAIR AGREEMENT ON US POLICY
Still caught in between concerns about the 
election and promoting the interests of US 
commercial interests abroad on the one hand and the 
need for better Mexican-American relations on the 
other, Washington's policy remained unchanged after 
the announcement of Sinclair's agreement. Welles 
admitted that Sinclair's receipt and re-sale of oil 
coming from properties expropriated from foreigners 
who had not been compensated for their loss caused 
concern in Washington.80 as a result, the state 
department turned down several Mexican requests to 
increase Mexico's quota to accommodate the sales of 
oil the Mexican government were making to Sinclair 
under their agreement. Castillo Ndjera complained 
that the Mexican quota was based on figures 
obtained after the expropriation when imports to 
the US were particularly low and pointed out that 
since Venezuela was not using all of its quota the 
US government should divert the unused portion to
79 Buhite, pp. 95-7.
Memorandum of a Conversation with Welles, Hurley, Bursley 
and Hackworth, 6 May 1940, RG 59, Records of the Department 
of State [812.6363/6899].
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Mexico. Welles, however, used the Mexican request 
to get leverage over the Mexican government to 
accept arbitration, claiming this was 'a question 
of principle and not a question of indemnity due to 
one particular company'. He again said that if 
the two sides submitted the petroleum controversy 
and settlement of the general claims to 
arbitration, the two countries could then adjust 
all of the important outstanding issues between the 
two countries. After that, he said, the oil quota 
could be settled in a mutually satisfactory w a y .81 
Despite the pressure the Mexican government 
maintained its position.
Nor was Hurley able to achieve an increase in 
the q u o t a . 82 Bursley wrote to Duggan on 12 March, 
that it was 'inadvisable to take any steps which 
would relax the pressure Mexico is now feeling in 
the oil matter.' He continued, 'The shoe is 
definitely pinching,• and if the department were to 
change its policy with regard to the quota, it 
would be 'open to charges of having failed to let 
natural economic forces have free play'. He firmly 
believed that the department should not change its 
policy to help Mexico 'in escaping the consequences
Memorandum of a Conversation by the Under Secretary of 
State (Welles), 3 April 1940, US Department of State: 
Foreign Relations of the United States: The American 
Republics. Vol. 5, 1940 (Washington, D.C.: United States 
Government Printing Office, 1961), pp. 1007-9.
®2 Memorandum of a Conversation between Secretary of State 
and Hurley, 1 March 1940, RG 59, Records of the Department 
of State [812.6363/6626].
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of her own voluntary acts' particularly when such a 
change would 1 involve a reversal of departmental 
policy and ... would ... be apparently for the 
benefit of only one company's settlement, ... [and 
to the] ... probable detriment of other companies'. 
In addition, he believed that such a change of 
policy would probably harm the chances of 'any 
equitable settlement of the principles i n v o l v e d '.83
In conclusion the policies of Hull and 
Roosevelt caused friction between Washington and 
Mexico City and also gave Mexico City an 
opportunity to stall negotiations long enough to 
make a separate agreement with Sinclair oil, which 
set a terrible precedent for US oil interests and 
made any chance of getting the oil properties 
returned all the more remote. Responsibility for 
such a policy, however during the period of this 
chapter, does not rest entirely with Hull. The 
administration faced critics who opposed a lenient 
policy toward Mexico, and if the administration had 
appeared to give in to Mexico, its authority would 
have been weakened domestically. Despite the ill 
effects of this policy, increasing preoccupation 
with defence concerns brought the two countries 
together, and even eventually allowed for defence 
cooperation, an oil settlement and a Mexican-
83 Bursley to Duggan, 12 March 1940, RG 59, Records of the 
Department of State [812.6363/6597].
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American trade agreement as chapter eight will 
show.
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
WHITEHALL'S POLICY AFTER THE AGRARIAN 
SETTLEMENT: NOVEMBER 193 8-MAY 1940
The prospect of the progressive loss of British 
owned oil supplies abroad is certainly one to fill 
us with apprehension since without adequate oil 
supplies our mechanised defence forces on sea, air 
and land must necessarily be paralysed 1
John Balfour
The discrepancy between what Britain had at 
stake in the Mexican oil problem and its power to 
control the situation became more pronounced after 
the agrarian settlement of November 1938 which made 
the return of British oil interests to working 
their former properties unlikely. The greater the 
prospect of war in the Far East and Europe, the 
more Director of the Petroleum Department Frederick 
Starling and John Balfour, who still largely 
controlled policy toward Mexico, felt the need to 
make an example of Mexico other countries would not 
want to follow. As early as December 1938 Balfour 
minuted that the lack of foreign oil supplies would 
paralyse British ships, aircraft and mechanised 
forces on land.2
1 Balfour, Minute, 10 December 1938, F0 371 21478 
[A9190/10/26].
2 Ibid.
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Whitehall's only options were few and 
ineffective. Starling and Balfour tried in vain to 
tighten the boycott of Mexican oil and secure 
Washington's cooperation in getting the properties 
returned. Washington, however, would not listen to 
Britain's requests to demand a reasonable 
settlement from Mexico. Roosevelt's Good Neighbor 
policy could not afford to be associated with 
British officials whom President Cdrdenas blamed 
for the break in relations. Also, as the war 
started, Washington felt increasingly threatened by 
British efforts to form a pound-franc trading bloc 
to the exclusion of the US. Whitehall did 
everything from making requests to the state 
department to cooperate in specific matters to 
waiting patiently in hopes that Hull would take a 
stern policy toward Mexico. No matter what London 
did, however, Hull and Welles refused cooperation 
and conducted policy regardless of British 
interests.
Balfour and Starling increasingly feared that 
Washington, which never communicated details of US 
policy to London, would make a compromise 
settlement with Mexico. Such a settlement could 
undermine Britain's war effort, and Whitehall 
became all the more determined to create the 
illusion if not the reality of a united front 
between London and Washington. Working closely 
with Washington, Balfour and Starling would try to
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reduce the chances of an unsuitable settlement 
between Mexico and the oil interests which 
continued to work in a united front. If the state 
department did decide to negotiate a settlement 
along lines acceptable to Whitehall, a united front 
would prevent Mexico City from leaving out British 
oil interests.
London, however, could no longer create the 
illusion of cooperation with Washington by making 
representations to Mexico parallel to the state 
department's - difficult even with Anglo-Mexican 
relations due to Washington's secrecy. Making a 
parallel approach would have involved using the 
Danish legation which was still looking after 
British interests in Mexico. For the illusion of a 
governmental united front to be convincing, 
Washington would have had to make representations 
to Mexico on behalf of both American and British 
interests, which it refused to do.
It is the purpose of this chapter to analyse 
the reactions of Starling and Balfour to the 
challenges which faced them between November 1938 
and April 1940 in turn: the agricultural 
settlement, Donald Richberg's negotiations, 
problems with the boycott and critics within 
Whitehall and France, US arbitration proposals, and 
the Sinclair settlement. It is argued that while 
Washington's policy did not change during the same 
time period because officials simply could not
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decide on a realistic, single goal, Whitehall 
maintained the same policy.
It will also be seen that Starling and 
Balfour, despite their critics, were able to make 
their views prevail. Because more immediate 
concerns such as growing hostilities consumed the 
attention of officials above the department level, 
Balfour and Starling kept control of policy. They 
continued to support the oil interests and worked 
hard to silence critics of established British 
policy. Also, shortly after the start of the war, 
there had been a reorganisation of the petroleum 
board at Shell-Mex House, which increased the 
petroleum department's power. Before the start of 
the war, the board had been established as a 
distributing agency comprised of Shell, Anglo- 
Iranian, Trinidad Leaseholds Ltd. and the National 
Benzole Company which together had a monopoly on 
handling and distributing all oil supplies in 
Britain during wartime with the exception of naval 
fuel oil. The petroleum department's assumption of 
a supervisory role over the board after the start 
of the war and its actions as an intermediary 
between the civilian organisation and Whitehall^ 
substantially helped the views of the petroleum
3 Payton-Smith, D.J.: Oil; Study of War-time Policy and 
Administration (London: HMSO, 1971), pp. 43-44, pp. 78-79.
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department to remain dominant over those of the 
treasury and ministry of economic warfare.^
WHITEHALL'S POLICY AFTER THE AGRARIAN SETTLEMENT
After the agrarian settlement of November 
1938, London had little choice but to continue to 
rely on both the boycott and the cooperation of 
Washington to discourage other countries from 
imitating Mexico. To Balfour, the continuation of 
the boycott was more important than ever in light 
of the efforts of the Mexican general worker's 
union to encourage left wing extremists in South 
American countries to assert themselves at the 
expense of foreign investors. At the pan-American 
labour congress in September 1939, attended by 
delegates from most of the republics of Central and 
South America, he had made strides in this 
direction. Although substantial amounts of oil had 
gone through the boycott, the conclusion of the 
memorandum was that it was achieving some success. 
Balfour hoped that it would both set an example of 
Mexico's worsening economy to discourage other 
governments from allowing left-wing elements to 
oust foreign investors and to wear the Mexican
^ Balfour, Minute, 22 November 1939, FO 371 22776 
[A8038/4/26].
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government down to the point that it would make 
concessions to the oil companies.5
Britain regretted its reliance on Washington, 
but it realised that it was necessary to wait for 
the US to take a stronger stand toward Mexico. 
Balfour resented that Washington did not feel free 
to take firm action in Mexico due to the Good 
Neighbor policy which, he believed, the Mexican 
government interpreted as carte blanche to do 
whatever it wished.6 He blamed ineffective policy 
primarily on Welles, whom he called a 'whole­
hearted protagonist of the Good Neighbour p o l i c y ',7 
and Daniels because he was not firm enough when 
dealing with the Mexican government. Balfour most 
likely summarised the sentiments of many in the 
foreign office when he wrote that 'The ambassador 
should be relieved of his post if the US are to 
exercise a helpful influence in Mexico.'® The fact 
that Washington rarely informed the British 
government about its policy and actions toward 
Mexico compounded this resentment.®
® Balfour, Memorandum, 1 December 1939, FO 371 22776 
[A8808/4/26].
6 Balfour, Minute, 21 April 1939, FO 371 22773 [A2896/4/26]. 
^ Balfour, Memorandum, 1 December 1939, FO 371 22776 
[A8808/4/26].
® Balfour, Memorandum, 20 September 1939, FO 371 22776
[A6548/4/26].
® Balfour, Memorandum, 1 December 1939, FO 371 22776 
[A8808/4/26].
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WHITEHALL'S ANXIETY ABOUT RICHBERG'S NEGOTIATIONS
Shortly after the agrarian settlement, 
Richberg's negotiations also challenged Whitehall's 
policy. Due to Washington's cageyness, Whitehall 
had no knowledge of Washington's true motives and 
had to rely on unsatisfactory reports that Starling 
forwarded from the oil companies. As a result, 
Whitehall did not know how to react and ended up 
oscillating between requesting Washington's help 
and being passive, neither of which produced 
anything satisfactory. On the one hand, Balfour 
suspected that Richberg was working with the state 
department to force the oil companies to accept a 
solution that would threaten Britain's access to 
foreign oil in wartime. As he put it, Richberg, a 
government insider, was 'running with the oil 
companies’ hare but hunting with the State 
Department's hounds’.10
On the other hand, Richberg's proposal of a 
commercial treaty with Mexico appealed to Starling 
who believed such a treaty would prevent Cdrdenas 
from taking liberties with foreign interests in 
Mexico, and he dreaded the prospect of Washington 
shutting British interests out of such a 
settlement. The fact that Whitehall could not 
propose a parallel treaty with Mexico because it
10 Balfour, Minute, 21 April 1939, FO 371 22773 
[A2896/4/26].
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lacked diplomatic relations made Starling, one of 
the most vocal supporters of a hard-line policy 
toward Mexico, consider a rapprochement.H  
Although Balfour was tempted by this idea because 
it would allow Britain to negotiate an advantageous 
commercial treaty with Mexico, he was uneasy about 
giving the impression to other countries that 
Mexico had expropriated foreign oil properties with 
impunity.I2
Not wishing to miss out on a commercial 
treaty, Starling, David Scott, Gerald Grey 
Fitzmaurice and Balfour decided to use the imminent 
departure of Fin Lund, the head of the Danish 
legation in Mexico who was representing British 
interests there, as a pretext to ask Washington to 
take his place.13 The Danish government had 
already appointed an able successor for Lund, but 
officials wanted an arrangement with Washington 
that would guarantee a united front between London 
and Washington.14 when Lindsay duly approached 
Welles with this proposal,15 the undersecretary 
gave an unofficial, evasive reply which, however,
1* Balfour, Minute, 13 February, FO 371 22771 [A1135/4/26]. 
12 Balfour, Minute, 5 February 1939, FO 371 22770 
[A863/4/26].
I2 Balfour, Memorandum of a Meeting with Lindsay, Starling, 
Scott and Fitzmaurice, 7 February 1939, FO 371 22770 
[A863/4/26].
14 Balfour, Minute, 13 February 1939, FO 371 22771 
[A1135/4/26].
Balfour, Memorandum of Meeting with Lindsay, Starling 
Scott and Fitzmaurice, 7 February 1939, FO 371 22770 
[A863/4/26].
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reassured Lindsay. He said that Washington would
give 'most friendly consideration to the British
request if and when the need arose to make a
decision'. He also said that the negotiations with
Richberg would probably result in an agreement, and
when they did, 'it would be very easy for the US to
use their good offices with a view to facilitating
the fast resumption of Anglo-Mexican relations.'16
Approximately two months later, however, Welles
told Lindsay that if Richberg's negotiations were
not successful, which seemed likely, the US embassy
would not be able to help British interests.I7
Not only were Balfour and Starling furious
about Welles' latest comment, but they were also
angry that Washington refused to take a strong
diplomatic stand in the matter to end the long
deadlock Richberg was experiencing. Balfour
angrily wrote that Washington
would like to see the Mexican oil 
dispute regulated even on 
unfavourable terms to the companies 
rather than that negotiations 
should drift towards a deadlock 
prejudicial to their p o l i c y . 18
Lindsay to Foreign Office, 20 February 1939, FO 371 22771 
[A1402/4/26]; Memorandum of a Conversation between Lindsay 
and Welles, 20 February 1939, RG 59, Records of the 
Department of State [812.6363/5024].
17 Lindsay to Foreign Office, 19 April 1939, FO 371 22773 
[A2896/4/26].
18 Balfour, Minute, 21 April 1939, FO 371 22773 
[A2896/4/26].
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What made the British situation seem all the worse
was that as Balfour saw it, it was impossible to
suggest such an approach to the state department:
Any such suggestion on our part 
would, I fear, merely lead to 
provoking resentment, and there 
seems to be nothing we can do 
except continue our policy of 
watchful waiting.I9
More than ever London had to be careful about 
approaching Washington. On the one hand, Whitehall 
realised that Roosevelt was anxious to strengthen 
Britain's resolve to defend its own interests 
rather than get the US involved in hostilities.
Even before succeeding Lindsay as ambassador to the 
US, Lord Lothian emphasised to Roosevelt Britain's 
need for US help, thus reinforcing the president's 
suspicions that Whitehall hoped to get the US to 
take on the unpleasant and potentially costly task 
of defending B r i t a i n . 20 on the other hand, in 
spring, Hitler's take-over of Czechoslovakia and 
his rumoured threat to Roumania, Italy's occupation 
of Albania and Japan's blockade of British and 
French concessions at Tientsin in June heightened 
Whitehall's worries that Britain might have to 
fight a war with Italy, Germany and Japan
19 Ibid.
20 Reynolds, David: The Creation of the Analo-American 
Alliance. 1937-41: A Study in Competitive Co-operation 
(London: Europa, 1981), pp. 43-4, 46.
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simultaneously and made Britain desperate to secure 
US cooperation.21
To make matters worse, Washington and London 
blamed each other for the unfortunate circumstances 
surrounding the Japanese blockade. Washington was 
disgusted at Britain's appeasement and believed 
that Whitehall's decision to negotiate with the 
Japanese would stimulate more German aggression. 
Whitehall was not only angry at congress for 
failing to revise the neutrality laws to allow 
implements of war to Britain and its allies in the 
event of hostilities, but was also furious about 
Washington's lack of support against Japan which 
was not forthcoming due to isolationist sentiment 
and concurrent debates in congress on the 
neutrality laws.22
Washington's continued lack of strong action 
when the oil companies were awaiting Cdrdenas to 
get his advisers' analysis on the guide-lines 
Richberg presented in May 1939 and Welles' secrecy 
about policy again raised British suspicions about 
the state d e p a r t m e n t . 23 The fact that Hull had not
!
i yet insisted that the Mexican government return the
21 Ibid., p. 61; Watt, Donald Cameron: How War Came: The 
Immediate Origins of the Second World War. 1938-1939 (New 
York: Pantheon Books, 1989), p 165.
22 MacDonald, C.A.: The United States. Britain and 
Appeasement. 1936-1939 (London and Basingstoke: Macmillan, 
1981), p. 158-64; Parker, R.A.C.: Chamberlain and 
Appeasement: British Policy and the Coming of the Second 
World War (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire and London: 
The Macmillan Press, Ltd., 1993), pp. 251-55.
23 Balfour, Minute, 15 August 1939, FO 371 22775 
[A5627/4/26].
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properties led the British government to believe 
that Washington was still striving to solve the 
matter with the international receivership plan 
Herbert Feis had suggested in April 1938.
According to the plan the Mexican government would 
retain ownership of the properties and let the 
companies operate them and distribute the products. 
Balfour and George Mounsey of the American 
department felt nervous that such a solution would 
give the state department a welcome opportunity to 
break the united front by convincing the American 
companies to agree to such a settlement which would 
squeeze British interests out of Mexico and at the 
same time ruin the chances of Mexican Eagle getting 
the settlement it had hoped f o r . 24
Roosevelt's spontaneous proposal of a 
compromise solution to Welles and Castillo Ndjera 
in Summer 1939 after Richberg's negotiations 
stalemated seemed to vindicate British suspicions 
and infuriate Whitehall f u r t h e r . 25 The proposal, 
Lindsay feared, would not only set a bad example 
and thereby endanger British oil supplies for war, 
but it would also let down British shareholders.2 6 
Halifax angrily remarked, 'The attitude of 
Roosevelt and also to some extent Richberg is...so
24 Mounsey, Minute, 17 August 1939, FO 371 22775 
[A5627/4/26].
25 Balfour, Minute, 4 September 1939, FO 371 22775 
[A5987/4/26].
25 Lindsay to Foreign Office, 15 August 1939, FO 371 22775 
[A5740/4/26].
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fundamentally opposed to both common sense and
equity of the situation.'27
THE BOYCOTT AND ITS CRITICS IN PARLIAMENT
Not only was Washington's policy a great 
source of anxiety for Whitehall during the Richberg 
negotiations, the fact that Washington, despite its 
efforts, had failed to prevent US citizens from 
distributing Mexican oil was also upsetting to 
London. Representatives of the petroleum 
department, the ministry of economic warfare, 
ministry of information, foreign office and Mexican 
Eagle had decided to continue the boycott shortly 
after the start of the war. Starling in particular 
believed the chances of the boycott having the 
intended effect were stronger than before the 
outbreak of war due to the effect of the economic 
blockade in cutting Mexico off from the German 
market which had been so important to Mexico, 
taking 48 per cent of Mexico's oil output.28 
Wartime freight rates, he believed, would most 
likely preclude the Japanese from buying Mexican
27 Foreign Office to Lothian, 23 November 1939, FO 371 22776 
[A8215/4/26].
2® Germany, Italy and the US, according to figures Lorenzo 
Meyer cites, accounted for 48%, 17% and 20% of Mexican oil 
exports during this period [Meyer, Lorenzo: Mexico and the 
United States in the Oil Controversy, 1918-1942 (Austin: 
University of Texas Press, 1972), p. 209].
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oil, and tanker restrictions and rationing would 
prevent Italy, which had taken 17 percent of 
Mexico's output, from increasing purchases of 
Mexican oil. With the increased success of the 
boycott and with British supplies being 
satisfactory, he believed that Cdrdenas would most 
likely consider a reasonable settlement with the
oil companies.29
Even after the start of the war, however, 
Mexico still sold oil to US independent companies, 
which resulted in continued resentment of US 
policy.20 Starling believed that without this leak 
in the boycott Mexico would have no outlet for her 
oil, particularly if Italy were to enter the war 
and the Allied blockade applied to that country.21 
Until it entered the war in June 1940, Italy also 
provided a major leak in the b o y c o t t . 2 2
After the start of the war the boycott became 
a political tool for those in parliament who wanted 
to embarrass the National government. The boycott 
lent itself to such manipulation because its 
success was so difficult to gauge. Information 
came from several different sources such as Mexican 
Eagle, which had its own intelligence network in
29 Foreign Office, Minute, 9 September 1939, FO 371 22775 
[A6165/4/26].
29 Balfour, Minute, 20 December 1939, FO 371 22777 
[A8718/4/26].
21 Starling to Balfour, 31 May 1940, FO 371 24215 
[A3198/57/26].
22 Meyer, p. 201.
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Mexico, and the ministry of economic warfare. Most 
important, it was not clear what it would take in 
terms of economic hardship to bring Cardenas to the 
bargaining table with a settlement the oil 
companies would find reasonable. People, 
therefore, were able to interpret the boycott's 
results in a manner which supported their political 
goals.
Arthur Woodburn, the Labour M.P. for 
Clackmannan, was one such critic. He expressed 
anxieties about Mexican oil going to Germany via 
Italy and blamed the boycott for this disturbing 
trend which he believed was harming Britain's war 
effort.33 Balfour, Starling and R.A. Butler 
responded to the critics by arguing that the 
continuation of the boycott was justified and 
necessary. The ministry of economic warfare denied 
there was any evidence to suggest Italian purchases 
were reaching Hitler and attributed the rise to 
Italy's desire to accumulate oil reserves and 
develop export markets in the Balkans and
Switzerland.34
The fact that Mexico's lack of new equipment 
and technical assistance had forced it to import 
gasoline refined from Mexican crude in the US, 
Balfour argued, indicated the boycott was
33 Balfour, Minute, 30 April 1940, FO 371 24215 
[A3085/57/26].
34 Balfour, Minute, 6 March 1940, FO 371 24213 
[A1305/57/26].
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succeeding.35 More importantly, Whitehall could 
not abandon the boycott because any British 
purchases of Mexican oil would force Britain to 
purchase less from countries like Iran and 
Venezuela because of tanker restrictions. Butler 
in particular did not want to risk alienating those 
countries which needed such oil exports for budget 
revenues and on whom Britain depended for oil 
supplies for defence. He also addressed criticism 
of the boycott by saying that even if Britain 
started to purchase Mexican oil, Whitehall could 
neither prevent Italy from selling oil to Germany 
nor prevent Mexico from supplying oil to Italy.
Even if they were able to prevent such things,
Italy would be able to obtain oil from other 
sources.3 6
CRITICISM OF THE TREASURY AND MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC
WARFARE
The treasury, not present when the ministry of 
information, ministry of economic warfare and 
petroleum department decided to continue the 
boycott after the start of war, began to criticise 
the boycott on the grounds that it was inconsistent 
with its dollar-saving policy. In early September
35 Ibid.
36 Balfour, Minute, 17 May 1940, FO 371 24215 [A3198/57/26] .
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the treasury got the war cabinet's approval of a 
memorandum recommending 'the maximum possible 
restriction of unnecessary imports' payable in 
dollars and other scarce currencies.37 The 
treasury had persuaded the cabinet in July that 
Britain needed to conserve foreign exchange as much 
as possible because of the American Johnson Act of 
1934, which banned loans and credits to belligerent 
nations, and the Neutrality Acts of 1935 and 1937 
which prohibited the export of implements of war to 
b e l l i g e r e n t s .38 Acting on the instructions of the 
exchange requirements committee, T.K. Bewley, an 
assistant secretary in the treasury, wrote to 
Balfour that the importation of oil from the US and 
other sources which required dollars for payment 
was worsening Britain's exchange difficulties. In 
order to conserve dollars to pay for arms, Bewley 
wanted Britain to import oil from Mexico and other 
countries which did not require payment in 
dollars.39
Balfour found Starling adamantly opposed to 
the idea. The treasury's proposal would involve a 
reversal of British policy toward Mexico which, 
they believed, had more of a chance than ever of 
producing the desired results of making an example
37 Bewley to Balfour, 12 September 1939, FO 371 22775 
[A6304/4/26].
38 Reynolds, p. 43, p. 73.
39 Bewley to Balfour, 12 September 1939, FO 371 22775 
[A6304/4/26].
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of Mexico which would discourage other foreign oil 
producing countries from expropriating British oil 
properties. In addition, the petroleum department 
believed that British oil supplies were perfectly 
satisfactory. Starling dismissed Bewley's inquiry 
as 'pro forma ... designed to safeguard the 
Treasury position as regards exchange.' He 
continued, 'any considerations in favour of 
altering our policy on this score were entirely 
outweighed by the political risks involved' and 
that 'now more than ever it was important to take 
steps to prevent other Latin American countries 
from doing the same as Mexico.' Balfour, with 
Starling's approval, replied to Bewley that it 
would be 'inadvisable for the time being ... to 
convey a hint to the Mexican government that we 
would welcome action on their part to settle the 
dispute.'
Although the ministry of economic warfare had 
been represented at the meeting on 8 September at 
which it was decided to continue the boycott, it 
soon became as critical as the treasury of the 
policy. Like the treasury, the ministry of 
economic warfare advocated a policy reversal with 
regard to the boycott within a fortnight of the 
treasury's similar recommendation. The fact that
4® Balfour, Minute, 15 September 1939, FO 371 22775 
[A6304/4/26]; Balfour to Bewley, 18 September 1939, FO 371 
22775 [A6304/4/26].
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Balfour took the ministry’s objections far more
seriously than those of the treasury and was
tempted to agree with them until Starling convinced
him otherwise was most likely due to the
competition for influence between the foreign
office and the treasury.41
Marris of the ministry of economic warfare
wrote to Balfour suggesting that Britain might want
to buy oil from sources other than the United
States and Canada due to concerns about Britain's
exchange difficulties:
In our search for such a source of 
supply we may have to consider 
Mexico before the Mexicans feel 
compelled...to agree to the oil 
companies' terms. If that should 
happen then the interests of the 
companies might conflict with 
those of the country.42
As a compromise, Marris suggested that the British
government agree to buy oil from Mexico for the
duration of the war provided that any agreement
made would not prejudice the rights of British oil
interests.43 Balfour wrote to Starling:
Marris' suggestion might be of 
value as long as it is made clear 
to Mexicans that money retained by 
Britain was not compensation to the 
oil companies who reserve their 
full rights in the matter.44
Balfour, Minute, 15 September 1939, FO 371 22775 
[A6304/4/26].
42 Marris to Balfour, 22 September 1939, FO 371 22776 
[A6542/4/26].
43 Ibid.
44 Balfour to Starling, 29 September 1939, FO 371 22776 
[A6542/4/26].
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Starling, the driving force behind Britain's
continued pursuit of the boycott, however,
convinced Balfour to reject the idea by assuring
him that British supplies of oil were perfectly
adequate for the time being and that the British
government should contemplate purchasing Mexican
oil only if supply difficulties arose.45 starling
was particularly worried about the shortage of
tankers. Buying Mexican oil would mean using
tanker space he would prefer to reserve for oil
from larger oil producers such as Iran and
Venezuela, who would complain if British purchases
slumped and perhaps sell the oil they usually sold
to Britain to other countries. In addition, he
said that since the committee of imperial defence
shortly after the expropriation had approved of the
policy of boycott,
Nothing short of a Cabinet 
decision to the contrary would 
induce the Petroleum Department to 
consent to the lifting of the 
embargo on Mexican oil for which 
in the present circumstances they 
see no occasion whatever from the 
point of view of easing the oil
situation.46
Balfour also silenced the critical voice of 
Consul General Rees of Mexico who was concerned 
about the losses suffered by British businesses 
like Swan Hunter and Turner Brothers Asbestos who
45 starling to Balfour, 2 October 1939, FO 371 22776 
[A6767/4/26].
46 Balfour, Minute, 10 November 1939, FO 371 22667 
[A7571/4/26].
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were cooperating with the boycott. He believed that 
there was a strong case for having the oil 
companies agree to a settlement whereby they would 
receive compensation by controlling Mexican oil 
exports. Balfour, however, did not believe in 
changing policy in present circumstances and 
remarked, 'The loss to British manufacturers is an 
inevitable consequence of the present 
position....'47
CRITICISM OF FRANCE
The French government also continued its 
efforts to change British policy. It made 
representations to both the president of the board 
of trade and the foreign office to secure British 
approval to buy Mexican oil. A French official 
complained to Oliver Stanley, president of the 
board of trade, that while France greatly wanted 
close Franco-British cooperation in the war, it was 
very difficult for France, whose oil imports in the 
opening months of the war fell far below expected 
levels,4® to continue heeding British wishes not to 
buy the cheaper Mexican oil only to see it ending
47 Balfour, Minute, 16 March 1939, FO 371 22772 
[A1980/4/26].
4® Payton-Smith, p. 111.
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up in enemy hands.49 France desperately wanted to 
accept the Mexican government's offer to place all 
of Mexico's production at the disposal of France 
and B r i t a i n . 50 Stanley sought to reassure French 
officials that in the special circumstances created 
by the war, the Allied blockade in particular, the 
boycott would be expected to bring Mexico to heel 
and discourage other countries from repeating the 
Mexican experiment, and he warned that it would be 
a 'grave error' for France to weaken Britain's 
efforts to now.51
Lothian, the British ambassador in Washington, 
also encouraged a change of policy when he 
suggested that Britain re-establish diplomatic 
relations with Mexico as a way toward a possible 
settlement of the oil question. He believed that 
not having diplomatic relations during the war was 
disadvantageous and that having them would improve 
reporting from Mexico and would allow Britain to 
make purchases of Mexican oil to help alleviate the 
dollar s h o r t a g e . 52 Before rejecting Lothian's 
suggestion, Balfour asked C.G. Jarret, a principal
4^ De Monzie to Oliver Stanley, 19 September 1939, FO 371 
22776 [A 6622/4/26].
50 Roche to Foreign Office, 5 October 1939, FO 371 22776 
[A6857/4/26]; Ambassador in Mexico (Daniels) to the 
Secretary of State, 6 September 1939, US Department of 
State: Foreign Relations of the United States: The American 
Republics. Vol. 5, 1939 (Washington, D.C.: United States 
Government Printing Office, 1957), pp. 706-7.
Oliver Stanley to De Monzie, 27 September 1939, FO 371 
22776 [A6622/4/26].
52 Balfour, Minute, 22 November 1939, FO 371 22776 
[A8038/4/26]; Lothian to Balfour, 18 October 1939, FO 371 
22776 [A7789/4/26].
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in the Admiralty, on 13 November 1939 whether the 
handling of wartime problems 'relating to Mexico so 
far as they concern the Admiralty is prejudiced 
owing to the absence of normal diplomatic relations 
in Mexico C i t y . ' 53 while Balfour knew that the 
petroleum board shared Starling's sentiments on 
maintaining the boycott, he needed the approval of 
the admiralty which had had autonomy over procuring 
its own oil supplies since before the outbreak of 
w a r . 54 He was pleased when Jarret indicated that 
the admiralty supported the boycott since Mexico 
supplied only about 2 percent of world production, 
and saw no need for a minister in M e x i c o . 5 5
BRITISH REACTIONS TO US ARBITRATION PROPOSALS
Washington's arbitration proposals to Mexico 
also caused London much anxiety. Balfour viewed 
Roosevelt's letter to Cdrdenas in August 1939 
urging him to accept arbitration for the amount and 
timing of compensation as a potential threat to 
British security because it was too lenient to set 
a negative example to other countries contemplating 
imitating Mexico. Both Balfour and Godber,
53 Balfour to Jarret, 13 November 1939, FO 371 22776 
[A7789/4/26] .
54 Payton-Smith, pp. 77-79.
55 Balfour, Minute, 10 November 1939, FO 371 22776 
[A7789/4/26] .
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managing director of Royal/Dutch Shell, were still 
concerned that the shah of Iran might interpret any 
leniency toward Mexico as a precursor to British 
purchases of Mexican oil at the expense of Iranian 
oil from Abadan and, therefore, try to 'squeeze the 
British petroleum interests if the British 
government were to display weakness in relations to 
M e x i c o ' . 56 The British demand for Iranian oil had 
already decreased substantially after the start of 
war due to the re-routing of tankers around Africa 
after the temporary closure of the Mediterranean to 
Allied shipping, heavy shipping losses due to 
hostilities, and the decrease in demand due to' 
rationing.57
The proposal also made Balfour again suspect 
that Washington wanted to force a settlement on the 
American oil interests. One alternative was to 
remain passive if the state department pushed 
through a settlement involving arbitration without 
them. Balfour rejected this option, however, 
because he was concerned it might also lead to a 
situation in which American interests were being 
compensated from former British assets in M e x i c o . 58 
Unable to make representations to Mexico directly,
56 Balfour, Minute, 22 November 1939, FO 371 22776 
[A8038/4/26].
57 Bamberg, J.H.: The History of the British Petroleum 
Company 1928-1954 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1994), pp. 230-31.
58 Balfour, Minute, 7 February 1940 FO 371 24212 
[A935/57/26].
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he decided that the only option was to try to give 
the illusion of a united front between Washington 
and London as well as among the Anglo-American oil 
interests and hope that it would lead to a 
settlement that was satisfactory to both the oil 
companies and Britain.
The foreign office, therefore, instructed 
Lothian to reiterate to Washington the importance 
of making an example of Mexico to protect oil 
supplies for defence from foreign countries, 
especially Iran.59 After Lothian presented the 
British concerns, Welles no doubt infuriated the 
British when he said that he thought the 
arrangement the US was already proposing would give 
'security against South Americans following 
Mexico's example'. When Lothian asked Welles if he 
did not think that the only basis for solution was 
for the companies to control the operation of their 
properties, Welles agreed but stated that operation 
of the oil properties was a question of national 
honour for the Mexicans.60
The British government and Mexican Eagle 
believed that getting a tribunal to rule on the 
time and method of payment would only lead to 
Mexico finding a way to evade making payments.61
Foreign Office to Lothian, 23 November 1939, FO 371 22776 
[A8038/4/26].
50 Lothian to Foreign Office, 17 November 1939, FO 371 22776 
[A8080/4/26].
51 Balfour, Minute, 22 November 1939, FO 371 22776
[A8038/4/26].
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Officials saw no need for Washington's efforts to 
get Mexico to admit that it could not pay 
compensation when the British found that fact 
obvious. They also felt that the only effective 
course was to be firm and insist that because of 
Mexico's inability to make prompt effective and 
adequate compensation, Mexico must allow the oil 
companies to operate their former properties on a 
long lease and with a contract guaranteeing labour 
conditions and royalties.62
Washington's second arbitration proposal, 
however, was sufficiently vague to give Britain 
hope that Washington was demanding arbitration of 
the expropriation itself, which Britain was 
confident would lead to the return of the oil 
properties. It, therefore, left London afraid that 
Washington would leave the British out of a 
favourable settlement by using the Inter-American 
Arbitration treaty. Balfour and Starling, while 
averse to the idea of arbitration of the amount of 
compensation, approved of the idea of having the 
legality of the expropriation arbitrated so long as 
the arbitration tribunal had the authority to 
restore properties to the control of the 
companies.63 Lothian was adamant that arbitration
62 Lothian to Foreign Office, 14 December 1939, FO 371 22777 
[A9117/4/26].
63 Lothian to Foreign Office, 30 January 1940, FO 371 24212 
[A758/57/26]; Foreign Office to Lothian, 3 February 1940, FO 
371 24212 [A758/57/26].
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must include British and American oil interests at
the same time because:
Otherwise the Mexican government 
could either refuse to arbitrate 
... about British properties or 
refuse to fulfil the award and 
compensate American ones out of 
British estates.64
Before Mexico's rejection, Starling and 
Balfour used direct approaches to Washington and 
indirect ones via the American oil companies. The 
foreign office instructed Lothian to tell Hull on 
30 January 1940 that if Washington and Mexico City 
were to use an impartial tribunal which would rule 
on whether the Mexican government had to return the 
properties to the management of the companies, the 
British government would wish to be a part of such 
arbitration. When Lothian raised the issue the 
same day, Hull said the arbitration agreement would 
only apply to American properties at first, and it 
was up to the companies to insist on simultaneous 
arbitration.65 Godber then tried to capitalize on 
the strength of the Anglo-American oil interests' 
united front by encouraging Standard Oil of New 
Jersey to persuade the state department to pursue 
single arbitration.66 william Farish tried his 
best to protest against the state department's
64 Lothian to Foreign Office, 30 January 1940 , FO 371 24212 
[A758/57/26].
65 Ibid.
66 Balfour, Minute, 2 February 1940, FO 371 24212
[A758/57/26].
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proposal which excluded British and Dutch 
interests, but to no avail.67
Once again Lothian informed Welles on 9 
February 1940 that the British hoped the state 
department would arrange for a tribunal to have the 
authority to restore the properties to the 
management of the oil companies. In such a case, 
the British government hoped that it would be able 
to deal with both American and British c l a i m s . 68 
When Lothian referred to the united front between 
Britain and the United States in dealing with the 
expropriation, Welles bluntly denied that 'there 
had...been anything remotely resembling a “united 
front" between the governments of the US and 
B r i t a i n . ’69 He also angrily rejected the idea that 
British and American claims should be dealt with 
simultaneously by the same arbitration tribunal.70 
Starling was deeply worried about Washington's 
reaction and the prospect of it using the Inter- 
American Arbitration treaty, which would 'squeeze 
out British and Dutch interest'. He had hoped to 
convince the state department to use a tribunal
^7 Lothian to Foreign Office, 16 February 1940, FO 371 24213 
[A1251/57/26].
Lothian to Foreign Office, 10 February 1940, FO 371 24213 
[A1437/57/26].
69 Memorandum of a Conversation by the Under Secretary of 
State (Welles), 9 February 1940, US Department of State: 
Foreign -.Relations _<af -the.. .United StatesThe .American 
Republics. Vol. 5, 1939 (Washington, D.C.: United States 
Government Printing Office, 1957), pp. 994-6.
70 Lothian to Foreign Office, 10 February 1940, FO 371 24213 
[A1437/57/26J.
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composed of three judges from the permanent court 
of international justice at the Hague.7^
Washington's unhelpful responses to Britain at 
this time are consistent with the resentment of the 
state department, particularly of Welles and Berle, 
at what seemed to be British efforts to use 
economic warfare to harm American trade during the 
winter of 1939-1940. The blockade had greatly 
reduced the amount of surplus agricultural crops 
Britain had purchased from the American South and 
Middle West, and to make matters worse, Whitehall 
announced that it would be importing more 
agricultural products from Turkey and Greece 
largely to prevent them from becoming too tied to 
Germany. Hull feared for the future of his trade 
agreements programme because he believed that the 
diminished purchases, which sometimes violated the 
1938 trade agreement with Britain, might lead 
congress to reject renewal of the Trade Agreements 
Act in Spring.72 In addition, Washington greatly 
resented Britain disrupting American trade by 
diverting neutral ships for inspection at 
contraband control bases, while Italian ships 
seemed to go through with far more ease than 
American ones. Britain's drive to increase its
7  ^ Starling to Balfour, 19 February 1940, FO 371 24213 
[A1414/57/26].
72 After a spirited Congressional debate, Hull managed to 
get the act renewed. See Steward, Dick: Trade and 
Hemisphere; The Good Neighbor Policy and Reciprocal Trade 
(Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1975), pp. 183-184.
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exports particularly in Latin America in early 1940 
raised Washington's suspicion that Britain was 
building a trading zone based on the pound and the 
franc which excluded the U S .73
Whitehall greatly resented the Johnson Act as 
well as the neutrality laws which by 1940 only 
allowed Britain access to American arms and 
implements of war on a cash and carry basis. 
Whitehall was also angry about Roosevelt's pan- 
American neutrality zone, formalized at the pan- 
American conference in Panama in September 1939.
The so called declaration of Panama delineated an 
area from 300 to 1,000 miles off the Atlantic Coast 
south of Canada, and signatories were to keep watch 
on the area to keep it free of belligerent vessels. 
The zone did nothing to help Britain, and it 
prevented the Allies from effectively controlling 
contraband from their bases in the C a r i b b e a n . 7 ^ 
Whitehall officials also strongly disagreed 
with the idea of Welles' mission to Italy, Germany, 
France and Great Britain to stop the fighting in 
Europe, because they believed it was an early 
attempt at American peace making which would be 
done strictly to the advantage of the US.
Whitehall suspected that Roosevelt was using it to 
secure a victory for the Democratic party in the
7  ^ Reynolds, pp. 67-8.
74 Medlicott, W.N.: The Economic Blockade (London: HMSO, 
1959), pp. 329-31.
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next presidential election. Successfully stopping 
a war would greatly enhance his position at home, 
but Roosevelt did not seem to think about the 
effect of the visit on the Allies. Not only would 
it give the impression that peace was near and, 
therefore, encourage Scandinavian neutrals not to 
support the Allies in sending aid to the Finns who 
were defending themselves against Russia, but it 
would also give Germany hope at a time when the 
prime minister harboured hopes Germany would 
collapse under the economic strain of the 
blockade.75
Reactions to Welles' impending visit showed 
how unpopular he was in London. R.A. Butler 
suggested that Whitehall 'twist Welles' tail* with 
regard to Mexico when he arrived. Balfour, 
however, rejected the idea because 'he possesses 
in this respect an iron tail with a spike at the 
end of it!'76 David Scott agreed with Balfour and 
minuted:
At no stage has Welles shown the 
slightest inclination to deviate 
from the path he has chosen in 
order to help British interests ...
I don't think that he is any more 
likely now than before to want to 
be kind to us over this
question.77
75 Reynolds., pp. 80-83.
16 Balfour, Minute, 28 February 1940, F0 371 24213 
[A1471/57/26].
77 David Scott, Minute, 1 March 1940, FO 371 24213 
[A1643/57/26].
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Balfour blamed him for Washington's insistence upon
separate arbitration, and minuted:
The arguments in favour of single 
arbitration are vigorously and 
clearly put and show what a deaf 
adder Welles is. I fear his ears 
are utterly clogged with the dust 
of self esteem.7®
BRITISH REACTIONS TO THE SINCLAIR SETTLEMENT
A fortnight after Lothian reported that the 
Mexican government had rejected arbitration,7  ^ the 
British government learned that the state 
department had again proposed the settlement of the 
oil issue by allowing a tribunal to determine the 
amount of compensation the Mexican government owed 
the American nationals. The Americans did not 
propose a specific treaty for arbitration, but they 
did exclude European interests. Balfour complained 
with understatement, 'This proposal... tends to put 
compensation in the forefront rather than the 
restoration of the properties.'®0 Lothian was 
cross that the state department had not warned him 
about its new note to M e x i c o . B a l f o u r  commented
78 Balfour, Minute, 3 March 1940, FO 371 24213 
[A1437/57/26].
79 Lothian to Foreign Office, 22 March 1940, FO 371 24214 
[A2135/57/26].
80 Balfour, Minute, 17 April 1940, FO 371 24215 
[A2822/57/26].
81 Lothian to Foreign Office, 5 April 1940, FO 371 24215 
[A2557/57/26].
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that the US proposal of arbitration was symptomatic 
of 'US caution to avoid any accusation of joint 
action with the British government'. He was 
particularly disappointed in the state department's 
'cageyness' which in this case manifested itself in 
Hull’s omitting in a letter to mention US plans for 
the third arbitration proposal. On 3 April, the 
same day as the US note to Mexico, the British had 
sent Washington a letter saying that they were 
pleased 'the question of arbitration was not a live 
issue'. As Balfour angrily wrote, '[Hull] must 
surely have smiled on reading [it].'82
The Sinclair agreement which the Mexican 
government announced at the same time that it 
received the US note also infuriated the British 
government. The agreement which involved the 
payment of compensation in oil and dollars in an 
amount which the major oil companies believed sadly 
undervalued Sinclair's former properties was a set­
back for them and the British government. The 
agreement, as Lothian acknowledged, greatly 
strengthened Mexico’s position.83 starling feared 
that the state department in its determination to 
resolve the matter would put pressure on American
82 Balfour, Minute, 17 April 1940, FO 371 24215 
[A2822/57/26].
88 Lothian to Foreign Office, 7 May 1940, FO 371 24215 
[A3198/57/26].
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oil interests to agree to a settlement like 
Sinclair' s . 84
The worries that the petroleum department had 
expressed while the Sinclair agreement was being 
negotiated became justified after the agreement was 
announced. By providing compensation it 
invalidated the argument that the Mexican 
government had committed an injustice by not paying 
compensation. The agreement eased the effects of 
the boycott which was so important to the success 
of British p o l i c y . 85 The British concern about the 
possibility of American oil interests being 
compensated from former British properties also 
turned out to be justified because much of the 
Mexican oil that Sinclair was to receive came from 
the Poza Rica field.86
In conclusion, although Balfour and Starling 
seemed ruthless in their continued willingness to 
sacrifice the interests of British companies such 
as Swan Hunter and Turner Brothers Asbestos by 
forcing them to adhere to the boycott, Britain's 
potentially dangerous oil situation justified their 
attempts to harm Mexico economically in order to 
set an example for other nations not to follow.
starling to Foreign Office, 31 May 1940, FO 371 24215 
[A3198/57/26].
Petroleum Department to Foreign Office, 11 March 1940, FO 
371 24215 [A2680/57/26].
86 Collins to Secretary of State, 18 May 1940, RG 59,
Records of the Department of State [812.6363/6887].
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While officials were not optimistic about a return 
to the status quo ante, they strove to give the 
appearance of causality between Mexico's economic 
problems and the expropriation.
Despite the short-sightedness of O'Malley's 
policy described in chapter four, maintaining 
diplomatic relations with Mexico would probably 
have helped Whitehall only marginally. Relations 
would certainly have given Britain the option to 
make a parallel appeal to Mexico to try to give the 
illusion of a united front. However, it is 
doubtful again whether Mexican nationalism would 
have allowed a response that was helpful to 
Britain. It is also questionable whether Britain 
could have kept up such an appearance because 
Whitehall, as seen in chapter four, for most of the 
time knew relatively little about US policy.
Having relations, however, would have made the 
British less obviously reliant on Washington at a 
time when it was not in Britain's favour to appear 
so dependent on US help. This fact alone, however, 
was not important enough to alter Anglo-American 
relations at the time. The most diplomatic 
relations with Mexico could do would have been to 
reduce the anxiety of officials in Whitehall by 
offering the assurance that they could negotiate 
directly with Mexico when the need arose.
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
THE AMERICAN SETTLEMENT:
MAY 1940-OCTOBER 1943
An unfriendly Mexico, as it was from 1914 to 1918, 
could create manifold and difficult problems for 
us. 1
Laurence Duggan
Hitler's renewed aggression in May 1940 
heightened Roosevelt's apprehension that Hitler's 
ambitions stretched well across the Atlantic and 
into South America, a convenient location from 
which Germany could launch air attacks on the 
United States or the Panama Canal. Reminiscent of 
the worries he had expressed in a press conference 
in November 1938,2 he publicly stated that Hitler's 
goal of striking such targets would be alarmingly 
easy to achieve if the Nazi fifth column in Mexico 
or any country in Latin America established a 
strong economic presence, infiltrated the 
government or established a puppet regime after
1 Duggan to Welles, 12 June 1940, RG 59, Records of the 
Department of State [711.12/1482], quoted in Cronon, E. 
David: Josephus Daniels in Mexico (Madison: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1960), p. 258.
2 White House Press Conference, 15 November 1938, RG 59, 
Records of the Department of State [710.H Continental 
Solidarity/2].
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staging a coup.3 His limited means to address the 
problems of allegedly growing Nazi influence in the 
area and the possibility of a Nazi military attack 
led him to take more interest in military 
cooperation with Mexico to combat threats from this 
direction.4 Specifically he hoped to establish 
bases on Mexico's Pacific coast, an ideal location 
for aircraft to refuel before making counter 
attacks against possible enemy action in the Panama 
Canal or other vulnerable sites in Latin America.5 
Such bases would also be tremendously helpful in 
keeping sea routes open.6
In June 1940 Roosevelt's plans became 
complicated when President Cdrdenas insisted that 
full military cooperation between the US and Mexico
3 The evidence of Nazi designs on South and Central America 
is far from convincing. The map of Central and South 
American that Roosevelt claimed in October 1941 to be proof 
of Hitler's plans to divide the area into five vassal states 
was later proved to be bogus. [Kimball, Warren F. : '"The 
Juggler": Franklin D. Roosevelt and Anglo-American 
Competition in Latin America' in di Telia, Guido and Watt, 
Donald Cameron, (eds.): Argentina Between the Great Powers.
1939-46 (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan, 
1989), p. 23; Gellman, Irwin: "The New Deal's Use of Nazism 
in Latin America" in Davids, Jules (ed.): Perspectives in 
American Diplomacy (New York: Arno Press, 1976), pp.197-8].
 ^ Roosevelt, Message to Congress, 16 May 1940, Address to 
the University of Virginia, 10 June 1940 in Rosenman, Samuel 
i.: Xhs,..Pufc>lic Papers ...and..Addresses, of FranKlin 
Roosevelt. 1940 vol. (London, Macmillan & Co., 1941), pp. 
198-205, pp. 259-64.
5 Hayes, Grace Person: The History of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff in World War II (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute 
Press, 1982), p. 4.
6 Meyer, Lorenzo: Mexico and the United States in the Oil 
Controversy. 1918-1942 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 
1972), pp. 217-18.
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depended on a resolution of all outstanding issues 
between the two countries.7 These included 
settling the claims resulting from Mexico's 
expropriation of American railroads, agrarian lands 
and oil properties. Despite concerns for defence, 
a settlement was not reached for nearly a year and 
a half, and this delay was due to Washington's 
refusal to abandon completely the cause of US firms 
with interests in Mexico. In pursuing such a 
policy, David Cronon in Josephus Daniels in Mexico 
remarks, the state department treated Mexican 
officials so offensively in the weeks before the 
settlement that the Mexican president nearly broke 
off relations with Washington, and it was only 
after the intervention of Josephus Daniels, he 
argues, that the agreement was signed and relations 
between the two countries saved.®
The purpose of this chapter is first to fill 
two main gaps in the existing literature on the 
Mexican oil nationalisation. First, this last 
chapter of the US side of the story explains why 
Washington did not subordinate commercial interests 
completely to defence after the end of the phoney 
war and when Cdrdenas made military cooperation 
contingent on a settlement of the oil issue. To do
7 Chapin, Memorandum of a Conversation, 11 June 1940, RG 59, 
Records of the Department of State, [812.20/222 1/2].
® Cronon, p. 270.
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so it is necessary to analyse Washington's policy ' 
towards Mexico in the wider context of the 
administration's concerns about German and Japanese 
aggression as opposed to the more obvious and 
narrow context of Mexican-American defence 
cooperation which the literature so far has done.9 
It is only by approaching the issue from this 
standpoint that the role of Ambassador Daniels in 
the settlement can be assessed. Second, the oil 
companies, despite the Sinclair agreement, did not 
abandon their determination to manage their former 
properties. Existing accounts mention that the 
companies objected to the eventual settlement of 
November 1941 which failed to provide this and 
refused to cooperate with it. However, the 
literature so far neglects to give a satisfactory 
explanation of why the oil companies did eventually 
agree to this settlement nearly two years after it 
was signed.
This chapter makes two arguments about 
Washington's policy. First, the continuing efforts 
Cordell Hull and Sumner Welles to strike a balance
^See, for example, Cronon, E. David: Josephus Daniels in 
Mexico: Koppes, Clayton: "The Good Neighbor Policy and the 
Nationalization of Mexican Oil," Journal of American History 
(June 1982); Meyer, Lorenzo: Mexico and the United States
in the Oil Controversy. 1918-1942 ; Wood, Bryce: The Making 
of the Good Neighbor Policy (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1961); Yergin, Daniel: The Prize: The Epic Quest for 
Oil. Money and Power (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991), pp. 
271-279.
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between the conflicting commercial and defence 
concerns with regard to Mexico were mainly 
responsible for the delay in reaching an oil 
settlement with Mexico, but only up until mid-1941. 
Preoccupied with defence, Roosevelt, as usual, paid 
only intermittent attention to the Mexican oil 
issue and left the settlement of outstanding issues 
with Mexico mainly to Welles and Hull. The 
standards both had set for relations between 
countries made them reluctant to make concessions 
to Mexico, and they still felt an obligation to use 
the oil problem to establish a norm for relations 
between countries based on fair treatment of 
American commercial interests abroad. Concerns 
about the Nazi threat and the precedent set by the 
Sinclair settlement, however, led them to 
compromise somewhat to secure Mexican military 
cooperation. In order to ensure that a compromise 
would not harm the cause of commercial concerns 
operating in Mexico, Hull thought it was imperative 
to secure the agreement of the oil companies, who 
were furious about the state department's 
willingness to compromise and were insisting on the 
return of their properties.
Second, the change in the strategic picture 
after June 1941 brought a subtle but important 
shift in the state department's tactics. With
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Hitler involved in war with Russia and progress 
being made on defence cooperation with Mexico, the 
department appreciated that insisting on an oil 
agreement acceptable to the oil companies did not 
risk compromising US defence needs. Hull and 
Welles, therefore, delayed progress toward an 
agreement while they tried to persuade the oil 
companies to accept an agreement with Mexico. In 
delaying the settlement, however, Hull and Welles 
angered the Mexican president to such a degree that 
he considered recalling his ambassador from 
Washington. The lack of communication between Hull 
and Welles made the management of US policy much 
worse. Only the intervention of Daniels ended the 
stalemate.
The events covered in this chapter are as 
follows. First, Roosevelt's changes in the 
division of responsibility for making foreign 
policy will be described. Examining this issue is 
essential to understand why there was an almost 
total lack of coordination between Hull and Welles 
in the weeks leading up to the oil settlement. 
Second, factors in the spring and summer of 1940 
that influenced policy in incompatible directions 
will be seen. Third, it will be shown that 
Washington's response to these factors, in 
particular Cdrdenas' determination to get a
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settlement of the oil matter before full military 
cooperation could be established, was to start 
recognising Mexican nationalist sentiment but at 
the same time to persist with a policy which did 
not lose sight of US commercial interests.
Fourth, it will be seen that after Vice 
President-elect Henry Wallace's mission to Mexico, 
Roosevelt became involved in the Mexican matter, 
and as a result the state department, Welles in 
particular, keen as ever to improve his political 
standing, took a softer line toward Mexico. Fifth 
it will be seen that after June 1941 Hull and 
Welles, after the temporary, decreased involvement 
of Roosevelt, became more willing to risk 
alienating Mexico to buy time to persuade the oil 
companies to compromise with Mexico, and only 
renewed involvement from the president got Hull to 
finalise a settlement with Mexico. Last, the 
settlement and Harold Ickes' attempts to oppose the 
state department's policy will be described and the 
reasons for the oil companies' delayed acceptance 
of the Mexican-American agreement given.
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FOREIGN POLICY-MAKING
Just before summer 1940, the division of 
responsibility for foreign policy changed. The 
state department had functioned for several years 
with Welles overseeing Latin American affairs while 
Hull managed most Asian and European matters. 
Roosevelt, however, who had decided to play a 
larger role in foreign policy, changed that 
structure by relying increasingly upon Welles to 
carry out most of his directives in foreign policy.
He chose Welles rather than Hull for the European 
mission in February and March 1940, and when the 
president casually mentioned in early July that he 
planned to seek a third term, Hull was devastated 
and even considered resigning a few months later.10 
In addition, Welles controlled policy toward Mexico 
more than ever with Hull's long absences due to 
illness and his activities with the Japanese. What 
feelings of personal enmity that existed between 
the secretary and undersecretary certainly grew 
with the president's changes, and Welles neglected 
to keep Hull informed on matters as well as he 
should have.
I® Gellman, Irwin F.: Secret Affairs; Franklin Roosevelt. 
Cordell Hull and Sumner Welles (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1995), pp. 174-5, pp. 215-7.
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FACTORS INFLUENCING POLICY
On the one hand congressional criticism of the 
administration's policy and the results of the 
Mexican elections, which brought no promise of 
change in Mexico's policy on the oil properties, 
encouraged the administration to take a firmer 
policy towards Mexico. On the other hand, the fall 
of France, the failure of the cartel plan, 
Roosevelt's defence considerations, the Sinclair 
settlement and the results of Mexico's presidential 
election made a more lenient policy seem 
appropriate and necessary. While the Mexican issue 
was not a big factor in the elections of 1940, 
nevertheless congressional opinion could not be 
ignored. Roosevelt still faced opposition from 
conservative Democrats and Republicans, and after 
he decided to run for a third term, he replaced his 
secretaries of navy and war, whom he believed 
incompetent, with Frank Knox and Henry Stimson 
respectively. Not only did he need their 
expertise, but the fact that they were both 
Republicans helped placate some of the 
opposition.11
H  Leuchtenburg, William E.: Franklin D. Roosevelt and the 
New Deal, 1932-40 (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), p. 301; 
Gellman, p. 215.
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Democratic Representative Thomas C. Hennings, 
Jr. of Missouri called for the government to set 
punishments for violations of the rights under 
international law of US citizens, who had invested 
in farm lands, railways and oil properties in 
Mexico. He was also concerned about the resulting 
worsening of Mexican-American relations and the 
possible spread of what he thought were Mexico’s 
socialist tendencies, which in his view threatened 
the peace of the hemisphere. Concerned that 
congress had done nothing despite many complaints 
of US citizens about Mexico's confiscatory policy, 
on 3 April 1940 he presented resolution 545, which 
called for congress to appoint a committee to 
investigate both Mexico's actions and how they had 
affected US citizens. It also raised alarm at the 
possibility of the Mexican government's policies 
spreading and threatening democracy in the western 
hemisphere.12 Hennings' resolution was clearly an 
embarrassment to Welles who evaded a reporter's 
question in a press conference about whether he 
welcomed the investigation Hennings' had proposed. 
When a correspondent commented that he understood 
that Hennings had asked the attitude of the
12 Speech of Congressman Thomas C. Hennings, 3 May 1940, RG 
59, Records of the Department of State, [812.6363/6847]; 
Hennings, 3 May 1940, Congressional Record. House of 
Representatives, (Washington, D.C.; United States Government 
Printing Office, 1940), v. 86 (part 5), Congress 76, session 
3 .
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department before making the proposal, Welles 
indicated that that was not the c a s e . 13
Republican Representative Dewey Short, who 
presented a similar resolution, was also openly 
critical of how both the president and the state 
department had treated Mexico after the 
expropriation. He bluntly said that what Mexico 
had done amounted to confiscation because no 
agreement about compensation had been reached 
before the expropriation of properties. Given what 
he thought was such a belligerent act, he argued 
that it was ridiculous for the president to keep 
calling the Mexican government a good neighbour.
In addition, the state department's suggestion of 
arbitration seemed ridiculous to him because, he 
argued, robbery could not be arbitrated. He 
proposed that the only viable alternative for the 
Mexican government was to return the properties 
because Mexico’s debt and financial conditions 
would preclude payment in full of the value of the 
confiscated properties. He proposed exactly what 
the major oil companies had wanted and even 
suggested that in the event Mexico did not
13 Memorandum of a Press Conference, 4 May 1940, Papers of 
Cordell Hull.
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cooperate, congress vote to stop US treasury 
purchases of Mexican silver.
Despite the arguments of congress, it had 
become hopeless for the state department to expect 
that they could effect much change by being firm 
with Mexico. The companies' favoured candidate, 
General Juan Andreu Almazdn had failed to win the 
violently contested Mexican presidential election 
of 7 July 1940. Although the conservative general 
had promised never to surrender to foreign oil 
interests, most foreign oil companies believed this 
was mere campaign rhetoric.15 By Summer 1940, most 
importantly, the Sinclair settlement had made the 
chances of the oil companies returning to Mexico to 
manage their former oil properties plummet.
The failure of the Latin American cartel plan, 
designed to keep important products from the region 
away from the Axis and to prevent the furthering of 
Axis trade links with Latin American countries, 
increased concern about Axis activities in the 
region. The state department in June 1940 had 
proposed a plan which provided for an inter- 
American trading corporation to purchase exports of 
the participating countries and market them in
1^ Dewey Short, 6 May 1940, Congressional Record. House of 
Representatives, (Washington, D.C.: United States Government 
Printing Office, 1940), v. 86 (part 5) Congress 76, session
3.
15 Cronon, pp. 255-6.
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Europe. The plan, however, came up against stiff 
opposition both within the United States and 
abroad. Not only were American domestic interests 
and European powers opposed to it, but Latin 
American states, especially Argentina, rejected the 
plan at the Havana conference in July for fear it 
would make their economies all the more dependent 
on the United States. ^  The plan's failure 
coincided with intelligence reports about offers 
German officials made to Mexico City to barter 
aviation material and British Honduras for Mexican 
petroleum after a German victory.
Roosevelt's anxiety about the alleged Nazi 
menace in the western hemisphere was based partly 
on a geopolitical conception of the world to which 
he was exposed while he served as assistant 
secretary of the navy during World War I. While 
Roosevelt was sincere in his anxiety about Hitler, 
he greatly exaggerated the Nazi military threat to 
South America. He calculated that linking the need 
to check Hitler's aggression with hemispheric 
defence would win domestic approval for measures
16 Steward, Dick: Trade and Hemisphere: The Good Neighbor 
Policy and Reciprocal Trade (Missouri: Columbia University 
Press, 1975), p. 274.
17 Naval Attache to State Department, 19 July 1940, RG 59,
Records of the Department of State [812.6363/7070];
Commander W.M. Dillon, Naval Attache's Report, 25 August
1939, RG 38, Records of the Chief of Naval Operations,
Office of Naval Intelligence; Justice Department to the
State Department, 29 September 1939, RG 59, Records of the
Department of State [812.6363/6207].
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such as rearmament and assisting the British, whose 
Atlantic fleet he claimed was useful for protecting 
the approaches to the western hemisphere by sea 
from attack.
Roosevelt's focus on geopolitics was apparent 
in his message to congress on 16 May 1940. Because 
of the accelerated pace of warfare due to the use 
of aircraft, he feared that the Atlantic and 
Pacific oceans were no longer adequate barriers of 
defence for the United States and that further 
measures were necessary to protect the western 
hemisphere. He calculated the flying time for 
enemy attacks on the United States from every 
possible angle and concluded that Germany could use 
locations such as Bermuda, Tampico on the Gulf of 
Mexico, and points in the West Indies as 
penultimate landing bases from which to attack the 
United States in three and a half hours or l e s s .
The memory of US-Mexican relations during 
World War I caused further concern. As Laurence 
Duggan stated, 'An unfriendly Mexico, as it was 
from 1914 to 1918, could create manifold and
Gellman, Irwin: "The New Deal's Use of Nazism in Latin 
America" in Davids, Jules (ed.): Perspectives in American 
Diplomacy (New York: Arno Press, 1976), p. 194.
Franklin Roosevelt, Message to Congress, 16 May 1940 in 
Rosenman, S.I. (ed.): The Public Papers and Addresses of 
Franklin D. Roosevelt. 1940 Volume (London: Macmillan & 
Co., Ltd., 1941), pp. 198-205.
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difficult problems for u s . ' 2 0 The war had 
demonstrated the necessity of oil for victory, and 
by the end of the war, Mexican supplies had proved 
vital to the Allies. The Allies during the war, 
however, had not felt secure about continued access 
to Mexican oil due to President Carranza's 
neutrality and his precarious relationship with 
Washington. By summer 1917 US and Allied needs for 
oil were severely straining supplies, and in the 
same year both the Zimmermann telegram, which 
raised the possibility of Germany forming an 
alliance with Mexico, and the Mexican Constitution 
of 1917, which potentially threatened foreign 
access to oil, made the Allies all the more 
anxious.21
WASHINGTON'S COMPROMISE POLICY
Despite Mexico City's anti-fascist leaning and 
its support in the declarations of Panama and 
Havana in September 1939 and the following J u l y , 22
20 Cronon, p. 258.
21 Nash, G.D.: United States Oil Policy (Pittsburgh: 
University of Pittsburgh Press, 1968) pp. 23-4.
22 Mexico was a particularly unlikely country to fall under 
Nazi influence because the governments of Lazaro Cardenas 
and his successor Manuel Avila Camacho leaned heavily toward 
socialism. On 11 June 1940 the Mexican Ambassador to 
Washington Francisco Castillo Najera expressed Cardenas' 
general interest in cooperating with Washington and 
governments of other American republics for hemispheric
320
the Mexican president's announcement in June 1940 
that full military cooperation could not be 
achieved without first resolving outstanding 
matters between the two countries came at the 
height of Washington's concern about Nazi activity 
on the South American continent. Instead of 
putting defence as their main priority, however, 
Hull and Welles reacted by trying both to meet 
Mexico's demands adequately to achieve increased 
defence relations and to demonstrate the failure of 
Mexico's expropriation by arranging for the 
companies to return to Mexico to operate their 
former properties. A note drafted by Herbert 
Bursley on 7 October offered US help to stabilize 
the ailing Mexican peso, to resume direct monthly 
purchases of Mexican silver, and to consider 
extending the necessary credits to finish the Pan­
defense. He also estimated the total number of Germans in 
Mexico to be merely 6,000 and discounted the possibility of 
subversive activities organized by foreign totalitarian 
nations presenting a viable threat to continental security. 
[Chapin, Memorandum of a Conversation, 11 June 1940, RG 59, 
Records of the Department of State [812.20/222 1/2]. 
Intelligence reports and the conferences in both Panama and 
Havana, in September 1939 and July 1940 respectively, 
offered further evidence of inter-American solidarity 
against the Nazi threat.[For example see W.M. Dillon, Naval 
Attache's Report, 18 June 1940, RG 38, Records of the Chief 
of Naval Operations; Earl S. Piper, Intelligence Report, 31 
October 1941, RG 226, Records of the Office of Strategic 
Services.] Despite these factors, Washington believed it was 
still possible, before Hitler attacked Russia, for Germany 
to attack Mexico and any other point in South America. In 
addition, Washington needed concrete proof that Mexico City 
was anti-fascist in the form of some kind of military 
agreement with the United States before officials could be 
confident of Mexico as an ally.
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American highway. In return, Bursley wanted Mexico 
to pay the US $40 million in instalments to settle 
all claims apart from oil. He also wanted the 
Mexican government to renew service on the public 
and railway d e b t s . 23
Bursley knew that the expropriated oil 
companies were insisting on running their former 
oil properties without interference from the 
Mexican government even if only for a limited 
period of time. He also realized that the oil 
issue was deeply rooted in Mexican nationalism and 
that Mexico would flatly reject the idea of 
surrendering control of the industry to foreigners. 
As a compromise, he proposed that the Mexican 
government compensate the oil companies in cash or 
oil in exchange for the companies' 'expert 
s e r v i c e s ' . 24 He hoped that being vague about 
control of the oil industry would eventually lead 
to a compromise both parties could accept. His 
plan, however, was destined to fail due to the 
stubbornness of both sides. In its memorandum of 
16 November 1940 the Mexican government indicated 
its desire for a settlement of the oil issue 
similar to that of S i n c l a i r . 2 5
22 Adolf Berle, Draft of a Note to Mexico City, 11 October 
1940, Diary, Papers of A. Berle.
24 Ibid.
25 Mexican Government, Memorandum, 16 November 1940, Papers 
of Josephus Daniels.
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By far the biggest obstacle to an agreement, 
however, was the unrealistic attitude of the oil 
companies. Despite the fact that by summer 1940 
the companies' chances of returning to Mexico to 
manage their former oil companies had decreased 
even further largely due to the Sinclair 
settlement, they refused to abandon their 
objective. In addition, as the oil companies had 
feared, the new government of President Manuel 
Avila Camacho proved no more amenable to the oil 
companies' solution of the oil issue than that of 
Cdrdenas. The fact that the oil companies insisted 
on leaving things unsettled rather than accepting a 
settlement that would set an unfavourable precedent 
for their oil properties in other foreign countries 
made the state department's job of trying to 
bargain with them extremely difficult.
THE WALLACE MISSION
President-elect Camacho's invitation to 
Roosevelt to attend his inauguration in December 
1940, led to Roosevelt's increased involvement in 
solving outstanding matters between the two 
countries and a softening of Washington's attitude 
toward Mexico. For several months Daniels had
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thought a visit from Roosevelt, who he believed 
embodied the Good Neighbor policy, would improve 
relations dramatically with Mexico, 'our front door 
to the south and our back door of any enemy.'26 
Because Roosevelt's wartime schedule greatly 
restricted his travel, however, he sent Vice 
President Elect Henry Wallace, secretary of 
agriculture, with the rank of ambassador 
extraordinary and plenipotentiary to the ceremony. 
Wallace proved to be an excellent choice to send to 
Mexico because he had, in his capacity as secretary 
of agriculture, realised for several years the need 
for strong relations with Latin American countries. 
He believed that increased importation of Latin 
American raw materials which had the advantage of 
being conveniently located for the US, would expand 
US export trade and check further economic 
penetration of the region by Japan and G e r m a n y . 27 
while in Mexico, Wallace did his best to pave the 
way for a reciprocal trade agreement with M e x i c o . 2 8  
While no concrete steps were taken toward such an 
agreement, he was very well received and took great 
strides toward fostering Mexican goodwill. Most
26 Daniels to Roosevelt, March 1940, Papers of Josephus 
Daniels.
27 Henry Wallace to Bell, 25 April 1938, RG 59, Records of 
the Department of State [812.6363/6309].
28 Bursley to Bonsai, Welles and Hull, 30 December 1940, RG 
59, Records of the Department of State [812.001 Camacho, 
Manuel A./116].
324
importantly for US policy, he came to the 
conclusion, which he communicated to President 
Roosevelt in a letter of 26 December 1940, that 
circumstances were propitious to a settlement of 
all outstanding questions with M e x i c o . 29
Wallace's assessment of the situation 
encouraged Roosevelt, who had been involved in 
military talks with Mexico, to become involved in 
the diplomatic negotiations between the two 
countries. Welles, missing no opportunity to work 
closely with the president, drafted the president's 
response to Wallace in which he blamed the 
companies for obstructing a settlement with the 
Mexican government. In particular he blamed the 
unwillingness of Standard Oil to consider any 
solution that did not involve its return to manage 
its former properties for the failure of the 
Mexican government and the companies to come to a 
compromise and concluded that it was time for the 
two governments to negotiate a solution to the 
p r o b l e m . 30 The sentiments in the letter were 
certainly a departure from the past support Welles 
had periodically given to the major oil companies.
2^ Wallace to Roosevelt, 26 December 1940, Official Files, 
Papers of Franklin D. Roosevelt.
2® Roosevelt to Wallace, undated draft, enclosed in Welles 
to Roosevelt 10 January 1941, RG 59, Records of the 
Department of State [711.12/1549-1/2].
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Roosevelt's decision to negotiate an agreement 
with the Mexican government resulted in Daniels, 
who had long agreed with the sentiments in 
Roosevelt's letter,31 and the president working 
closely together to build better relations with 
Mexico. Roosevelt's increased interest in the 
matter also drew Welles into a close working 
relationship with them. Little of what Roosevelt, 
Daniels and Welles did about the Mexican issue was 
communicated to Hull, who was still engrossed in 
negotiations with the newly appointed Japanese 
Ambassador Admiral Nomura to get a Japanese 
agreement to restore Chinese sovereignty, to 
refrain from interfering in South East Asian 
matters and to accept the principle of freedom of 
trade and respect for current borders.32
Welles' request to the interior department to 
set a cash value upon the oil properties indicated 
Washington's determination to settle the dispute 
with Mexico. The request also was a departure from 
Welles' comment to Castillo Ndjera in March 1938 
that the oil companies properties were worth 
millions of dollars.33 Given the known difficulty
Daniels also blamed the oil companies for preventing a 
solution of the problem. See Daniels to Roosevelt, 11 March 
1941, Official Files, Papers of Franklin D. Roosevelt.
32 Geliman, Secret Affairs, p. 266.
33 Memorandum of a Conversation by Under Secretary of State 
(Welles), 21 March 1938, US Department of State: Foreign 
Relations of the United States: The American Republics. Vol.
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involved in coming up with an acceptable valuation, 
this request showed that Welles, due to Roosevelt's 
influence, had come to think of compensation as an 
acceptable option. Evaluating the properties 
required predicting oil prices as well as the yield 
of specific fields well into the future. The 
evaluations the state department had made in summer 
1938 which took into account profits from oil in 
the subsoil resulted in the two very different 
figures of $76,297,105 and $101,729,473. Also, 
the American companies had estimated that their 
properties were worth more than $200 m i l l i o n . 3 4  
Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes, 
petroleum coordinator for national defence from May 
1941 worked closely with the Mexican government on 
valuations and produced low figures. Ickes had 
been suspicious that the oil companies had wanted 
to incite a revolution in Mexico and used the 
Sinclair settlement as a basis for the valuations. 
Although the state department chose not to 
publicise the results of the evaluations, its 
decision to explore compensation attests to the 
change that had taken place in the state 
department's attitude.35
5, 1938 (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing 
Office, 1956), pp. 729-33..
34 Meyer, Lorenzo, p. 221.
35 Bursley to Duggan and Welles, 24 April 1941, RG 59, 
Records of the Department of State [812.6363/7267-1/2].
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The softening of Washington's policy led to a 
tentative agreement with Mexico in August 1941.
The Mexican government agreed to make an initial 
payment of $9 million toward the oil settlement, 
and both governments agreed to appoint experts to 
determine the total amount of compensation that 
Mexico should pay the American oil companies.36 
The US and Mexican treasuries agreed to a programme 
for the stabilization of the peso whereby Mexico 
would be able to draw up to $30 million, with 
certain restrictions. The US treasury also agreed 
to renew the arrangement with Mexico for direct 
purchases of silver, and the Export-Import bank 
agreed to a loan of $30 million for highway 
construction guaranteed by Mexican highway bonds.37 
The Mexican government also agreed to pay $40 
million to liquidate all property claims.38
WASHINGTON'S ATTITUDE BECOMES FIRMER
When the strategic picture changed, Welles and 
Hull worked all the harder to get the oil
3® Cronon, p. 262; Draft of a Note from the Department of 
State to the Mexican ambassador, 17 July 1941, RG 59, 
Records of the Department of State [812.6363/7346-5/9]. 
3^Duggan to Welles, 1 August 1941, RG 59, Records of the 
Department of State [812.6363/7354-1/11].
3® Ibid.
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companies' approval of a compromise settlement. 
After Hitler's attack on Russia in June 1941, it 
was clear that the possibility of Germany attacking 
the British Isles or any point in the western 
hemisphere was nearly nonexistent for the time 
b e i n g . 39 The destroyers-for-bases deal with 
Britain in September 1940 had provided the US with 
bases in the Caribbean, and by spring 1941, despite 
the stalemate on the oil issue, limited progress 
had been made in Mexican-American defence 
cooperation. Roosevelt, in an attempt to get bases 
on Mexico's Pacific coast in March 1941, had 
instructed Daniels to talk to Avila Camacho about 
both countries' requirements for enlarged naval and 
air bases.40 The agreement, finalised in April, 
provided for mutual rights of transit in landing 
fields for military aircraft of both nations.41
Although the threat of a Nazi attack on South 
America had largely disappeared and progress in 
defence arrangements had been made, Roosevelt was 
increasingly anxious to prevent a Japanese attack 
on British South East Asia and wanted to secure 
naval bases in Mexico. In September 1940 the
39 Kimball, Warren F.: The Juggler: Franklin Roosevelt as 
Wartime Statesman (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1991), p. 41.
40 Daniels to Roosevelt, 11 March 1941, Official Files, 
Papers of Franklin D. Roosevelt.
41 Roosevelt to Senate, 2 April 1941, Official Files, Papers 
of Franklin D. Roosevelt.
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Japanese occupation of northern Indochina and the 
Tripartite pact, a treaty of mutual aid among Rome, 
Berlin and Tokyo, heightened worries about Japan.42 
Roosevelt's role in the matter, however, soon 
receded as he focused on more direct defence 
concerns. Although no records exist as to the 
state department's attitude towards the agreement 
with Mexico after June, Washington had strong 
reason to abandon anxiety about Mexico's role in 
defence should an emergency arise. With the German 
army engaged in Russia, access to Mexico's oil, 
conveniently located for counter-attacks against 
Japan, was the major remaining strategic concern 
about Mexico. Policy-makers assumed that if Mexico 
had been so cooperative in granting rights of 
transit to US aircraft without an agreement on the 
oil matter while the US was still a non­
belligerent, the anti-fascist Mexican government 
would be all the more forthcoming in the event of 
war with Japan.
The way was clearly open for the state 
department to concentrate on settling the oil 
matter. Anxious to expedite matters, Welles, at 
the time free of the need to please Roosevelt, 
rashly informed President Avila Camacho that he
42 Reynolds, David: The Creation of the Analo-American 
Alliance. 1937-41: A Study in Competitive Co-operation 
(London: Europa, 1981), p. 140.
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approved of his idea of announcing in his first 
state of the union address on 1 September that 
agreements with the United States would soon be 
r e a c h e d . N o t  only did the undersecretary neglect 
telling Hull, who was away recovering after his 
tuberculosis had taken a turn for the worse, but 
Welles also seemed to ignore the fact that the oil 
companies were far from ready to agree to the 
proposed settlement.
Although a settlement was still some way off, 
Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau was 
anxious to finalize financial agreements with 
Mexico. He had long believed in the need for 
economic aid to Mexico to prevent the country from 
forming strong economic links with Germany, Japan 
and Italy.44 He, therefore, invited Mexican 
Minister of Finance Eduardo Suarez to Washington to 
sign the agreements with regard to US purchases of 
silver and currency stabilization which had been 
drawn up during the summer. When Suarez arrived in 
Washington on 2 October 1941, Welles, before 
hearing the oil companies' reply to the latest 
draft of the tentative agreement, persuaded the 
treasury to delay signing their agreements until 
all the issues between the two countries were ready
43 Welles to Roosevelt, 8 August 1941, President's 
Secretary's Files, Papers of Franklin D. Roosevelt.
44 us Treasury, Memorandum, 18 July 1940, Morgenthau Diary.
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to be resolved. Welles clearly did not want 
Washington to provide financial help for Mexico 
until he knew that the tentative agreement on oil 
was something the oil companies would accept.45 
Given Welles' approval of Avila Camacho's 
announcement that agreements would soon be 
concluded, his last-minute decision to delay the 
financial agreements for what would inevitably be a 
long period of time given the oil companies’ 
attitudes attests to his inability to act 
consistently on the matter. Furthermore, he made 
no effort to expedite the settlement.
Hull's job of winning the consent of the oil 
companies was a particularly arduous one. In a 
meeting of 27 September 1941, he tried in vain to 
persuade William S. Farish that the proposed 
agreement with Mexico was the best the state 
department could do under the circumstances. When 
the secretary mentioned that the agreement was 
necessary for the United States to get naval bases 
in Mexico, Farish emphatically stated that the oil 
companies would rather leave the matter unsettled 
than to agree to anything less than control of 
their former oil holdings. Anticipating this 
attitude, Hull had secured the agreement of the
Morgenthau, Diary entry, 6 October 1941, quoted in 
Everest, A. S.: Morgenthau. the New Deal and Silver (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1950), p. 86.
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Mexican government that after the oil companies 
consented to the proposed settlement it would later 
negotiate more favourable terms. Farish, however, 
rejected Hull's arrangement as uncertain and 
continued to insist on his usual stipulations. The 
meeting failed to accomplish anything and ended 
with the state department presenting the oil 
companies with the latest draft of the tentative 
agreement with Mexico, to which Farish promised to 
respond formally after further consideration.46 
Farish formally rejected the proposed 
settlement between the two countries in a letter to 
Hull on 8 October and tried to sabotage the 
agreement with indiscreet public comments. One of 
his biggest complaints was that the proposed 
arrangement did not specifically mention oil 
company ownership of assets in the subsoil, which 
Hull had informed him was an extremely sensitive 
nationalist issue for Mexicans.47 Despite Hull's 
caution, two days later Farish issued a press 
release saying that the oil companies could not 
accept the tentative oil settlement because they 
did not want to give up their rights to the subsoil 
in return for a Mexican pledge to pay compensation
46 Memorandum of a Conversation, 27 September 1941, RG 59, 
Records of the Department of State [812.6363/7365-4/21].
47 Farish to Hull, 8 October 1941, RG 59, Records of the 
Department of State [812.6363/7353].
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which Farish said would be a mere 'paper promise' 
due to Mexico's d e b t . 48 Hull furiously told Farish 
that his public statement left him 'greatly 
surprised' because he had earlier 'emphasized ... 
the delicate political nature of the subsoil 
question.' Despite Farish's insensitivity, Hull's 
determination to set a helpful precedent for other 
US interests operating abroad led him to keep 
Suarez waiting while he tried in vain to persuade 
Farish that agreeing to the proposed settlement 
would allow the companies the opportunity to 
arrange a more advantageous deal with Mexico at a 
later d a t e . 49
While Hull and Welles kept Suarez waiting, 
they made little effort to conciliate the Mexican 
government. Their increasingly irreverent 
treatment of Mexican officials attests to their 
newly-found confidence in Mexico as an ally and 
their efforts to buy time to persuade the oil 
companies to agree to their tentative settlement. 
President Avila Camacho became increasingly 
impatient, and Josephus Daniels, who still believed 
strongly in the Good Neighbor policy and 
sympathized with Mexico's program of land
48 Farish, Press Statement, 10 October 1941, RG 59, Records 
of the Department of State [812.6363/7365-14/21].
48 Memorandum of a Conversation, 28 October 1941, Papers of 
Cordell Hull.
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redistribution, tried hard to convince Sumner 
Welles to end the delay. On 2 November Daniels 
wrote to Welles emphasizing that two months had 
passed since Avila Camacho's state of the union 
address and that the delay was becoming 
embarrassing to his government.50 a  few days 
later, the Mexican president informed the state 
department that the delay was causing political 
problems because closer relations with the United 
States had been part of his electoral platform. 
Avila Camacho flatly refused to agree to any 
settlement that did not provide a plan to solve the 
problem with the oil companies, whom he blamed for 
the delay, and threatened that if Suarez were to 
return to Mexico City without the requisite 
agreements, the result would be 'the end of his 
policy of cooperation with the US'.51
Despite the threat both Hull and Welles 
treated the matter casually. On 6 November Hull, 
who despite his ill health was keeping an 
exhausting schedule of meetings with Japanese 
envoys, lost his temper. After Castillo Ndjera 
informed the secretary that the lack of an 
agreement was causing political problems for the
Daniels to Welles, 2 November 1941, Papers of Josephus 
Daniels.
51 Memorandum of a Conversation, 5 November 1941, RG 59, 
Records of the Department of State [711.12/1682-6/11]; 
Mexican Government Memorandum, 7 November 1941, RG 59, 
Records of the Department of State [711.12/1682-8/11].
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Avila Camacho government, Hull asked why the 
Mexican president had announced early in September 
that agreements would be ready for signing within a 
few days only to learn from the ambassador that 
Welles had encouraged the statement. Instead of 
treating the Mexican situation sympathetically and 
trying to make amends for the embarrassment Welles 
had caused, Hull tactlessly asked why there was 
such a sudden sense of urgency on the part of the 
Mexican government to settle the oil problem, when 
the ambassador reiterated that Avila Camacho's 
political standing was at stake, Hull wearily 
responded, 'We have had our political situation 
injured often in connection with these m a t t e r s . ' 5 2  
Welles' comments to Castillo Ndjera on 12 
November while less blatantly rude than Hull's, 
also offended Mexico City. The long delay and 
Hull's comments had obviously angered Avila 
Camacho, who instructed Suarez and the Mexican 
ambassador to return to Mexico. Castillo Najera 
was barely able to persuade the president that he 
needed to stay in Washington. On 12 November 
Castillo Ndjera reported these happenings to Welles 
and emphasized, 'The situation in Mexico City with 
regard to the tentative oil agreement was becoming
52 Memorandum of a Conversation, 6 November 1941, Papers of 
Cordell Hull.
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very serious indeed . . . ' . Welles' reply was that 
it was,
in the highest degree important to 
get the cooperation of the oil' 
companies... and that...a few days’ 
delay was not going to be so 
serious as to make it undesirable 
to make every final attempt to get 
the cooperation of the c o m p a n i e s .
It is truly remarkable that after hearing that
Avila Camacho blamed the oil companies for the
delay and tried to call the ambassador home,
Welles, who had had so much experience in Latin
American affairs, expressed concern about the oil
companies instead of reassuring the Mexican
government that Washington was taking the situation
very seriously. Having given Avila Camacho
approval in August to announce that agreements
between the two governments would be arrived at
soon, Welles had certainly made the situation worse
by delaying the negotiations in early October after
Suarez had arrived in Washington.
Only Daniels and Roosevelt, who had little 
sympathy for the oil companies, were able to end 
the deadlock. On 13 November Farish wrote to Hull 
announcing the continued refusal of the oil 
companies to cooperate with the proposed settlement 
and emphasizing that if the state department could 
not insist on a long-term contract for the oil
53 Memorandum of a Conversation, 12 November 1941, RG 59, 
Records of the Department of State [812.6363/7372-11/12].
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companies to manage their former properties without 
the intervention of the Mexican government, the 
companies would prefer that the matter be left in 
a b e y a n c e . 54 Having received this response for the 
second time, Hull was obliged to act. It was, 
however, only after Daniels encouraged Roosevelt to 
intervene that the secretary finally signed the 
agreements.
Shortly after the state department received 
Farish's letter of 13 November, Ambassador Daniels 
returned to Washington after resigning from his 
post in Mexico City due to his wife's poor health. 
Hull was still reluctant to come to an agreement 
without the oil companies' consent. On 18 November 
Daniels discussed the Mexican situation with 
Roosevelt and presented him with an appeal from 
Avila Camacho to stop the delay. After Daniels and 
the president agreed that matters could be delayed 
no longer, Daniels received Roosevelt's permission 
to press Hull to act by telling him that the 
president was highly concerned about recent 
developments between the two countries. Roosevelt 
readily deferred to Daniels' judgement on matters 
involving Mexico.55 After a short meeting with
54 Farish to Hull, 13 November 1941, RG 59, Records of the 
Department of State [812.6363/7430].
55 e . David Cronon describes this relationship in Josephus 
Daniels in Mexico.
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Daniels, Hull agreed to sign the agreements the 
following day. Laurence Duggan attributed Hull's 
decision to Daniels' visit and wrote to him, 'I 
suspect that the words which you brought back from 
the White House weighed heavily with the 
Secretary.'56
THE SETTLEMENT
According to the final agreements, signed on 
19 November 1941, the Mexican government promised 
to pay $40 million over fourteen years for American 
general and agrarian claims. The US treasury 
agreed to buy newly mined Mexican silver each month 
directly from the Mexican government on a similar 
basis to that before 1938 and to furnish Mexico 
with credits worth $40 million to stabilize the 
p e s o . 57 in addition, the Export-Import Bank agreed 
to loan the Mexican government $30 million for the 
construction of roads, especially the section of 
the Pan-American highway between Mexico City and
56 Duggan to Daniels, 25 November 1941, Papers of Josephus 
Daniels, quoted in Cronon, Josephus Daniels in Mexico, p. 
267.
57 The US treasury never ended up purchasing silver from 
Mexico the way they had before the oil expropriation because 
Mexico City preferred to sell its silver on the world market 
where it commanded a higher price than what Washington was 
offering when purchasing it directly from the Mexican 
government. For more information see A.S. Everest, 
Morgenthau. the New Deal and Silver, p. 96.
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Guatemala. The two governments also agreed to 
negotiate a commercial treaty at a later date. As 
in the temporary agreement regarding the oil 
properties, each government agreed to appoint an 
expert to set the amount Mexico owed the American
oil companies.59
when Manuel Zevada and Morris L. Cooke, Mexico 
City's and Washington's respective experts, went to 
Mexico to examine the properties in question, they 
concluded that the companies had grossly 
overestimated the amount of money they had invested 
in the Mexican oil industry. They determined that 
the properties of the American companies still 
remaining to be compensated were worth a mere 
$23,995,991, and on 17 April 1942 they announced 
the terms they recommended for the Mexican 
government to make payments to the oil companies 
over five years.60
Not long after the settlement, Ickes 
challenged the policy of the state department to 
get the oil companies back into Mexico. In 
December Roosevelt appointed him petroleum 
administrator for war and authorised him to advise
5® Department of State, Bulletin. V, 22 November 1941, pp. 
399-403; Cronon, pp 268-69.
59 Department of State, Press Release, 19 November 1941, RG 
59, Records of the Department of State [11.12/1682-2/11].
Bermudez, Antonio J.: The Mexican National Petroleum 
Industry; A Case Study in Nationalization (Stanford; 
Stanford University Press, 1963), p. 25; Meyer, p. 224.
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on ways to increase production. Ickes' primary 
concern was that few reserves had been discovered 
in the US in recent years while defence and 
domestic demands were increasing. He believed that 
the US would, therefore, have to turn to supplies 
overseas especially in South America and, ignoring 
nationalist sentiment in Mexico, he tried 
unsuccessfully to get Roosevelt's support to have 
Washington purchase the Mexican properties.61
THE OIL COMPANIES' ATTITUDE
The agreement infuriated the oil companies, 
particularly Wallace Pratt, who had been Jersey 
Standard's geologist before becoming a director of 
the company, and it took them nearly two years to 
accept it. The settlement failed to refer to 
subsoil rights and made only a vague mention of 
Mexico reimbursing the companies for 'all elements 
of tangible and intangible value'.62 Pratt was 
determined to have his company resume the role it 
had played in the Mexican oil industry before the 
expropriation. Two small companies, Titania and 
Mercedes, subsidiaries of a company owned by Jersey
61 Ickes to Roosevelt, 1 December, 1941, RG 48, Central 
Classified Files, Department of the Interior.
62 Wood, p. 258.
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Standard, had possessed extensive leases and 
concessions before the expropriation and had not 
been named in the expropriation decree. Pratt was 
particularly hopeful in July 1942 when the Mexican 
supreme court granted an injunction to the 
companies against the expropriation. He tried hard 
to get the state department's support for his plan 
to get Jersey Standard to develop and operate the 
concessions of the two s u b s i d i a r i e s . 63
Hull, perhaps inhibited by Roosevelt's 
involvement in the settlement and dislike of the 
oil companies, and the possible need for Mexican 
oil, tried to convince Pratt that his hope was 
unrealistic. First, the supreme court and the 
executive in Mexico were engaged in a struggle for 
power, and it was doubtful, despite the decision of 
the supreme court, that the Mexican government 
would surrender Titania and Mercedes. In addition, 
the Mexican government was insisting that in order 
to finalize the Cooke-Zevada agreement, the state 
department should agree that Titania and Mercedes 
were the property of the Mexican government.
Because the state department was anxious to 
complete the agreement, he put pressure on the 
companies to accept the Cooke-Zevada terms. The
63 Memorandum of a Conversation, 25 June 1942, RG 59,
Records of the Department of State [812.6363/7717]; Herbert 
S. Bursley to Hull, 11 August 1943, RG 59, Records of the 
Department of State [812.6363/8000].
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whole matter was happening at a time when 
Washington was nervous about the future of US oil 
supplies, which had been severely strained by the 
Pacific war and, therefore, wanted to ensure access 
to well-run, nearby foreign oil fields. Washington 
loaned the Mexican government $10 million in May 
1943 for the construction of a high octane 
refinery, and the state department hoped that US 
companies could be of help to Mexico in running the 
oil industry. The fact that the state department 
was prepared to support any US company to help 
Mexico regardless of whether it had had experience 
in Mexico, most probably spurred Jersey Standard 
towards a settlement.64
On 1 October 1943, the companies finally 
agreed to the Cooke-Zevada terms, and Jersey 
Standard, realizing it was fighting a losing battle 
with regard to the two subsidiaries, agreed not to 
press any more claims with regard to the companies. 
After the agreement the state department made sure 
the Mexican government knew how cooperative Jersey 
Standard had been, hoping that perhaps one day the 
company would again be able to exploit its former 
properties in Mexico.65 while the oil companies
64 Hull to Roosevelt, 30 August 1943, RG 59, Records of the 
Department of State [812.6363/8018].
65 Messersmith to Secretary of State, 23 September 1943, RG 
59, Records of the Department of State [812.6363/8021].
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never did resume the role they had played in Mexico 
before the expropriation, the Mexican government 
made all of the necessary payments to the companies 
by 1947.
Although the US never got naval bases in 
Mexico because it ran up against nationalist 
sentiment, Mexico City was highly cooperative in 
defence matters. The Mexican government severed 
relations with Japan, Germany and Italy and froze 
Axis funds shortly after the Japanese attack on 
Pearl Harbor. On 24 December the Mexican president 
persuaded the senate to assent to the opening of 
Mexican airfields and ports to US military 
aircraft. In addition, in January 1942 the two 
governments established a United States-Mexican 
defence commission to coordinate the defence of 
both countries. On 30 May 1942 the Mexican 
government, after losing several Mexican tankers to 
German attacks, declared war on Germany and 
eventually sent manpower to the United States and 
forces abroad.66
In conclusion, despite the fall of France, 
Washington did not concentrate all its efforts into 
the establishment of satisfactory Mexican-American
66 Humphreys, R. A.: Latin America and the Second World War, 
vol. I (London: Athlone, 1981), pp. 116-119.
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defence relations. The delay in coming to an oil 
settlement, however, was only risky until spring 
and summer 1941. Before then, Hitler was seen as a 
threat to the western hemisphere, and Mexico's 
role, if any, in US defence was unclear. After 
spring and summer 1941, US-Mexican defence 
relations were secure and the Nazi military threat 
was diverted. It also became clear to Washington 
that it was part of Avila Camacho's electoral 
platform to improve relations with the US, and his 
threat in early November to call the Mexican 
ambassador home was not a politically viable option 
for him. While the state department had earlier 
expressed willingness to agree to Mexico paying 
compensation to the oil companies, its new-found 
confidence in defence allowed it to buy time with 
Mexico in order to persuade the oil companies to 
agree to a compensatory settlement.
In light of this evidence, Cronon's claim that 
Daniels saved Mexican-American relations from the 
brink of disaster is grossly inflated. It is, 
however, certainly a tribute to Daniels' political 
skill that an oil agreement was reached in November 
1941. Given the fact that Hull had so little 
motivation by the second half of 1941 to give way 
to Mexico on the oil matter, it is remarkable not 
that Washington took so long to come to an
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agreement with Mexico, as much of the literature 
remarks, but that an agreement was reached as 
quickly as it was.
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CHAPTER NINE 
BRITAIN AND THE AMERICAN SETTLEMENT:
MAY 1940-JUNE 1943
Any prospect of bringing the Mexican Government to 
terms was destroyed in 1941 by the action of the 
United States Government A
R.A. Butler
From the Sinclair settlement of May 1940 to the 
Mexican-American settlement of November 1941, 
statesmen and officials in London diverged sharply 
over the appropriate policy to pursue toward Mexico. 
Starling, Balfour and Balfour's successor at the 
American department David Scott continued to see the 
problem in the context of British oil supplies for 
war. Although oil supplies were satisfactory, they 
believed it was vital to persuade the Mexican 
government to allow the foreign oil companies to work 
their former properties in order to dissuade more 
important oil suppliers from deciding to follow 
Mexico's example. While Foreign Secretary Anthony 
Eden had reservations about this policy, it prevailed 
for over a year. In contrast, Sir Frederick Leith-
1 Foreign Office, Minute, 18 May 1943, F0 371 33980 
[A4738/113/26].
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Ross, director general of the ministry of economic 
warfare, and Lord Drogheda, its joint director, saw 
the problem in the context of Anglo-American 
relations. They believed it was necessary to yield to 
the pressure the United States was putting on Britain 
to renew relations with Mexico and hoped that such 
cooperation would secure American help in matters of 
economic warfare. There is no evidence that Drogheda 
and Leith-Ross influenced British policy. Eden in 
late summer 1941 nevertheless decided to renew Anglo- 
Mexican relations. However, his efforts failed to 
benefit British oil interests or the British war 
effort as he had hoped. Scarcely a month after he 
renewed relations, Washington came to an agreement 
with Mexico which set an unwelcome precedent for 
British-owned Mexican Eagle.
In this final chapter of the story, it is shown 
why the American and petroleum departments were able 
to maintain their chosen policy for so long despite 
opposition. It is argued not only that their most 
politically powerful critics initially lacked the 
necessary conviction about changing policy due to 
their preoccupation with the war, but also that until 
August 1941 the arguments for maintaining it were just 
as sound as the arguments for abandoning it, and the 
American department, the petroleum department and 
their critics had equally sound approaches to the
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problem. Second, it is seen that Anthony Eden, after 
giving the issue fleeting attention previously, 
decided in August 1941 to secure the Cabinet's 
approval to renew relations with Mexico. It is argued 
that the worry about the renewal of relations causing 
retaliation in Venezuela and Iran had been removed, 
and even Starling and David Scott agreed with the 
proposed change. In addition, Eden's desire to win 
the cooperation of the US in defence matters in the 
Far East turned his mild hesitation about policy into 
concrete action.
It is shown first that Whitehall's reliance on 
the US in matters involving Mexico was symptomatic of 
Britain's increased dependence on the United States 
with regard to matters of defence, particularly in the 
Far East. Then attention is given to the following 
elements in turn: the criticism of the policy of the 
petroleum department and the American department from 
Washington, Lord Halifax and senior officials in the 
foreign office, parliament and the ministry of 
economic warfare; the efforts to check such 
challenges; Eden's decision to take charge of the 
issue and secure the war cabinet's approval of 
renewing relations with Mexico in order to gain the 
cooperation of Washington; London's disappointment at 
Washington's refusal to take its interests into 
account after it renewed relations with Mexico; and
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finally Anglo-American competition for export markets 
in Mexico.
ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS
Washington continued to deny Britain cooperation 
with regard to Mexican oil, and such unhelpfulness 
forced Whitehall, increasingly reluctant to challenge 
Washington's decisions lest it ruin any chance of 
cooperation, to stand by and watch events unfold.
With regard to Japan and Mexico, Washington, weary of 
requests to salvage British concerns from perilous 
situations, particularly when such interests appeared 
imperialistic, simply ignored Britain's requests.
Since the end of the phoney war, London wanted 
Washington to assume responsibility for defence in the 
Far East and Roosevelt to transfer the Pacific Fleet 
from Pearl Harbor to Singapore or Manila while the 
royal navy, with some help from US cruisers and 
destroyers, patrolled the Atlantic. Not only did 
Whitehall want to leave the British empire's vital 
offensive manpower from Australia and New Zealand 
available to protect the Middle East, but it also 
hoped that the presence of the US navy would deter
350
Japan from attacking its South Asian empire which 
supplied vital tin, oil and rubber.2
Washington refused to comply with Britain's 
request to move the fleet. The administration doubted 
Britain would ward off Hitler and, therefore, refused 
to allow the Pacific Fleet to stray too far from the 
United States. As a compromise, Roosevelt agreed to 
keep the fleet in Hawaii where it could in theory 
deter Japan while being close enough to the mainland 
to confront any possible crisis in the Atlantic. A 
number of highly placed Washington officials, 
particularly Welles, Hull and Ickes, found Britain's 
imperialism offensive and resented Whitehall's request 
to protect Britain's interests in the Far East. Even 
after Japan extended its control to the ports and 
bases of Southern Indochina on 23 September 1941, 
leaving Singapore within range of Japanese bombers, 
the US war department refused to transfer the bulk of 
the US navy to the area and instead fortified the 
Philippines with fighters, heavy bombers, men and 
equipment.3
2 Reynolds, David: The Creation of the Anglo-American Alliance. 
1937-41: A Study in Competitive Co-operation (London: Europa, 
1981), pp. 224-225; The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to 
President Roosevelt, 7 December 1940, US Department of State: 
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1940, Vol. 3 
(Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 
1958), pp. 18-26.
3 Reynolds, pp. 224-225; Dallek, Robert: Franklin D. Roosevelt 
and American Foreign Policy. 1932-1945 (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1979), p. 303.
351
Washington was also secretive and uncooperative 
with regard to diplomatic matters. When Hull started 
meeting with Japanese Ambassador Admiral Nomura in 
Spring 1941, it was several weeks before the secretary 
of state even mentioned the talks to the British, and 
when he did he was far from forthcoming about their 
substance. After the Lend-Lease Act was passed on 11 
March 1941,4 Whitehall wanted to issue parallel notes 
to Japan in which the United States would threaten 
military retaliation in the event of Japanese 
aggression in the South West Pacific. Prime Minister 
Winston Churchill thought he had secured Roosevelt's 
promise to cooperate with this plan, and was deeply 
disappointed when Washington's note to Japan in mid- 
August warned merely that further Japanese aggression 
would lead the United States to safeguard American 
interests. Not only did Washington fail to threaten 
Japan with war, but it had only mentioned American 
interests.5
4 Lend Lease gave the president the power to authorize the 
Secretary of War, Navy or head of other departments to procure 
defense supplies up to a certain amount to lend, sell or 
transfer to a nation at war as long as the defence of that 
nation was vital to the defence of the US. (Martel, Leon: Lend- 
Lease. Loans and the Coming of the Cold War (Boulder, Westview 
Press, 1979), pp. 4-5)).
5 Reynolds, pp. 230-31, 238-9.
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WHITEHALL'S POLICY AFTER THE SINCLAIR SETTLEMENT
Whitehall nevertheless, for lack of a better 
alternative, continued its efforts to persuade 
Washington to make an example of Mexico. The change 
of government in May 1940 which brought Winston 
Churchill to power and the ministerial changes that 
followed had no immediate effect on policy, and 
officials in the American and petroleum departments, 
whose attitudes on the question had not changed, still 
largely determined the details of policy. While David 
Scott replaced John Balfour as head of the American 
department, Balfour remained involved in the Mexican 
issue, and Scott who had worked alongside him in the 
American department for several years, shared his 
opinions on Mexico. In addition, Frederick Starling, 
who went from being head of the petroleum department 
to principal assistant secretary in the department, 
remained closely involved in the formation of policy 
towards Mexico.
Britain's policy, however, faced more challenges 
than ever before. The chances of getting Mexican 
Eagle's properties returned even for a limited period 
of time were more remote than ever especially since 
the Mexican government mentioned several times that
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the Sinclair settlement would be a good model for an 
agreement with the remaining companies. The only way 
for Britain to make an effective example of Mexico, 
therefore, was by persuading Washington to pressure 
Mexico into allowing the companies to work their 
former properties for a specified period of time as 
Richberg had unsuccessfully proposed in his five 
points before the Sinclair settlement. The Mexican 
government, however, had already rejected the points 
before the unwelcome precedent of the Sinclair 
settlement.6
The chances of getting support from Washington 
in taking a stronger line toward Mexico were also more 
remote than ever. The US note to Mexico of 7 October 
1940 had marked a softening of attitudes toward Mexico 
as defence cooperation became increasingly urgent. In 
the same note Washington offered to help stabilise the 
ailing Mexican peso by resuming special purchases of 
Mexican silver. Worse yet for Britain, the note 
proposed a settlement of the oil dispute either by 
Mexico paying an amount of money agreed on by US and 
Mexican engineers, or by Mexico giving the oil 
companies a percentage of the oil produced in return 
for the companies' advice on various matters in the 
oil industry.7
6 Gallop, Minute, 19 July 1940, FO 371 24216 [A3595/57/26].
7 Berle, Diary entry, 11 October 1940, Diary, Papers of A. 
Berle.
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Balfour in particular objected to the fact that
Welles had failed to consult the companies before
sending the note to the Mexican government and took
this as an ominous sign of Welles' willingness to
'liquidate the oil dispute at any cost'.® Starling
agreed and angrily wrote:
It is all very well for Welles to 
stress the importance of a quick 
settlement in the interests of 
Western Hemispheric defence, but he 
either overlooks or intends to 
ignore the effect of a bad 
settlement on our defence 
problems.9
Mexican Eagle also dreaded the effects of Washington's 
policy. Frederick Godber feared that if the US agreed 
to compensation, it would force Whitehall to abandon 
its insistence upon a settlement on the basis of the 
five points. He also bitterly resented Welles' 
actions which displayed 'little regard for the views 
of the companies whose assets are at stake'.10
Starling, Balfour and officials in Mexican Eagle 
realised that a compensatory agreement involving 
Washington and Mexico City would do far more damage 
than the agreement between the Sinclair Oil Company 
and the Mexican government. They feared that the
® Balfour, Minute, 10 December 1940, FO 371 24216 
[A5037/57/26].
® Starling to Balfour, 9 December 1940, FO 371 24216 
[A5037/57/26].
I® Godber to Wilkinson, 28 November 1940, FO 371 24216 
[A5037/57/26].
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state department might force a settlement on the
American oil interests that was compromising to the
British oil position. Scott, Starling and Balfour
realised that their only chances of salvaging the
situation was to maintain the united front of British
and American oil interests and persuade Washington
firmly to insist on a settlement with Mexico based on
the five points. Balfour wrote:
As a result of the initiative of 
the United States, the Mexicans 
have been given every encouragement 
to adopt an obstructive attitude 
towards the solution based upon the 
five points in the knowledge that 
the American companies at any rate 
will then find themselves subjected 
to pressure by the State Department 
to come to a dictated settlement.H
Despite the odds against receiving Washington's 
help, Scott and Starling as well as Mexican Eagle 
continued to hope that Washington would eventually 
conclude a favourable settlement and include British 
interests that would set an example which would help 
secure Britain's oil supplies for war. In the likely 
event that this policy failed, they hoped that 
Washington's insistence on a settlement the oil 
companies would accept would cause a stalemate in 
negotiations with Mexico and delay a settlement until 
after the war. Although there were no shortages,
H  Balfour, Minute, 10 December 1940, FO 371 24216 
[A5037/57/26].
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policy-makers wanted to make sure Britain's 
satisfactory oil situation continued.
THE AMERICAN AND PETROLEUM DEPARTMENTS' ATTITUDES TO 
RESUMING RELATIONS WITH MEXICO
Britain's policy became all the more difficult 
to sustain once the Mexican government started 
overtures to resume relations while Washington was 
putting pressure on Britain to do so. The boycott and 
Mexico's economic policy of retrenchment in the oil 
industry had badly affected not only the industry 
itself but also the Mexican economy as a whole. 
President Cdrdenas, therefore, decided that settling 
the oil dispute before the presidential election in 
June 1940, in which he was constitutionally ineligible 
to run, would help get his chosen candidate Avila 
Camacho, minister of war, into office. In June 1940 
Lothian reported word from Sumner Welles that Cdrdenas 
sought an early resumption of relations with 
Britain, 12 an(j the following February Welles informed 
the British embassy that it would substantially help 
Washington's position with Mexico City if Britain 
would resume relations. Helping Cdrdenas repair
12 Confidential Print, 10 October 1940, FO 371 24216
[A4486/57/26].
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relations with Britain, Welles perhaps assumed, would 
increase America's chances of securing Mexican 
military cooperation.
The arguments for maintaining the status quo 
were just as sound as those for resuming relations. 
Initially unopposed by higher officials, David Scott, 
Balfour and Starling discouraged this suggestion, 
arguing that it would be ill-advised to repair 
relations with Mexico during the war because of the 
problems Whitehall was having with Venezuela and 
Iran.14 At the time, oil supplies far exceeded tanker 
space, and the shipping shortage was forcing Britain 
to decrease purchases from the two oil-exporting 
countries. Starling believed that resuming relations 
before Mexico yielded on the oil question might 
provoke Iran and Venezuela to threaten Britain's 
access to their oil resources. In addition, both 
Starling and Balfour believed that renewing relations 
would be seen as a sign that Britain was weak enough 
to be blackmailed into condoning its nationalisation 
of the oil industry. They, therefore, continued to 
insist on nothing less than restoring, the oil 
companies' right to operate their former properties.
Halifax to Foreign Office, 17 February 1941, FO 371 26061 
[A1009/47/26].
14 Balfour, Minute, 10 August 1940, FO 371 24216 [A3595/57/26] .
15 Balfour, Minute, 17 May 1940, FO 371 24215 [A3198/57/26].
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Nor were these the only reasons for opposing the 
resumption of relations in present circumstances. It 
would mean abandoning the boycott, which Balfour 
believed was starting to work well to deter other 
countries from following Mexico's example. It would 
also undermine the Allied blockade which had made 
Mexican oil inaccessible to Germany and to some 
degree Japan.16 Balfour figured that once relations
were resumed Whitehall’s ability to resist the 
pressure of the Mexican government, desperate to find 
markets for its oil, would be far less than if Britain 
continued to stand firm by making the resumption of 
relations dependent upon a prior satisfactory 
settlement of the oil matter.
Agreeing that it was vital to put British 
interests in Iran and Venezuela first, Starling and 
the American department sought the opinions of the 
British ministers in Caracas and Tehran on the matter. 
Donald St. Clair Gainer in Caracas confirmed their 
suspicions that Venezuela would be 'most disturbed if 
they had any reason to believe that [Britain] might 
resume oil buying in Mexico to the detriment of 
Venezuela', because the country was facing an economic
16 ibid.
^  Balfour, Minute, 24 December 1940, FO 371 24216 
[A5198/57/26]; Scott, Minute, 7 May 1940, FO 371 24215 
[A3198/57/26]; Scott, Minute, 16 January 1941 FO 371 26061 
[A364/47/26].
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crisis due to the fall in oil production and 
e x p o r t s . This aroused fears in the foreign office 
that if Britain in any way offended the Venezuelan 
government, it might find other markets for its oil at
Britain’s expense.18
Sir R. Bullard in Tehran also shared the fear 
that renewing relations with Mexico would put 
Britain's access to Iranian supplies at r i s k . 2 0  The 
shah had been extremely upset at the decrease in 
Iranian exports and oil revenues due to the rerouting 
of ships around Africa after the closure of the 
Mediterranean to Allied shipping since the start of 
the war, the use of convoys, the delaying of tankers 
in port while they were armed, the destruction of 
Allied ships by Germans and the rationing of civilian 
supplies. Britain's recent failure to deliver 
aircraft and railway equipment under the Exports 
Credit Scheme had further alienated the shah who 
angrily cancelled the arrangement in June 1940. Sir 
John Cadman, chairman of Anglo-Iranian and adviser on 
oil matters to the British government, had. presented 
the scheme to Iran to help the shah sustain 
expenditure on military and civilian projects despite
Gainer to Foreign Office, 17 January 1941, FO 371 26061 
[A364/47/26].
19 Scott, Minute, 21 February 1941, FO 371 26061 [A1009/47/26] . 
2® Bullard to Foreign Office, 19 January 1941, FO 371 26061 
[A364/47/26].
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decreasing oil revenues. Under the scheme, Iran was 
to buy British goods from future rather than present 
income by obtaining the necessary export credit 
licenses from the British exports credit guarantee 
department. The shah was all the more angry that the 
restrictive system of British exchange controls made 
it nearly impossible for Iran to convert its oil 
revenues from sterling into dollars so as to purchase 
the needed equipment from dollar sources.21
The situation was at its worst with the closure 
of the Mediterranean after Italy's entry into the war 
and the introduction of Britain's short haul policy, 
whereby the pattern of supply and shipping was re­
arranged to shorten the journeys of available tankers- 
a policy that stopped exports of Iranian oil to 
markets west of Suez. The Iranian Finance Minister in 
July 1940 warned Britain that Anglo-Iranian's 
concessions would be threatened unless Britain eased 
Iran's exchange problems. He demanded a payment for 
that year nearly twice the value of the year's oil 
p r o d u c t i o n . 22 Balfour and Starling were greatly 
alarmed by the situation since the loss of Iranian oil 
supplies would severely affect the Royal N a v y . 23
21 Bamberg, J.H.: The History of the British Petroleum Company: 
The Analo Iranian Years. 1928-1954 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994), pp. 230-232.
22 Bamberg, pp. 230-232; Bullard to Foreign Office,
19 January 1941, FO 371 26061 [A364 /47/26] .
23 Balfour, Minute, 17 May 1940, FO 371 24215 [A3198/57/26] .
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The Make-up Payments Agreement of 21 August 1940 
somewhat relieved immediate anxieties about Anglo- 
Iranian's concession. According to the agreement, the 
company would make payments to the Iranian government 
as compensation for decreased oil revenues. The 
company in fact had only wanted to agree to a loan, 
but Halifax insisted that it was not worth risking 
alienating the shah to the point of having him do rash 
things like cancel the company's concession or 
expropriate foreign oil holdings which would harm the 
company’s and Britain's interests. The Iranian 
government was to receive £1.5 million in addition to 
the royalty for 1939, as well as further payments in 
whatever amounts were necessary to make the royalties 
for 1940 and 1941 equal to £4 million each. The 
British government separately agreed to provide half 
of Anglo-Iranian's p a y m e n t s . 24
The situations in Iran and Iraq with regard to 
British interests there were fairly unpredictable, and 
officials in Whitehall were anxious not only to have 
access to foreign oil but also to have British 
companies working foreign concessions. Scott and 
Starling, therefore, continued to call for a tough 
line against Mexico. Lord Halifax, who had been sent 
to Washington to replace Lothian, asked for a response
24 Bamberg, pp. 232-234.
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to Welles' suggestion of restoring Anglo-Mexican
relations, and Scott and Starling insisted that
Britain could not afford to risk its present
satisfactory oil situation by taking a lenient
attitude toward Mexico. Their draft showed resentment
towards the US:
For the US who have no such oil 
problem, the question is of course 
a far simpler one, but it is 
impossible for us to dissociate our 
relations with Mexico and our oil 
supplies.
They admitted that it was in Britain's best interest 
for the current situation to continue rather than for 
Mexico to take what they considered was a more 
reasonable attitude. Halifax, they suggested, should 
inform Welles of Britain's situation and request that 
he cease pushing Britain in the wrong d i r e c t i o n . 25
25 Foreign Office to Halifax, 1 March 1941, FO 371 26061 
[A009/47/26].
OPPOSITION TO THE POLICY OF THE AMERICAN AND PETROLEUM
DEPARTMENTS
Arguments for resuming relations with Mexico had 
merit, but at first more senior officials' criticism 
of Starling and Scott's policy was too mild to effect 
change. Halifax, like his predecessor Lothian, 
believed that not having relations with a country was 
a foolish way to show disapproval and tried to 
persuade the foreign office to yield to Washington's 
pressure to renew relations with Mexico without 
reference to the oil situation. He believed that the 
state department was on the verge of persuading the 
American oil companies to accept a settlement Britain 
would not like. He feared that if the state 
department knew that Britain was trying to delay a 
settlement, it might try even harder to persuade the 
American oil companies to leave the British oil 
interests in the lurch, thus making it nearly 
impossible for Britain to get a satisfactory 
settlement later on. Halifax, however, saw the merit 
of Scott's and Starling's worries and, therefore, 
wanted the foreign office to continue its previous 
policy of supporting Mexican Eagle in efforts to 
obtain a satisfactory settlement. This policy, he 
believed, would probably have the desired effect of 
postponing a settlement without prompting the state
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department to put increased pressure on the American 
firms.26
Sir Alexander Cadogan questioned whether it was
sound logic to think that Venezuela and Iran would
stop selling Britain oil because Britain was not
buying enough from them, but did not press for change
at that time because Scott and Starling pointed out
that Venezuela could be awkward with Britain in
several ways apart from denying oil supplies. For
example, the country could impose unmanageable wage
rates or cancel concessions. Such measures would
cause Britain a great deal of anxiety about oil
supplies, and Whitehall, therefore, should 'at all
costs avoid giving any excuse to the Venezuelans for
thinking up ways in which they could make conditions
for us more onerous.' Scott continued:
We are not in fact so much afraid 
of their being tempted to do
anything which would mean their
foregoing our market but of 
squeezing us over the condition on 
which we purchase their o i l . 27
Neither Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden nor R.A. 
Butler, the parliamentary undersecretary, was 
satisfied with the way the American and petroleum 
departments chose to handle matters. When Cardenas
26 Halifax to Foreign Office, 22 March 1941, FO 371 26062 
[A2045/47/26]; Lothian to Foreign Office, 7 August 1940, FO 371 
24216 [A3729/57/26]; Halifax to Cadogan, 26 May 1941, FO 371 
26063 [A4457/47/26].
27 Scott, Minute, 12 May 1941, FO 371 26062 [A3341/47/26] .
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attempted to discuss the resumption of relations in 
January 1941, Eden expressed his approval of British 
policy, but at the same time revealed uneasiness about 
its implications. When David Scott requested the 
opinions of British ministers in Tehran and Caracas, 
Eden was pleased their views were being sought but 
remained hesitant. 'Even in wartime I do not like 
giving the shah and Venezuela a veto on our relations 
with a n y b o d y . ' 28 ^t this time, Eden, preoccupied with 
the war with Germany and Japanese aggression, only 
showed a fleeting interest in the Mexican matter and 
perhaps did not think it was necessary for him to 
change Britain's policy.
R.A. Butler believed that the case for resuming 
relations with Mexico was valid. First, he believed 
it would help counteract enemy propaganda and other 
bad influences in Mexico. While he understood that 
Britain did not need Mexican oil for the time being, 
he believed that Britain should keep open the option 
to take it in the event of a disaster in Iran and 
Iraq, which was likely given German aggression in the 
Middle East, in which case Venezuelan oil would not be 
enough. In addition he was highly sensitive to 
parliamentary opinions and realised that resuming 
relations would placate Labour, Independent
28 Eden, Minute, 15 January 1941, FO 371 26061 
[A218/47/26].
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Conservative and Independent M.P.s who were accusing 
Britain of turning a cold shoulder to Mexico. Most 
importantly he knew that it would please W a s h i n g t o n . 29 
Yet, like Eden, Butler did not feel strongly enough to 
try to influence policy. While he saw the need for 
resuming relations, he regarded Starling's and Scott's 
concerns as legitimate and did not want to do it at 
the expense of or before a satisfactory settlement of 
the oil dispute was r e a c h e d . 20
Much harsher critics of British policy existed 
in parliament and the ministry of economic warfare but 
these officials and statesmen were outside of the 
petroleum department and the foreign office, the 
channels which normally dealt with policy toward 
Mexico, and, therefore, had little effect on policy.
In parliament where the issue of resuming relations 
with Mexico repeatedly came up, the Labour party, part 
of the Coalition government which took over in May 
1940, continued to exert pressure on the government to 
resume relations. Butler, out of institutional 
loyalty responded to the critical comments of George 
Strauss, Labour M.P. for Lambeth, and William James 
Thorne, Labour M.P. for West Ham, with evasive
29 R.A. Butler, Minute, 23 July 1940, FO 371 24216 
[A3409/57/26].
20 R.A. Butler, Minute, 22 February 1941, FO 371 26061 
[A1009/47/26].
replies. But the questioning continued.31 Daniel 
Lipson, Independent Conservative for Cheltenham, was 
very worried about rumours of a high German official 
visiting Mexico and wanted relations resumed to 
counteract his activities there.32 Philip Noel-Baker, 
Labour M.P. for Derby, and Thorne expressed their 
disapproval of the delay in resuming relations and 
indicated concern about the possibility of Mexican oil 
going to Japan.33
Particularly strong criticism also came from Sir 
Frederick Leith-Ross and Lord Drogheda, but their 
efforts came to little. They both insisted that the 
British government should renew relations with Mexico 
to secure the vital cooperation of both Washington and 
Mexico City in three aspects of economic warfare: 
keeping important supplies out of enemy hands by 
controlling them at the source, denying bunkering 
facilities to hostile ships, and securing Washington's 
support for British use of enemy shipping seized in 
Mexican and other ports.34
Leith-Ross strongly disapproved of the 
instructions the foreign office issued to Halifax to
31 House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates (London, H.M.S.O., 
1940), 30 April 1940, 11 June 1940, 25 June 1940.
32 House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates (London, H.M.S.O., 
1940), 16 July 1940.
33 House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates (London, H.M.S.O., 
1940), 6 November 1940.
34 Leith Ross to Cadogan, 23 April 1941, FO 371 26062 
[A2972/47/26].
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tell the state department that Britain could not risk 
its good oil situation by resuming relations with 
Mexico. Britain's policy of controlling important 
overseas supplies at the source, which the ministry of 
economic warfare had adopted after the fall of France, 
required the cooperation of both Mexico and 
Washington. Leith-Ross complained to Cadogan that 
Mexico was capable of supplying both oil and minerals 
to undesirable destinations and was, therefore, 
potentially a danger to the blockade's effectiveness. 
He specifically wanted supplies like oil, mercury, 
lead, zinc and antimony in Mexican ports to be brought 
under control to prevent Japan from passing them on to 
Britain's enemies. He realised that controlling such 
supplies at the source would involve huge purchases 
from Mexico, and because Britain could not afford 
them, he hoped Washington would do so instead.35 He 
also pointed out that Mexico and the United States 
could lessen the effects of the blockade by providing 
bunkering stations for enemy ships and hoped that both 
countries would deny bunkering to vessels on Britain's 
blacklist. Drogheda was especially worried that 
Mexico would provide two bunker stations on the 
Mexican Pacific Coast, Salina Cruz and Manzanillo, 
thus ruining the desirable effect of the closure of
35 Ibid.
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the Panama Canal in stopping Japanese trade in that
direction.36
Both Leith-Ross and Drogheda realised what a 
challenge it would be to secure US cooperation in 
these matters since Washington had until now firmly 
refused to cooperate in the economic blockade out of 
concern to avoid being drawn into the armed conflict. 
Washington had objected to Britain's plan to establish 
a control base in Trinidad to stop the flow of 
contraband between the Americas and Vichy France and 
French North Africa, a trade that increasingly alarmed 
Britain. In addition the ministry of economic warfare 
wanted to check traffic between the Americas, the Far 
East and Siberia, the route by which goods passed to 
Britain's enemies. Washington repeatedly told 
officials in Whitehall that interception in the 
Caribbean would ruin the security provided by the 
Panama neutrality zone, deemed vital to US security, 
and perhaps encourage German warships to operate in 
the area. Most importantly, Hull and Roosevelt did 
not want to provoke the Japanese by giving the 
impression that they were being encircled.37
In Spring 1941, Lord Drogheda became 
increasingly nervous about the possibility of Mexico
36 Drogheda to Cadogan, 9 May 1941, FO 371 26063 [A4510/47/26] .
37 Medlicott, W.N.: The Economic Blockade (London: H.M.S.O., 
1952), pp. 489-494.
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offering oil to Spain, Japan or Vichy France on a 
c.i.f basis.* Mexico had interned nine Italian 
tankers in Mexican ports because Italy had not yet 
fulfilled a contract to deliver an order of ships to 
Pemex. Although Mexico City did this also to show 
Washington that it was favourably inclined towards the 
Allied cause, Drogheda feared Mexico might later be 
tempted to offer oil to enemy countries. Desperate 
for ships, the ministry of shipping wanted half of the 
ships to be chartered to Britain and secure Mexican 
cooperation in bunker control in exchange for British 
recognition of the transfer of the Italian ships to 
the Mexican flag. Leith Ross and Drogheda also wanted 
to secure Britain's use of the tankers, but believed 
that it was necessary first for Whitehall to secure 
Washington's support by heeding the American request 
to renew relations with Mexico.3 8
Drogheda particularly feared Mexican oil going 
to Japan because British naval forces in the Pacific 
were not strong enough to intercept vessels headed 
toward the Far East. A c.i.f. contract between Japan 
or Japanese-occupied China and Mexico would nullify 
Britain's success in restricting Japanese imports by 
preventing Japanese access to foreign tonnage. He
* cost, insurance, freight.
Leith Ross to Cadogan, 23 April 1941, FO 371 26062 
[A2972/47/26]; Drogheda to Cadogan, 9 June 1941, FO 371 26063 
[A4510/47/26].
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also wanted to prevent two Japanese companies from
completing arrangements to supply Mexican oil to
occupied China. The considerable French tanker fleet
available to Vichy France was yet another worry:
Unless we are prepared and able to 
intercept ships conveyed through 
the Straits of Gibraltar by the 
French Navy the possibility of 
France importing up to 2 million 
tons of Mexican oil a year must be 
reckoned w i t h . 39
DEFENCE OF BALFOUR AND SCOTT'S POLICY
Cadogan, despite his earlier, mild criticism, 
defended the policy pursued by Starling and the 
American department. He wrote to Leith-Ross 
explaining that Britain could not jeopardise its 
future access to oil from Venezuela and Iran by giving 
in to M e x i c o . starling and Scott were worried that 
as a result of the short haul policy the British had 
upset the governments of Iran and Venezuela by 
purchasing less oil than usual.41 Renewing relations 
with Mexico might, they feared, further offend Caracas 
and Tehran, who would probably assume that Britain
39 Drogheda to Cadogan, 9 May 1941, FO 371 26063 
[A4510/47/26].
4® Cadogan to Leith Ross, 29 March 1941, FO 371 26062 
[A1928/47/26].
41 Payton-Smith, J. D.: Oil: A Study of War-time Policy and 
Administration (London: H.M.S.O., 1971), pp. 161-2.
372
would soon purchase oil from Mexico. Buying oil from 
a country whose policy had directly gone against 
Britain's interests while reducing the amount of oil 
purchased from Venezuela and Iran might set a bad 
example to important oil suppliers contemplating 
expropriation.42
Starling, Scott and Balfour questioned the 
strategy of the ministry of economic warfare to resume 
relations with Mexico to secure the cooperation of the 
United States. Balfour accepted that it was important 
to please the Americans, but had little faith in 
Washington giving the support Britain needed and 
remained focused on punishing Mexico with the boycott 
to deter other nations from expropriating oil 
properties. He remembered with bitterness the 
occasions when Britain had fallen in with Welles' 
recommendations in its dispute with the Guatemalan 
government over Belize and with the Brazilian 
government over the S.S. Siquiera Campos, only to find 
that effective US support was still not forthcoming.43 
When the S. S. Siquiera Campos, containing war material 
from Germany, sailed from Lisbon for Brazil in 
November 1940, the British had intercepted it and 
taken it to Gibraltar. The Brazilian government
42 Starling to Balfour, 1 May 1941, FO 371 26062 [A3244/47/26]? 
Balfour, Minute, 3 May 1941, FO 371 26062 [A2972/47/26].
43 Balfour, Minute, 24 March 1941, FO 371 26062 [A1928/47/26].
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greatly resented the interception and persuaded 
Washington to support it in getting an exemption on 
the grounds that the arms were for defence of the 
western hemisphere. After detention of nearly a 
month, Washington's pressure secured the ship's 
release.44 R.A. Butler agreed with Balfour and wanted 
to avoid following Washington's recommended line of 
policy too closely because it would do Britain little
good.45
Cadogan pessimistically warned the ministry of
economic warfare against hoping that Britain could
exercise some influence over US policy:
We have nothing to show that Welles 
or the administration in general 
would be likely, if we were to meet 
their wishes over Mexico, to adopt 
a more cooperative attitude towards 
us in regard to economic warfare 
questions or indeed surpluses if it 
did not suit them to do so for
other reasons.46
Washington would support Britain in export control 'as 
far as but no further than their Good Neighbour policy 
and domestic preoccupations permit them to do so', he 
believed, but it was 'hopeless' to expect Washington 
to bring any pressure on the Mexican government 
however much the British tried to please Welles. He
44 Medlicott, pp. 459-460.
45 r .a . Butler, Minute, 22 March 1941, FO 371 26061 
[A1009/47/2 6].
45 Cadogan to Leith Ross, 29 March 1941, FO 371 26062 
[A1928/47/26].
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cited the example of the enemy ships seized in neutral 
ports; the decision of the inter-American economic and 
finance committee on 26 April to allow countries which 
seized the ships full use of the vessels in 
international and national trade made it almost 
impossible for Washington to single out Mexico for 
different treatment to please Britain.47
As Balfour put it, Washington had effectively:
lent the full weight of their authority 
to an arrangement by which Latin 
American governments [would] take all 
the ships for themselves and dare us to 
intervene.48
Washington acted according to its own interests and 
largely disregarded British attempts to curry 
favour.49 R.A. Gallop, a clerk in the American 
department, and Balfour also doubted that renewing 
relations with Mexico would help the economic warfare 
situation. They did not believe that diplomatic 
relations with Mexico would give Whitehall control of 
Mexican oil at the source nor did they believe that 
Britain would be able to prevent American companies 
from selling to whomever they wanted. On the other 
hand, they also doubted that Washington would let its
47 Cadogan to Leith Ross, 9 May 1941, FO 371 26062 
[A2972/47/26].
48 Balfour, Minute, 2 May 1941, FO 371 26062 [A3463/47/26] .
49 Balfour, Minute, 3 May 1941, FO 371 26062 [A2972/47/26] .
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unhappiness at Britain's Mexican policy influence the 
broader issue of US collaboration with Britain.50 
Starling addressed the ministry of economic 
warfare's fears about Mexican oil going to Japan or 
Vichy France by angrily stating that the United States 
was more of a threat to the boycott than those 
countries. He was particularly irate that after Italy 
entered the war, most of Mexican oil exports had gone 
to the US. He believed that without the American 
market, Mexico would have serious trouble finding any 
markets for oil. He doubted that Mexican oil would go 
to Japan in sufficient quantities to have any real 
effect on the boycott because Japan and Mexico faced 
serious shortages of tanker tonnage which forced them 
to resort to short haul policies. The Japanese 
government had recently asked for an extension of an 
agreement with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company to take 
100,000 to 150,000 tons of crude oil from Abadan 
because of the shortage of tankers. Besides, if the 
United States entered the war, it would prevent Japan 
from having access to Mexican oil supplies. As for 
France, it was unlikely to import large quantities of 
Mexican oil for fear of having its tankers captured in 
the Atlantic.51
50 Gallop, Minute, 22 March 1941, FO 371 26062 [A1928/47/26] .
Starling to Balfour, 27 June 1941, FO 371 26063 
[A5010/47/26]; Balfour, Minute, 3 July 1941, FO 371 26063
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REACTIONS TO WASHINGTON'S IMMINENT SETTLEMENT
News that Washington was about to conclude a 
financial agreement with Mexico caused Scott, Starling 
and officials of Mexican Eagle finally to re-evaluate 
their policy in August 1941. Godber informed Halifax 
that according to a reliable source in Washington, the 
US treasury and state department had worked out a plan 
to settle all outstanding questions with Mexico 
including o i l . 52 sir Ronald Campbell, British 
minister in Washington, confirmed the news later that 
month when he spoke to Welles, who admitted that 
Washington and Mexico City were discussing the matter, 
and an overall settlement was likely. He would not, 
he said, allow the American oil companies to stand in 
the way of a settlement with the Mexican government.53 
According to Campbell, Washington seemed desperate to 
have an immediate settlement with Mexico, and nothing 
Britain or the British oil interests could do, despite 
their large stake in the matter, would influence
[A5010/47/26]; Balfour, Minute, 17 June 1941, FO 371 26063 
[A4510/47/26].
52 Godber to Wilkinson, 8 August 1941, FO 371 26064 
[A6509/47/26]; Halifax to Foreign Office, 13 August 1941, FO 
371 26063 [A6426/47/26].
53 Campbell to Washington, 21 August 1941, FO 371 26064 
[A6580/47/26].
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Washington's feelings to the contrary.54 ^s Starling
warned Butler:
Our stake in Mexico is very much 
larger than the US oil companies, 
and there is a danger that an 
attempt may be made to clear the US 
oil interests and to overlook the 
greater importance of our interests 
there.55
Butler in reply called for a re-examination of 
the assumption that the Persian and Venezuelan 
governments would react badly to a British deal with 
M e x i c o . 56 From Caracas, Gainer reported that in the 
event that relations with Mexico were renewed, 
Venezuela would not restrict supplies so long as the 
British government promised to continue buying the 
usual amount of oil. He reassuringly added that even 
if the Venezuelan government nationalised the oil 
industry, Britain's access to supplies would not be 
affected so long as it continued to purchase 
reasonable amounts of o i l . 57 British and Soviet 
occupation of Iran in August 1941 in response to Nazi 
activities in the Middle East removed any anxiety 
British officials had about I r a n . 58
54 Campbell to Washington, 20 August 1941, FO 371 26064 
[A6580/47/26]; King, Minute, 23 August 1941, FO 371 26064 
[A6580/47/26].
55 Starling to Butler, 18 August 1941, FO 371 26064 
[A6509/47/26].
56 Butler, Minute, 23 August 1941, FO 371 26064 [A6580/47/26]. 
5^ Gainer to Foreign Office, 28 August 1941, FO 371 26064 
[A6792/47/27]; Gainer to Foreign Office, 29 August 1941, FO 371 
26064 [A6792/47/26].
58 Butler, Minute, 23 August, FO 371 26064 [A6580/47/26] .
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Although Starling, Scott and Godber on 25 August 
1941 approved the idea of renewing relations with 
Mexico, they had neither given up hope of making an 
example of Mexico nor abandoned their desire to insist 
on an agreement whereby the oil companies would work 
their former properties for a specified amount of time 
or at least to delay a settlement until after the war. 
They hoped that bargaining with Washington would 
achieve these goals despite Balfour and Cadogan's 
warning that, no matter what the British did, they 
would not be able to influence the actions of 
Washington and despite the repeated statements of the 
state department that it would not allow the American 
oil companies to affect its decisions. Although the 
chances of Washington's cooperation were slim, they 
hoped that Washington would conclude a satisfactory 
settlement which would include British interests.59 
Mexican Eagle used the united front to ensure such a 
settlement, and several times officials of Standard 
Oil of New Jersey told the state department that it 
was essential for a satisfactory settlement of the oil 
matter with Mexico to include Mexican Eagle.60
Minute of a Meeting with Starling, Scott, Godber, Leigh 
Jones, 26 August 1941, FO 371 26064 [A6580/47/26].
60 Memorandum of a Conversation with Duggan, Thomas Armstrong 
of Standard Oil of New Jersey and Bursley, 21 August 1941, RG 
59 [812.6363/7346-8/9]; Farish to Hull, 27 August 1941, RG 59 
[812.6363/7329]; Memorandum of a Conversation with Welles,
Hull, Duggan Farish, Armstrong and Judge Frank Feuille and 
Bursley, 27 September 1941, RG 59 [812.6363/7365].
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The most important change in late summer 1941 
was Eden's decision to become more involved in Anglo- 
Mexican matters and achieve the renewal of relations. 
Instead of shaping British policy in accordance with 
Britain's oil needs as the petroleum department 
continued to do, he subordinated decisions about 
Mexico to the broader issue of Anglo-American 
relations. Following the initial success of Hitler's 
attack on Russia in June 1941, British officials 
became anxious about Russia's ability to withstand a 
renewed German offensive in Spring 1942. The prospect 
of German defeat diminished as did optimism about the 
US entering the war. Hopes raised by the meeting 
between Roosevelt and Churchill in early August in 
Placentia Bay off Newfoundland had been followed by 
disappointment when it became clear that Washington 
was not close to entering the war, and Eden's decision 
to renew relations with Mexico was an attempt to 
secure US cooperation in matters of defence.
Eden secured the war cabinet's approval on 28 
August to resume relations with Mexico, and the very 
same day he informed the US ambassador of Britain's 
decision. He mentioned nothing about resuming 
relations in exchange for a certain type of oil 
settlement, but he expressed his hope that Washington 
would help Britain by coming to a satisfactory
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agreement with Mexico and include British interests.61 
A fortnight later, the foreign secretary explained to 
the cabinet why he did not present the news to 
Washington in the form of a bargain. Like the 
ministry of economic warfare, he wanted to get as much 
cooperation from Washington as possible on war matters 
and believed that the resumption of relations with 
Mexico was the best way to get such cooperation. He 
was convinced that Washington would be more willing to 
respond to British needs regarding Mexico if Whitehall 
renewed relations than if it put an obstacle in 
Washington's path by bargaining.62
Almost one month after Britain re-established 
relations with Mexico on 21 October 1941, the state 
department concluded the agreement of 19 November 1941 
with Mexico which set an unfavourable precedent for 
Mexican Eagle. Whitehall and the British oil 
interests had failed to achieve what they had hoped 
for: an advantageous settlement from Washington and 
the option to be included in it, or, failing this, a 
stalemate in Mexican-American negotiations with regard 
to oil until after the war. As they appreciated, it 
was only a question of time before the American oil 
interests broke the united front, upon which Britain
61 Eden to Halifax, 28 August 1941, FO 371 26064 [A6580/47/26] .
62 Extracts from War Cabinet Conclusions, 6 September 1941, 41 
(215) .
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had precariously come to rely for a satisfactory 
solution of the problem.
The foreign office and Royal Dutch/Shell deeply 
resented the agreement which they believed was an 
American attempt to drive British oil interests out of 
Mexico. Furthermore, it conceded far too much to 
Mexico, and they dreaded the precedent it set which 
not only ruined their chances of getting British oil 
interests back into Mexico to work their former 
properties but also included an American loan, a 
concession which the British government would not be 
able to grant.63 it was enormously frustrating, but 
there was precious little they could do. Charles 
Harold Bateman, the British minister to Mexico, echoed 
the foreign office's bitterness on 23 January 1942 
when he reported that the Mexican government could 
scarcely offer a better settlement to the British 
interests than it gave to the American companies and 
that the Mexican government would in no circumstances 
agree to abandon control over the Mexican oil 
industry.64 in May 1943 R.A. Butler summed up opinion 
in Whitehall: 'Any prospect of bringing the Mexican
63 Campbell to Foreign Office, 3 November 1941, FO 371 26024 
[A6967/47/26].
64 Bateman to Foreign Office, 23 January 1942, FO 371 33980 
[A930/113/26].
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Government to terms was destroyed in 1941 by the 
action of the United States Government65
ANGLO-AMERICAN RIVALRY OVER TRADE IN LATIN AMERICA
The decision to renew relations with Mexico was 
a sound one for reasons other than those Eden had put 
forward. The board of trade had for a long time 
regarded increased export trade with Latin America as 
highly important after the war because of the region's 
purchasing power. In 1938 there was already a 
substantial volume of trade between Britain and the 
region: Britain's imports from South and Central 
America totalled approximately 8 percent of British 
imports, and 8 percent of Britain's exports went to 
the area.66 The board of trade resented US 
competition which had made deep inroads into both 
German and British markets in the region, particularly 
Brazil, during the w a r . 67 t o  British businesses and 
the board of trade, this trend was most unfair because 
much of it had taken place when British industry was
65 Foreign Office, Minute, 18 May 1943, FO 371 33980 
[A4738/113/26].
66 Report on South and Central America and Mexico,
7 October 1940, BT 11-1466.
67 Beith, General Observations from the Point of View of the
Foreign Office regarding British Trade Relations with Latin
America, January 1940, BT 11-1395.
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on a wartime footing and dedicated to the manufacture 
of armaments rather than machinery which could 
profitably have been sold in Latin American markets.68 
As Halifax noted, while the Americans had gained the 
upper hand in the Mexican oil settlement, 'The Board 
of Trade and the Department of Overseas Trade have no 
intention of adopting a defeatist attitude in regard 
to post-war commercial activities (in Mexico)'.69
The commercial rivalry between Britain and the 
US in the region was very obvious during the Lend- 
Lease negotiations. From the winter of 1940-41, 
Britain's ability to pay for US supplies became very 
doubtful because of the dollar shortage facing 
Whitehall, and British officials hoped Washington 
would grant them credits. On 8 December 1940 
Churchill wrote to Roosevelt expressing Britain's 
desperate need for finance for US munitions, aircraft 
and shipping as well as US naval escorts to keep open 
supply routes, particularly after the closure of the 
Mediterranean and the Suez Canal to merchant shipping. 
The memory of Britain defaulting on war debts from 
World War I in 1934 was still fresh, however, and 
Cordell Hull among others simply could not understand 
how an imperial power could not afford to maintain its
68 H.H. Bellot, Minute, 30 November 1941, BT 11-1477.
88 Halifax to Foreign Office, 13 June 1943, FO 371 33981 
[A5102/113/26].
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security. Churchill's plea, therefore, never received 
a formal reply, rather suggestions from US officials 
that Britain sell off its assets in the US and Latin 
America.
The British treasury, however, was highly 
reluctant to sell off British overseas assets only to 
have them purchased by US competitors especially in 
Latin and South America. The treasury also believed 
that it was vital for Britain to retain a minimum of 
gold reserves to operate the sterling area and have a 
successful postwar recovery and maintain a stable 
currency. It was, therefore, reluctant to continue 
paying for US goods with its gold. Despite the 
treasury's concerns, Washington refused to grant 
Britain credits and sent a warship to Cape Town to 
collect £50 million of British gold to cover some of 
Britain's US p u r c h a s e s . Churchill was furious, but 
could not do anything at a time when US cooperation in 
war was so vital.71
Furthermore, Lend-Lease was hugely disappointing 
to the British treasury. Presidential adviser Harry 
Hopkins had led Whitehall to believe that it would pay 
for Britain's purchases from the US between the first
David Reynolds analyses London's reaction to Washington's 
policy in chapter six of The Creation of the Analo-American 
Alliance.
71 Dobson, Alan P.: US Wartime Aid to Britain. 1940-1946 
(London: Croom Helm, 1986), p. 27.
385
of the year and March 1941. After Lend-Lease became 
law, however, Washington continued to try to persuade 
Britain to sell assets to pay for the orders, and on 
13 March Britain was told that Roosevelt had 
despatched another vessel to collect £120 million in 
British gold held in South Africa. Even though the 
gold had been promised as cover for other British 
purchases from abroad there was nothing Whitehall 
could do.7^
Press reports that the British were using Lend- 
Lease goods to capture markets in South America by 
selling them to compete with goods from US businesses 
did nothing to alleviate Washington's anxieties about 
British commercial aspirations in the region.
Although there was little evidence of these sales, 
Whitehall agreed not to export goods from the US which 
were in short supply, Lend-Lease goods or even similar 
goods into new markets. Such a restriction left 
Britain in a weaker position to pay for essential 
purchases from the Americas and to balance 
international payments after the w a r . 7 ^
In conclusion, the British archives reflect far 
less bitterness about the Mexican-American agreement 
of November 1941 and the subsequent America oil
7^ Reynolds, pp. 162-3.
7  ^ Reynolds, pp. 273-4.
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companies' willingness to adhere to the agreement in 
October 1943 than one might have expected at the 
conclusion of a problem which had caused Britain so 
much frustration. Britain never stood a chance to 
achieve US cooperation in the Mexican oil matter 
whether or not it chose to renew relations with 
Mexico, because of Washington's determination to 
protect the Good Neighbor policy from association with 
Whitehall. British officials most likely realised 
this fact and only continued to try to get US 
cooperation for lack of a viable alternative and out 
of concern to maintain Britain's overseas oil 
supplies. After the worries attached to oil from 
Venezuela and Iran were removed, making an example of 
Mexico was much less of a priority, and Eden was right 
to try to win US cooperation in larger defence matters 
by renewing relations with Mexico given the gravity of 
defence concerns.
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CONCLUSION
The analysis of policy in both Washington and 
London toward the Mexican oil expropriation 
provides a useful comparison of policy-making in 
the two countries. Unlike Washington where 
internecine conflict on a personal level was an 
integral part of politics, British officials worked 
more closely together because Britain had 
potentially a great deal at stake strategically in 
securing oil supplies abroad. While different 
departments wanted to diverge from the chosen 
policy of Balfour, Starling and later David Scott, 
the differences of opinion were not usually born of 
inter-personal strife, except perhaps in the case 
of critics in parliament who tried to embarrass the 
government and critics in the treasury who had 
long-standing disagreements with the foreign 
office.
In Washington, however, differences of opinion 
on policy were often born of struggles for 
influence. Welles seemed highly aware of the 
importance of endearing himself to Roosevelt to 
further his own political standing, often at Hull’s 
expense, and, despite the fact that Hull and Welles 
broadly agreed on the basic policy to pursue toward 
Mexico, he would support the views of Roosevelt and
388
Daniels on the Mexican matter when either of them 
was paying attention to his work. The competition 
for influence between Hull and Welles became so 
acrimonious in the autumn of 1941 that they failed 
to work together at all over the Mexican situation.
Daniels was also highly aware of the 
importance and potential power of his connection to 
the president, and this realisation led him to take 
bold initiatives in the formation of policy toward 
Mexico by not delivering Hull's note of 26 March 
and using the president's influence to persuade 
Hull to sign the agreement with Mexico in November 
1941. O ’Malley also had great influence on policy 
in Britain. Unlike Daniels, however, O'Malley was 
influential because matters of defense had consumed 
the attention of senior officials in the foreign 
office, allowing him considerable independence in 
his note of 11 May 1938 which provoked Mexico to 
sever diplomatic relations with Britain.
Policy was formed at different levels in each 
country. At the same time that the war increased 
the concerns of officials in Whitehall about oil 
supplies and made them realise the importance of 
handling Mexico effectively, it also eclipsed the 
importance of the expropriation. Therefore, apart 
from the cabinet's brief involvement in approving 
both the basics of policy in 1938 and Eden's 
decision to renew relations with Mexico in 1941, 
policy was mostly decided at the departmental level
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by Starling, Balfour and David Scott. While the 
foreign secretary rarely gave input on policy and 
the prime minister stayed aloof completely, in 
Washington, the secretary of state and 
undersecretary were central to policy-making in the 
US, and Roosevelt's involvement was intermittent 
yet significant.
The relationship between the government and 
companies was different in both countries.
Whitehall never deviated from the wishes of Shell 
with regard to the Mexican matter because the 
interests of the company coincided with Britain's 
defense needs. Whitehall's close relationship with 
British business led it to support Shell by 
securing widespread cooperation in the City for the 
boycott. Unlike London, Washington did not have a 
close relationship with American business like 
Whitehall had with the City of London. Furthermore 
Washington did not necessarily insist on defending 
the oil companies who had lost their properties in 
Mexico. The US' plentiful oil supplies allowed 
Washington to pursue the broader goal of securing 
respect for Americans investing overseas in order 
to establish reciprocal trade agreements with 
Mexico and other countries.
Although Britain paid the price for Owen 
O'Malley's actions in Mexico, Whitehall's position 
would not have been much better had Britain 
retained a legation in Mexico City. The US had
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more power to affect change in Mexico and geography- 
dictated that Whitehall rely on Washington to take 
the lead in the Mexican problem. However, the Good 
Neighbor policy ruled out military intervention in 
Mexico, and allowed Mexico City to decide Mexico's 
fate. Given Britain's lack of alternatives and 
Britain's dependence on oil supplies abroad,
Balfour and Starling and later Scott emphasised the 
need to try to make an example of Mexico to 
maintain access to the large supplies of oil in 
Venezuela.
While the issue of Mexican oil provided a mild 
irritant in Anglo-American relations, in the 
broader context of Anglo-American relations, the 
Mexican oil issue had little effect. For 
Washington, feelings of animosity toward British 
interests which made officials unwilling to help 
the British in this case were more symptoms than 
causes of wider resentment. Washington found what 
seemed to them to be Whitehall's efforts to get the 
US to help Britain cope with German and Japanese 
hostilities before Britain tried to help itself 
offensive and also resented British imperialism 
generally. Whitehall, however, continued 
approaching Washington for help, and Britain's 
attitude toward the Mexican matter partly reflects 
Britain's attitude to the growing crisis in Europe 
and the Far East. David Reynolds argues in The 
Creation.of the Anglo-American Alliance that with
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regard to defence Whitehall desperately needed 
substantial US help but at the same time feared 
that such help would compromise British interests.^  
With regard to the Mexican situation, mistrust of 
the US certainly existed. However, Whitehall, 
feared the lack of US cooperation far more. Not 
only were British officials desperate for US 
support, but Washington's cooperation was a way to 
try to ensure that the US would not come to a 
settlement without Mexican Eagle as Washington 
ended up doing.
Despite Washington's refusal to cooperate with 
London, Britain did not experience problems of 
supply as a result. Whitehall was able to resolve 
situations in both Iran and Venezuela which could 
have led to those countries restricting Britain's 
access to the oil fields, and the US ended up 
supplying nearly 90 percent of Allied needs of oil 
during wartime. Apart from Mexican Eagle's lost 
investment in Mexico, Britain’s exclusion from 
Mexico's oil industry was not nearly regarded as 
the loss it had been at the start of the war when 
officials in Whitehall were reflecting on Mexico's 
importance as an oil supplier during World War I. 
The centre of world oil production was shifting 
from the US and the Caribbean area to the Middle
1 Reynolds, David: The Creation of The Analo-American 
Alliance. 1937-1941: A Study in Competitive Co-operation 
(London: Europa, 1981), p. 10.
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East, and the focus of the Anglo-American oil 
rivalry was shifting with it. War in the Pacific 
had substantially drained US oil supplies, and the 
rate of discoveries of domestic oil fields had 
plummeted since the boom of the late 1920's and 
early 1930's. The fact that the US started to feel 
reliant on overseas supplies pitted the US against 
Britain in the Middle East and detracted from the 
importance of the Mexican oil issue after the 
American settlement.2 it is the subject of another 
study to determine the influence of the Anglo- 
American oil rivalry in Mexico on the abortive 
attempts to negotiate an Anglo-American oil 
agreement about managing the world oil market and 
Middle Eastern oil development.
2 Yergin, Daniel: The Prize; The Epic Quest for Oil. Money 
and Power (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991), p. 396.
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HULL'S NOTE TO MEXICO CITY OF 26 MARCH 19381
Telegram Sent
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington 
March 26, 1938
Embassy
Mexico City (Mexico)
Please deliver, not later than Monday to the Minister 
of Foreign Affairs a note reading textually as 
follows:
In his First Inaugural Message in 1933 President 
Roosevelt announced that QUOTE in the field of world 
policy I would dedicate this Nation to the Policy of 
the good neighbor - the neighbor who resolutely 
respects himself and, because he does so, respects the 
rights of others - the neighbor who respects his 
obligations and respects the sanctity of his 
agreements in and with a world of neighbors. UNQUOTE
During the last five years, I feel sure Your 
Excellency will agree, my Government has repeatedly 
evidenced its fulfilment of that pledge, both in 
general and in specific cases. Moreover, because of 
the universal applicability of the basic principles 
upon which this policy is premised, they have had the 
support of other governments of this hemisphere.
These principles include a real friendship between 
nations, complete confidence of the respective 
governments and peoples in each other, the adjustment 
of difficulties by processes of negotiation and 
agreement, fair play and fair dealing, and the whole­
hearted disposition to cooperate each with the other 
for the promotion of their mutual interests and mutual 
welfare. My Government has repeatedly expressed to 
the Government of Mexico its conviction that, as has 
been generally recognized by other governments, this 
policy of equity and of reasonable and just treatment 
cannot of its nature be a one-sided policy. As shown 
in its application by the American Republics generally
1 Cordell Hull to Josephus Daniels, 26 March 1938, RG 59, 
Records of the Department of State [812.6363/3190A] .
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this policy must of its very essence have reciprocal 
character if the peoples of the New World are to 
progress steadily toward a higher level of 
international relationships.
It will be agreed, I think, that my Government 
has been mindful of the high social objectives of your 
Government. Both of our Governments have endeavored 
to better the conditions of living of their respective 
citizens. My Government is confident that the 
American people, who have been giving frequent 
indications of their friendship for and good-will 
toward Mexico and the Mexican people fully sympathize 
with these objectives.
It is apparent from the statements which His 
Excellency the President of the United Mexican States 
has repeatedly made that he believes that in order to 
improve the standard of living of the Mexican people 
as a whole, a development of national resources is 
essential. For such development, capital has been 
required. Very substantial amounts of American 
capital have in the past been made available to the 
Mexican people, resulting in the development of 
natural resources and the establishment of industries 
not previously existing which have provided an 
increasing scale of wages for the Mexican people and 
increased revenue for the Mexican Government.
His Excellency the President of Mexico has 
frequently stated, even during the present year, that 
the Mexican Government welcomed the investment of this 
capital, to which it would give all guarantees under 
Mexican law.
My Government recognized the obligation of all 
American interest in Mexico to play their reasonable 
and relative part in promoting the policy of the 
Mexican Government and the welfare of the Mexican 
people, but despite the consistent endeavours of the 
Government of the United States to cooperate in every 
mutually desirable and profitable way with the 
Government of Mexico, my Government has noticed with 
anxiety the increasing number of instances of 
disregard of legitimate and uncontroverted private 
property interest of its nationals. This has been 
particularly true with respect to the carrying out of 
the agrarian policy of the Mexican Government, 
pursuant to which land holdings, both large and small, 
owned by American citizens, in many instances, have 
been taken and turned over to Mexican nationals 
without the payment of compensation to the American 
owners of such lands. My Government has made repeated 
representations to the Mexican Government regarding 
this situation and has pointed out in all such 
representations that, while it has not been disposed 
to question the right of the Mexican Government to 
take over and distribute large holdings of real
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property, such action should not amount - as it has in 
effect - to the confiscation of such property, but 
that under every rule of generally recognized law as 
well as equity the rightful owners are entitled to the 
payment of just compensation, having a present 
effective value to the owners from whom the properties 
are taken.
In addition to these difficulties pertaining to 
the agrarian policy, a large group of American claims 
against Mexico, some of which date back over a long 
period of years, remain unadjudicated despite efforts 
of this Government to reach some satisfactory 
adjustment of them.
Finally, we have the occurrence of recent date 
of the taking over by the Mexican Government of large 
investments of American nationals in the oil industry 
of Mexico, amounting to many millions of dollars. The 
position which my Government has so frequently 
presented to the Mexican Government regarding the 
payment of just compensation for land taken pursuant 
to the agrarian policy applies with equal force with 
respect to the oil properties that have just been 
expropriated. This does not mean that the Government 
may later pay as and when it may suit its convenience. 
Having in mind the treatment that has been accorded 
the American owners of land, my Government must of 
necessity view with concern and apprehension the most 
recent act of the Mexican Government.
My Government reserves for itself and for its 
nationals all rights affected fcy the proceedings under 
which the oil companies have recently been faced with 
an award of the Labor Board, sustained by the Supreme 
Court of Mexico. Furthermore, my Government reserves 
for itself and its nationals all rights affected by 
the decree of expropriation.
My Government has taken attentive note of the 
statement that President Cardenas is quoted as having 
made on March 23 that QUOTE We are not going to 
refuse to pay for what is expropriated. We are acting 
on a high legal and moral plane in order to make our 
country great and respected. UNQUOTE
In view of that statement by the Chief Executive 
of Mexico, my Government directs me to inquire, in the 
event that the Mexican Government persists in this 
expropriation, without my Government undertaking to 
speak for the American interests involved, but solely 
for its preliminary information, what specific action 
with respect to payment for the properties in question 
is contemplated by the Mexican Government, what 
assurances will be given that payment will be made and 
when such payment may be expected. Inasmuch as the 
American citizens involved have already been deprived 
of their properties, and in view of the rule of law
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stated, my Government considers itself entitled to ask 
for a very prompt reply to this inquiry.
My Government also considers that the time has 
arrived for a similar understanding regarding the 
payment of American nationals whose lands have been, 
and are being, taken pursuant to the agrarian policy 
of the Mexican Government.
Signed.
Hull
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O'MALLEY'S NOTE FROM HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT 
TO THE MEXICAN GOVERNMENT2
11 May 1938
1. I have the honour under instructions from His 
Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs to direct you Excellency's attention to the 
sum due by the Mexican Government to His Majesty's 
Government in regard to British special claims for 
losses arising from revolutionary actions between the 
20th November, 1910 and the 31st May, 1920.
2. Your Excellency will recall that in notes 
exchanged on the 31st December, 1935, between yourself 
and the late Mr. Murray, the Mexican Government 
undertook that the amount of 3,795,697.53 pesos 
payable by them to His Majesty's Government, as 
provided for in the Anglo-Mexican special claims 
conventions, should be paid in Mexican national 
currency in eleven annual instalments beginning the 
1st January, 1936. The first two instalments were 
punctually discharged and a third payment of 
370,962.71 pesos fell due on the 1st January, 193 8. 
Four months have now passed and I have received 
neither payment nor any reply to the numerous oral and 
written communications to your Excellency's 
department, of which the most recent was my note No.
25 of the 22nd of March. In this note I drew your 
Excellency's attention to the fact that it had not 
escaped the notice of His Majesty's Government that a 
similar debt to the United States Government had been 
punctually discharged and that His Majesty's 
Government were at a loss to understand the apparently 
discriminatory treatment of two Governments with equal 
title.
3. The unexplained delay in making this payment has 
obliged His Majesty's Government to review the 
position in the light of the attitude manifested by 
the Mexican Government towards government indebtedness 
generally. The conclusions to which this review 
points are far from reassuring.
2 O'Malley to the Foreign Office, 26 April 1938, FO 371 [21468 
A3296/10/26].
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4. According to information at their disposal 
Mexico's public external debt excluding all foreign 
claims not represented by Mexican Government 
securities amounts approximately to 248 million United 
States dollars of principal and 267 million United
States dollars of accrued interest, to which must be
added about 240 million dollars principal and 226 
million dollars interest in respect of foreign debt 
dependent on railways for which the Mexican Government 
assumed responsibility when they expropriated them on 
the 24th June, 1937. A substantial proportion of this 
debt is held by British subjects who in the last 
quarter of a century have received no interest in 
twenty of these years, and only part of the interest
due in respect of five of them. In addition, there
are also outstanding against the Mexican Government 
claims amounting to approximately £9,400,000 which 
were not included in the Oca-Lamont Agreements.
5. In the second place, in addition to the internal 
debt estimated at about 285 million pesos (not 
including, of course, the internal loan of 100 million 
pesos shortly to be placed on the market) the Mexican 
Government have assumed very extensive internal 
obligations of which only an insignificant proportion 
have yet been met towards the landowners, foreign as 
well as Mexican, whose agricultural properties...have 
been expropriated for the purpose of agrarian reform. 
His Majesty's Government know of no case where 
dispossessed British landowners have received any 
compensation whatever. The amount of total agrarian 
indebtedness of the Mexican Government is not clear 
but may be assumed to be in proportion to the area 
expropriated which on the 1st January was stated by 
the President of the Republic to amount to just under 
18,000,000 hectares.
6. In the third place, the Government have recently 
declared expropriated the properties of seventeen oil 
companies, and according to their own statements they 
consider themselves to have incurred an additional 
financial liability, of which the total amount is as 
yet unascertained but could in no circumstances be 
anything but very large.
7. His Majesty's Government, without prejudice to the 
view on expropriation of the oil companies expressed 
in their notes of the 8th April and 20th April, cannot 
but regard the failure of the Mexican Government to 
discharge even their existing obligations as in itself 
rendering unjustified an expropriation an essential 
condition of the validity of which would be the 
payment of full and adequate compensation amounting in 
this case to a very large sum.
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8. My Government must in any case request the 
immediate payment of the sum of 370,962.71 pesos which 
fell due on 1st January last.
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